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Abstract:
REPRESENTATION MODELS AS DEVICES FOR SCIENTIFIC 
THEORY APPLICATIONS V5. THE SEMANTIC VIEW OF 
SCIENTIFIC THEORIES:
The Case of Models of the Nuclear Structure
Analyses of the nature and structure of scientific theories have predominantly focused on 
formalisation. The Received View of scientific theories considers theories as axiomatised sets 
of sentences. In Hilbert-style formalisation theories are considered formal axiomatic calculi 
to which interpretation is supplied by a set of correspondence rules. The Received View has 
long been abandoned. The Semantic View of scientific theories also considers theories as 
formal systems. In the Semantic conception, a theory is identified with the class of intended 
models of the formal language, if the theory were to be given such linguistic form. The 
proponents of the Semantic View, however, hold that this class of models can be directly 
defined without recourse to a formal language. Just like its predecessor, the Semantic View is 
also not free of untenable implications. The uniting feature of the arguments in this work is 
the topic of theoretical representation of phenomena. The Semantic View implies that 
theoretical representation comes about by the use of some model, which belongs to the class 
that constitutes the theory. However, this is not what we see when we scrutinise the features 
of actual representation models in physics. In this work particular emphasis is given to how 
representation models are constructed in Classical Mechanics and Nuclear Physics and what 
conceptual resources are used in their construction. The characteristics that these models 
demonstrate instruct us that to regard them as families of theoretical models, as the Semantic 
View purports, is to obscure how they are constructed, what is used for their construction, 
how they function and how they relate to the theory. For instance, representation models are 
devices that frequently postulate physical mechanisms for which the theory does not provide 
explanations. Thus it seems more appropriate to claim that these representation devices 
mediate between theory and experiment, and at the same time possess a partial independence 
from theory. Furthermore, when we focus our attention to the ways by which representation 
models are constructed we discern that they are the result of the processes of abstraction and 
concrétisation. These processes are operative in theoretical representation and they demand 
our attention if we are to explicate how theories represent phenomena in their domains.
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1 Introduction
Much of the work in Philosophy of Science on the nature of Scientific Theories has 
focused on formalisation issues. This trend prevailed, initially with the Logical 
Positivist attempt to eliminate metaphysics from science, and reduce philosophy of 
science to the logical analysis of scientific theories, of their concepts, and of their 
languages. The logical positivist program eventually led to the view that scientific 
theories can be formalised in first-order language with identity. A scientific theory, in 
this view, is identified with a pure syntax (which is expressed in Hilbert-style 
formalisation as a formal axiomatic calculus) to which an interpretation is supplied at 
the point of application via a set of correspondence rules. The logical positivist 
program has long been abandoned and so has this view of the nature and structure of 
scientific theories. Chapter 2 contains a brief analysis of the logical positivist view of 
Scientific Theories and a presentation of the major philosophical arguments that led 
to its demise. It is meant as a historical introduction to the debate about scientific 
theories.
The successor of the logical positivist view is nowadays referred to as the Semantic 
View of scientific theories. The Semantic View, just like the Logical Positivist 
program, is also an attempt to establish a formal reconstruction of theories. The tool 
employed by the Semantic View, in its quest to analyse the nature and structure of 
theories, is not first-order formal calculus but model-theory. In the Semantic 
conception, a theory is identified with the class of intended models of the formal 
language, if the theory were to be given such linguistic form. The proponents of the 
Semantic View, however, hold that this class of models can be directly defined 
without recourse to a formal language. Just like its predecessor, the Semantic View is
also not free of untenable implications. Chapter 3 focuses on the presentation of the 
Semantic View as advocated by two of its prominent proponents, Bas van Fraassen 
and Frederick Suppe. It is primarily an attempt to understand the Semantic View and 
through this exploration to extract its main implications.
The uniting feature of the arguments in this work is the topic of theory application 
and theoretical representation of phenomena. Emphasis on formal tools leads to a 
highly idealised, often distorted, understanding of theoretical representation for both 
the logical positivist and the Semantic views. The Semantic View implies that 
theoretical representation of phenomena comes about by the use of some model, 
which belongs to the class of models that constitutes the theory. This model is 
contrasted or compared to a model of data by some form of structural mapping. 
However, this is not what we see when we scrutinise the features of actual 
representation models in physics. In this work particular emphasis is given to how 
representation models are constructed in Classical Mechanics and Nuclear Physics 
and what conceptual resources are used in their construction. The characteristics that 
these models demonstrate instruct us that to regard them as families of theoretical 
models, as the Semantic View purports, is to obscure how they are constructed, what 
is used for their construction, how they function and how they relate to the theory.
There are primarily two dimensions to the main argument of the thesis. The negative 
dimension is an attempt to establish where the Semantic View of scientific theories 
goes wrong in its description of actual theories. The positive dimension is an attempt 
to establish that more often than not scientific models are necessary devices for 
theoretical representation of phenomena. Frequently these models act as 
intermediaries between theory and experiment and hence it is important to understand 
how they relate to theory, how they are constructed and how they function.
Chapter 4 is an attempt to explicate how representation models in Classical
Mechanics are constructed and to argue that a sharp distinction between models of
theory and models of data, as the Semantic View purports, is untenable. Chapters 5
and 6 are devoted to the construction of several representation models in Nuclear
Physics. In all three of these Chapters an attempt is made to argue against the
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Semantic View, by pointing to the fact that representation models in physics do not 
have the characteristic features that this view attributes to them. Indeed, 
representation models are devices that frequently postulate physical mechanisms for 
which the theory does not provide explanations. In other cases, representation models 
are constructed by the use of background knowledge, for the sole purpose of 
providing an explanation of experimental results, and then imported into the theory in 
ways that the Semantic View offers no help in understanding. Thus it seems more 
appropriate to claim that these representation devices mediate between theory and 
experiment, and at the same time possess a partial independence from theory. Chapter 
6 is also an attempt to show that the evolutionary history of representation models is 
obscured, unless we explore the processes of model construction. Furthermore, when 
we focus our attention to the ways by which representation models are constructed 
we discern that they are the result of the thought processes that I choose to call 
abstraction and concrétisation. These processes are operative in theoretical 
representation and they demand our attention if we are to explicate how theories 
represent phenomena in their domains, or more precisely, how theories are used in 
the construction of representation models. Tacit throughout Chapters 4, 5 and 6 is the 
view that theories and models are constructed via these thought processes. It is not 
until the last Chapter, however, that I offer a formal schema of a theory of abstraction 
and concrétisation, in an effort to explicate the processes of construction of scientific 
models as practised in actual science.
2 The Received View of Scientific 
Theories
2.1 Introduction
What has come to be called -following Putnam (1962)- the Received View of 
Scientific Theories is a view on the nature and structure of scientific theories 
associated with Logical Positivism. The Received View is nowadays widely 
considered as inadequate. Nonetheless, a clarification of its major features is 
important in understanding contemporary views. In briefly presenting and analysing 
it and most importantly outlining the major philosophical arguments against it, my 
aim is to facilitate an understanding of the historical picture of the debate about the 
structure of scientific theories.
The Received View regards scientific theories as axiomatised sets of sentences in 
mathematical logic, e.g. first-order predicate calculus with identity. The terms of such 
logical axiomatisations are generally divided into three kinds: (1) logical and 
mathematical terms, (2) theoretical terms, and (3) observation terms. The scientific 
laws, which specify relations holding between the theoretical terms, constitute the 
axioms of the theory. Via a set of correspondence rules, theoretical terms are reduced 
to, or defined by, observation terms. In its history, the Received View underwent 
several developments, but I think that what Suppe (1974) calls the ‘final version of 
the Received View’ (which I shall herein refer to as the RV) is a convenient starting 
point. Since here I am not concerned with the historical development of the RV, an
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interesting and philosophically detailed study of which can be found in Suppe (1974), 
earlier versions of this view are not of particular importance. This version is a 
convenient starting point because it is the most sophisticated and satisfactory version 
and hence the least prone to criticism. In Suppe’s presentation, the RV construes 
scientific theories as having ‘...a canonical formulation satisfying the following 
conditions:
(1) There is a first-order language L (possibly augmented by modal operators) in terms of 
which the theory is formulated, and a logical calculus K  defined in terms of L.
(2) The nonlogical or descriptive primitive constants (that is, the “terms”) of L are bifurcated 
into two disjoint classes:
Vo which contains just the observation terms;
Vt which contains the nonobservation or theoretical terms.
Vq must contain at least one individual constant.
(3) The language L is divided into the following sublanguages, and the calculus K is divided 
into the following subcalculi:
(a) The observation language, Lq, is a sublanguage of L which contains no quantifiers 
or modalities, and contains the terms of Vq but none from Vt- The associated 
calculus K q is the restriction of K  to Lq and must be such that any non-Ko terms 
(that is, nonprimitive terms) in Lq are exphcitly defined in K q, furthermore, K q 
must admit of at least one finite model.
(b) The logically extended observation language, Lq ', contains no Vt terms and may be 
regarded as being formed from Lq by adding the quantifiers, modahties, and so on, 
of L. Its associated calculus K q 'is the restriction of K  to Lq
(c) The theoretical language, Lt, is the sublanguage of L which does not contain Vq 
terms; its associated calculus, K t, is the restriction of K  to Lt.
These sublanguages together do not exhaust L, for L also contains m ixed sentences that is, 
those in which at least one Vt and one Vq term occur. In addition it is assumed that each of 
the sublanguages above has its own stock of predicate and/or functional variables, and that 
Lq and Lq ' have the same stock which is distinct from that of L t.
(4) Lq and its associated calculi are given a semantic interpretation which meets the following 
conditions:
(a) The domain of interpretation consists of concrete observable events, things, or 
things-moments; the relations and properties of the interpretation must be directly 
observable.
(b) Every value of any variable in Lq must be designated by an expression in Lq.
It follows that any such interpretation of Lq and K q, when augmented by appropriate 
additional rules of truth, will become an interpretation of Lq ' and K q '. We may construe 
interpretations of L q and K q as being partial semantic interpretations o f  L and K, and we 
require that L and K  be given no observational semantic interpretation other than that 
provided by such partial semantic interpretations.
(5) A partial interpretation of the theoretical terms and of the sentences o f L containing them 
is provided by the following two kinds of postulates: the theoretical postulates T (that is, 
the axioms of the theory) in which only terms of Vt occur, and the correspondence rules or 
postulates C which are mixed sentences. The correspondence rules C must satisfy the 
following conditions:
(a) The set of rules C must be finite.
(b) The set of rules C must be logically compatible with T.
(c) C contains no extralogical term that does not belong to Vq or Vt.
(d) Each rule in C must contain at least one Vq term and at least one Vt term essentially
or nonvacuously. ’ [Suppe 1974, pp50-51]
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Following Suppe, let TC be the conjunction of T and C, where T is the conjunction of 
the theoretical postulates and C is the conjunction of the correspondence rules. Then 
TC designates the scientific theory that is based on L, T, and C.
The above sketch of the RV contains many features the rationale and implications of 
which shall not be treated here. Indeed, I shall limit myself only to those features of 
the RV that are relevant to the main criticisms. The above version of the Received 
View, as well as previous versions of it, has been criticised inter alia on the following 
grounds: (1) On its reliance on an observation-theory distinction and in addition on an 
analytic-synthetic distinction. (2) On its employment of a correspondence-rule 
account of the interpretation of theoretical terms. (3) On its commitment to a theory 
consistency condition and to a meaning invariance condition. (4) On the fact that it 
obscures a number of epistemologically important features of scientific theories. (5) 
On the fact that it assigns a deductive status to empirical theories.
Although the conclusive power of these criticisms is, as will be seen, doubtful, 
collectively they have been persuasive among philosophers of science and as a result 
the Logical Positivist analysis of scientific theories gradually gave room to other 
schools of thought.
2.2 The Observation-Theory Distinction
The separation of L into Vo and Vt terms implies the need of an observation-theory 
distinction in the terms of the vocabulary of the theory. What might be more difficult 
to discern is that the rationale for the RV’s dependence on the observation-theory 
distinction is provided by the analytic-synthetic distinction. The analytic-synthetic 
distinction is embodied in the RV, because (as suggested by Carnap 1956, pp222- 
229) implicit in TC are meaning postulates that specify the meanings of sentences in 
L. However, if meaning specification were the only function of TC then TC would be 
analytic, and in such case it would not be subject to empirical investigation. TC must 
therefore have a factual component, and the meaning postulates must separate the
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meaning from the factual component. This implies an analytic-synthetic separation, 
since those sentences in L that are logical truths or logical consequences of the 
meaning postulates are analytic and all non-analytic sentences are synthetic. 
Furthermore, any non-analytic sentence in L taken in conjunction with the class of 
meaning postulates, has certain empirical (i.e. Lo) consequences. If the conjunction is 
refuted or confirmed by directly observable evidence, this will reflect only on the 
truth-value of the sentence and not on the meaning postulates. Hence the sentence can 
only be synthetic. The issue could therefore be understood as a need for the RV to 
characterise meaning postulates for a theoretical language.
Against the observation-theory distinction there are mainly three kinds of criticisms:
(1) criticisms aimed to prove the untenability of the analytic-synthetic distinction, (2) 
attempts to establish accounts of ‘observation’ that are incompatible with a theory- 
observation distinction, (3) arguments showing that for scientific languages the 
observation-theory distinction cannot be drawn.
2.2.1 The Untenability of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
The main criticism against the analytic-synthetic distinction attempts to show its 
untenability. In ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, Quine (1951) points out that there are 
two kinds of analytic statements, (a) logical truths, which remain true under all 
interpretations, and (b) statements that are true by virtue of the meaning of their non­
logical terms, e.g. ‘No bachelor is married’. He then proceeds to argue that the 
analyticity of statements of the second kind cannot be established without resort to 
the notion of synonymy. The latter notion, however, is just as problematic as the 
notion of analyticity.
The argument runs, roughly, from the notion of meaning to the notion of cognitive 
synonymy and finally to the notion of analyticity. If meaning (or intention) is clearly 
distinguished from its extension, i.e. the class of entities to which it refers, then the 
theory of meaning is primarily concerned with cognitive synonymy (i.e. the 
synonymy of linguistic forms). For example, to say that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried
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man’ are cognitively synonymous is to say that they are interchangeable in all 
contexts without change of truth-value. If such is the case then the statement ‘No 
bachelor is married’ would become ‘No unmarried man is married’, which would be 
a logical truth given the proper logical calculus. In other words, statements of kind (b) 
are reduced to statements of kind (a) if only we could interchange synonyms for 
synonyms. But as Quine argues, the notion of interchangeability salva veritate is an 
extensional concept and hence does not help with analyticity. In fact, no analysis of 
the interchangeability salva veritate account of synonymy is possible without 
recourse to analyticity, thus making such an effort circular, unless interchangeability 
is ‘... relativised to a language whose extent is specified in relevant respects’ [Ibid^ 
p30]. That is to say, we first need to know what statements are analytic in order to 
decide which expressions are synonymous, hence appeal to synonymy does not help 
with the notion of analyticity.
White (1952) gives an argument along similar lines. He argues that an artificial 
language, Lj, can be constructed with appropriate definitional rules, in which the 
predicates Pi and Qi are synonymous whereas Pi and Q2 are not; hence making such 
sentences as \lx{Pi{x)^Qi(x)) logical truths and such sentences as Vx(P;(x)->Q2 (^)) 
synthetic. In a different artificial language L2 , Pi could be defined to be synonymous 
to Q2 and not to Qi, hence making the sentence '^x{Pi{x)^Q 2 {x)) a logical truth and 
the sentence \fx{Pi{x)^Qi{x)) synthetic. This relies merely upon convention. 
However, he asks, in a natural language what rules are there that dictate what choice 
of synonymy can be made such that one formula is a synthetic truth rather than 
analytic? The main point of the argument is therefore that in a natural language or in 
a scientific language, which are not artificially constructed and which do not contain 
definitional rules, the notion of analyticity is obscure. Both arguments are far more 
composite and reach much stronger conclusions; for instance they try to establish that 
even for artificial languages the notion of analyticity remains obscure.
In arguing for the analytic-synthetic distinction, Carnap and other proponents of the 
RV were aware of the obscurity of the notion of analyticity in natural languages.^
’ See, Creath 1990, pp427-432; Carnap 1956, pp205-221; Putnam 1962a.
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Indeed such arguments, as the above, are not conclusive, primarily because the RV is 
not intended as a description of actual scientific theories. But, as Suppe well 
recognises, ‘...it presents a canonical linguistic formulation for theories and [it] 
claims that any theory can be given an essentially equivalent reformulation in this 
canonical way.’ [Suppe 1972, p3] In other words, the RV is offered as a rational 
reconstruction of scientific theories, i.e. an explication of the structure of scientific 
theories. It does not aim to describe how actual theories are formulated, but to 
indicate a logical framework into which theories can be essentially reformulated. 
Therefore all Carnap, and other proponents of the RV, needed to show was that the 
analytic-synthetic distinction is tenable in some artificial language (with definitional 
rules or meaning postulates) in which scientific theories could potentially be 
reformulated. In view of this, despite the purpose of the above arguments to deny the 
existence of the analytic-synthetic distinction altogether, what the arguments establish 
about the RV is something different: The RV requires a clear way by which to 
characterise meaning postulates for a theoretical language.
Putnam (1962a) is not hesitant to claim that statements of the kind ‘All bachelors are
unmarried’ are indeed analytic by virtue of the meaning of their non-logical terms.
The important question for him is, how does one clarify the distinction of such
statements from synthetic ones? He addresses this question by developing the concept
of, what he calls, ‘law-cluster’. A law-cluster concept is constituted by a bundle of
laws that collectively determine its identity. Any one law of the collection can be
abandoned without destroying the identity of a law-cluster concept. The concept of
‘energy’ exemplifies a law-cluster concept, but there is an abundance of terms in
highly developed sciences that are law-clusters. Statements involving law-cluster
concepts are neither analytic nor synthetic. On the one hand, there cannot be an
analytic statement involving law-cluster concepts because such a statement would be
another law in the collection that determines the identity of the concept, and this
statement could be abandoned without destroying the identity. And since analytic
statements are statements that could not be abandoned without alterations in the
meanings of the terms involved, law-clusters are not analytic. On the other hand,
Putnam distinguishes law-cluster concepts from synthetic statements by the use of a
rather idiosyncratic construal of ‘synthetic’. According to Putnam, synthetic
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statements are those that can be refiited by a single observation or experimental test, 
or be verified inductively by simple enumeration. Tests of statements that involve 
law-clusters are never tests of an isolated statement. They are always tests of a 
conjunction of law-statements that determine the identity of the law-cluster and the 
most one can conclude is the refiitation or the verification of the conjunction. 
Putnam’s examples to demonstrate the point are the case of the classical law of 
kinetic energy (e=V2 mv ,^ which seems definitional in character) and the laws of 
Euclidean geometry. Equating the kinetic energy with half the product of the mass 
and the square of the velocity was given up with the development of the Special 
Theory of Relativity. However, the extensional meaning of the term kinetic energy 
(i.e. energy of motion) has not changed, hence it could not have been an analytic 
truth. Although a new (special relativistic) theory was proposed, the classical 
e= V2 mv^ was not overthrown just by an isolated experiment, hence it could not have 
been a synthetic truth. An analogous argument is given for the case of the laws of 
Euclidean geometry.
Putnam uses this conceptual apparatus to argue that statements of the kind ‘All
bachelors are unmarried’ can safely be decided to be held non-revisable, whereas
statements of the kind e=^2 mv  ^ cannot, because ‘energy’ is a law-cluster term but
‘bachelor’ is not. ‘This is not to say that there are no laws underlying our use of the
term ‘bachelor’ ... but it is to say that there are no exceptionless laws of the form ‘All
bachelors are...’ except ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ ...and consequences thereof.
Thus preserving the interchangeability of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’ in all
extensional contexts can never conflict with our desire to retain some other natural
law of the form ‘All bachelors are...” [Putnam 1962a, p384] Thus Putnam addresses
Quine’s and White’s arguments, because a sentence of the kind Vx(P(x)->2(x)) is
analytic in an artificial language if and only if the interchangeability of Q and P never
conflicts with some other natural law, i.e. if P is not a law-cluster concept.
Furthermore, since such statements as ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ do not involve
law-cluster concepts they can only be false by altering the meanings of their
constituent terms. The concepts involved in such statements are ‘fixed points’ of the
language, strict synonymies with minimal systematic import, i.e. with hardly any
theoretical grounds for accepting or rejecting them. By inquiring further into the
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rationale for introducing analytic statements, Putnam concludes that they do no harm 
and that they provide language with intelligibility and practicality.
Putnam presents a way by which the close to our common sense analytic-synthetic 
distinction can be saved, despite Quine’s arguments. However, his argument does 
affect the RV since it requires that the meaning postulates do not consist entirely of 
sentences that specify meanings in L, but also of law-cluster concepts. It follows from 
his argument that many of the sentences in L, which will involve law-clusters, will be 
neither analytic nor synthetic; hence Carnap’s attempt to separate the factual from the 
meaning content of TC fails.
2.2.2 The Theory-Ladenness of Observation
Attempts to establish accounts of ‘observation’ that are incompatible with the 
observation-theory distinction have concentrated mainly on showing the theory- 
ladenness of observation statements. Hanson’s argument is a good example of such. 
He tries to show that there is no theory-neutral observation language and that 
observation is ‘theory-laden’.^  He does this by attempting to establish that an 
observation language that intersubjectively can be given a theory-independent 
semantic interpretation, as the RV purports, can not exist.
He begins by asking whether two people see the same things when holding different 
theories. For example he asks whether Kepler and Tycho Brahe see the same thing 
when looking at the sun rising. Kepler of course holds that the earth revolves around 
the sun, whilst Tycho holds that the sun revolves around the earth. Hanson addresses 
this question by first considering diagrams that sometimes can be seen as one thing 
and other times as another. The most familiar example of this kind is the duck-rabbit 
diagram.^
 ^Hanson 1958, pp4-30. Hanson 1969, pp59-198. Also see Suppe 1974, p p l5 1-166. 
 ^Many examples of such diagrams can be found in Hanson (1958) and (1969).
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Such a diagram can be seen to represent a duck or a rabbit depending on the 
perspective one takes, but in both cases one sees the same thing. Hanson uses this to 
develop a sequence of arguments. If the difference in seeing a duck or a rabbit 
involves interpreting the drawing lines then interpretation is an essential part of 
seeing, since in this case it contributes to seeing two different things. However he 
challenges this assertion on the grounds that interpreting is part of thinking, and not 
an experiential state. One does not first see a duck and then via some process of 
interpretation then sees a rabbit. On the contrary, the switch from seeing one thing to 
seeing the other seems to take place spontaneously and moreover a process of back 
and forth seeing without any thinking seems to be involved. Therefore since 
interpretation is a form of thinking, Hanson excludes the possibility that it is involved 
in this process.
He then asks, if interpretation is not involved then what accounts for the difference in 
what is seen? His answer is that what changes is the organisation of what one sees, 
meaning that what one sees is appreciated in a different way. The organisation of 
what one sees depends on the background knowledge and experience of the observer. 
When Tycho and Kepler look at the sun, they are visually aware of the same object, 
but they see different things in the sense that their conceptual organisations of their 
experiences are vastly different. Thus there is a sense in which observation is theory­
laden, viz. observation is conditional on background knowledge.
Hanson further purports to show that these conceptual organisations are part of the
concept of seeing. In science it is important that seeing, unlike picturing, involves a
linguistic component. This component enters into ‘seeing’ because what is relevant to
knowledge is ‘seeing that.. .’, which is a logically distinguishable element of seeing.
A sentence like ‘Seeing that...’ is always followed by a propositional clause. And
without this linguistic component what we observe can have no relevance to our
knowledge. By this he tries to point to what is wrong with the RV’s sense data
position. The RV claims that Kepler and Brahe see the same sense datum, but this
only means (according to Hanson) that they picture the same thing, i.e. they perceive
the same representation or arrangement. Seeing, however, has a linguistic component
so it must involve characterisation or it must have reference. If seeing is understood
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to have a linguistic component then it follows that two observers seeing the same 
thing implies meaning the same thing and not simply asserting that they see the same 
thing.
By these arguments Hanson attempts to establish that the sense data position is 
incorrect and also that conceptual organisations are logical features o f ‘seeing’, which 
are indispensable to scientific observation. It is, however, questionable whether 
Hanson’s arguments are conclusive. They can be disputed, for instance, on the 
grounds that conceptual organisation is part of the process of interpretation. When 
looking at the diagram we do see the same thing, if we have the concepts of duck or 
rabbit we apply the concept to what we see, but unless we do have the concepts of 
duck or rabbit we just see the diagram. Although his arguments do not tackle the 
tenability of the observation-theory distinction conclusively, they do nevertheless 
provide a persuasive consideration that observation is theory-laden.
2.2.3 The Untenability of the Observation-Theory Distinction
Achinstein’s and Putnam’s^  objections to the observation-theory distinction are 
twofold. On the one hand, they claim that an observation-theory distinction of 
scientific terms cannot be drawn. And on the other, that a classification of terms 
following the above distinction gives rise to a distinction of observational-theoretical 
statements. The latter distinction can also not be drawn for scientific languages.
Achinstein’s argument is that the sense of the term ‘observation’ relevant to science 
involves visually attending to something. He assigns to the scientific sense of 
observation the following characteristics [Achinstein 1968, pp 160-165]: (1) It 
involves attention to the various aspects or features of an item depending on the
Hanson continues his argument to establish that not only is observation theory-laden but that so are 
facts and causality. This way he attempts to show that there does exist a logic of discovery contrary to 
the claim of the RV that only the context of justification belongs to the realm of the Philosophy of 
Science, whereas the context of discovery belongs to the domains of History and Psychology.
 ^ Achinstein 1965, 1968. Putnam 1962.
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observer’s concerns and knowledge. (2) It does not necessarily involve recognition of 
the item. (3) Observing something does not imply that it is in the visual field or in the 
line of sight of the observer, e.g. a distant fire. (4) Observing an item could be done 
indirectly, for instance looking at a mirror image. (5) The description of what one 
observes can be done in different ways.
If now one urges an observation-theory distinction by simply presenting lists of 
observable and unobservable terms (as proponents of the logical positivist view, 
according to him do), the distinction could be objected to. For instance according to 
typical lists of unobservables, ‘electrons’ and ‘fields’ are theoretical terms. But based 
on points (3) and (4) above, Achinstein claims that, this could be rejected. Similarly 
based on point (5), he also rejects a statement distinction, because ‘what scientists as 
well as others observe is describable in many different ways, using terms from both 
[the theoretical, Vt, and the observational, Vo] vocabularies.’ [Ibid, p i65]
Logical positivists have claimed that items in the observational list are directly 
observable whereas those in the theoretical list are not (and they have also attached 
importance to the number of observations necessary in order to claim that an item 
belongs to the observational list).^ Achinstein’s claim is that once ‘directly 
observable’ is closely construed, the desired classification of terms into the two lists 
fails. His consideration is that ‘directly observable’ could mean that it can be 
observed without the use of instruments or by only observing something distinct from 
it. If this is what Carnap and Hempel have in mind then it does not warrant the 
distinction. First, it is not precise enough to classify things seen by images and 
reflections, e.g. a cell nucleus. Second, if something is not observable without 
instruments means that no aspect of it is observable without instruments then things 
like temperature, mass, charge, entropy, would be observables, since some aspects of 
them are detected without instruments. If however it means that instruments are 
required to detect its presence, then it is insufficient because one cannot talk about the 
presence of temperature, or kinetic energy. Finally, if it means that instruments are 
required to measure it or its properties, then such terms as volume, water, weight.
 ^ See, Hempel 1958, Carnap 1936-37 and 1956a.
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etc., would be theoretical terms. Hence, Achinstein concludes that the notion of direct 
observability fails to draw the desired observation-theory distinction, although he 
does realise that it may give rise to a whole lot of other distinctions.^
Putnam’s claim is that the distinction is completely ‘broken-backed’ mainly for three 
reasons. Firstly, if an observation term is one that only refers to observables then 
there are no observation terms. For example the term ‘red’, which is in the observable 
class, but which was used by Newton to refer to a theoretical term, namely red 
corpuscles. Secondly, many terms that refer primarily to the class of unobservables 
are not theoretical terms. Thirdly, some theoretical terms, that are of course the 
outcome of a scientific theory, refer primarily to observables. For example Darwin’s 
theory of evolution, as originally put forward, referred to observables by employing 
theoretical terms.
The most that these arguments accomplish is to point to the fact that scientific 
languages employ terms that cannot clearly and easily be classified into observational 
or theoretical. They do not however show the untenability of the observation-theory 
distinction as employed by the RV. In fact, as Suppe (1972) argues, what the RV 
needs is an artificial language for science, no matter how complex it may turn out to 
be. Such a language, in which presumably the observation-theory distinction is 
tenable, must have a plethora of terms and concepts. Such that, to use his example, 
the designated term ‘redo’ will refer to observable occurrences of the predicate red, 
and the designated term ‘redt’ will refer to unobservable occurrences. I think this 
example is indicative of ways out of the objections raised by Achinstein and Putnam.
2.3 Correspondence Rules
Logical positivists were determined to distinguish the character and function of 
theoretical terms from speculative metaphysical ones (such as, ‘unicorn’, ‘ghost’, 
‘holy spirit’). In their efforts to establish such a distinction, they sought a kind of
 ^ Achinstein 1968, ppl72-177.
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‘connection’ of theoretical to observational terms, thus providing an analysis of the 
empirical nature of theoretical terms contrary to that of metaphysical terms. This 
‘connection’ was formulated in what I shall call, following Achinstein (1963), the 
thesis o f Partial Interpretation. The thesis of partial interpretation is basically the 
following; Clauses (4) and (5) of the RV allow that a complete empirical semantic 
interpretation in terms of directly observables is given to Vo terms and to sentences in 
L q and L q '. However, no such interpretation is intended for Vt terms and 
consequently for sentences of L  containing them. The empirical or observational 
content of theoretical terms is supplied by TC as a whole. Such terms receive a partial 
observational meaning indirectly by being related to sets of observational terms, via 
certain postulates. These postulates are known as correspondence-rules. To use one 
of Achinstein’s examples, ‘it is in virtue of [a correspondence-rule] which connects a 
sentence containing the theoretical term ‘electron’ to a sentence containing the 
observational term ‘spectral line’ that the former theoretical term gains empirical 
meaning within the Bohr theory of the atom.’ [Achinstein (1963), p90]
Correspondence-rules were initially introduced to serve three functions in the RV: (1) 
to define theoretical terms, (2) to guarantee the cognitive significance of theoretical 
terms, and (3) to specify the admissible experimental procedures for applying theory 
to phenomena. In the initial stages of Logical Positivism it was held that, on the basis 
that observational terms were cognitively significant, theoretical terms were 
cognitively significant if and only if they were explicitly defined in terms of 
observational terms. The criteria of explicit definition and cognitive significance were 
abandoned once Carnap became convinced that dispositional terms, which are 
cognitively significant, do not admit of explicit definitions.^ Consider the 
dispositional term ‘tearable’ (let us assume all the conditions necessary for an object 
to be torn apart hold), if we try to explicitly define it in terms of observables we end 
up with something like this:
An object x is tearable if and only if, if  it is pulled sharply apart at time t then it will tear
at t (for simplicity let us ignore time lapse for a material to be tom apart).
Camap 1936-37. Also see Hempel 1952, pp.23-29, and Hempel 1958.
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We can render the above definition as: \/x(T(x)<r^\/t(P{x,t)^Q{x,t))). Where, 7  is the 
theoretical term ‘tearable’, P  is the observational term ‘pulled apart’, and Q is the 
observational term ‘tears’. But this does not define the actual dispositional property 
tearable, because the right-hand side of the biconditional will be true of objects that 
are never pulled apart. As a result some objects that are not tearable and have never 
being pulled apart will by definition have the property ‘tearable’.
As a result Carnap proposed to replace the construal of correspondence-rules as 
explicit definitions, by reduction sentences that partially determine the observational 
content of theoretical terms. A bilateral kind of reduction sentence would define the 
dispositional property tearable as: \/x\ft{P{x,t)^{Q{x,t)^T{x))). Unlike the explicit 
definition case, if a is a non-tearable object that is never pulled apart then it is not 
implied that T{a) is true. What will be implied is that \ft{P{a,t)^{Q{a,t)<r^T{a))), is 
true. Thus the defect of explicit definitions is avoided, because a reduction sentence 
does not completely define a disposition term. In fact this is also the reason why 
correspondence-rules supply only partial observational content, since many other 
reduction sentences can be used to supply other empirical aspects of the term 
tearable, e.g. being torn by excessively strong shaking. Finally as a result of 
abandoning the criterion of explicit definition, the criterion of cognitive significance 
was also abandoned and replaced by that of empirical significance. Empirical 
significance is tightly connected to correspondence-rules understood as reduction 
sentences. A term has empirical significance if it can be introduced through chains of 
true reduction sentences, on the basis of observation terms.^
The status of correspondence-rules in the RV is therefore simply to contribute (as part 
of TO) to the partial interpretation of theoretical terms and languages. It must be 
noted that TC specifies the interpretation of Vt terms only in the strict sense of 
observational interpretation. A full interpretation of Vt terms can be specified through 
a richer meta-language. Thus the RV accommodates the general intuition that a Vt 
term has various non-empirical associations that may contribute to its meaning and
 ^ For the changes in the use of correspondence-rules through the development of the Received View, 
see Suppe 1974, ppl7-27.
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that only part of the thll meaning of Vt terms is empirical. Furthermore, partial 
interpretation in this sense is all the RV needs since, given its goal of distinguishing 
theoretical from speculative metaphysical terms, it only requires a ‘connection’ of the 
Vt terms to the Vo terms.
The thesis of partial interpretation came under attack from Putnam (1962) and 
Achinstein (1963 and 1968) who posed the following question; How is the statement 
‘TC provides Vt terms with partial interpretation’ to be understood? Putnam gave the 
following plausible explications: (1) Using the notion from mathematical logic, to 
partially interpret Vt terms is to specify a class of intended models with at least two 
members. (2) To partially interpret a term is to specify a vérification-réfutation 
procedure that applies only to a proper subset of the extension of the term. (3) To 
partially interpret a formal language L is to interpret only part of the language (e.g. to 
provide translations into common language for some terms and leave the others as 
mere dummy symbols).
Achinstein gave the following plausible explications: (F) To partially interpret a term 
is to say that although it has a complete meaning only part of that meaning has been 
given. (2') To partially interpret a term X  means that there are no observational 
conditions all of which are logically necessary and whose conjunction is logically 
sufficient for X, but there are other sorts of analytic statements relating X  to 
observational terms. (3') A term X  is partially interpreted if, among the sentences in 
which it appears in the theory there is none of the form X(a)<r^Y{a), where Y(a) is an 
interpreted observational sentence (i.e. from To or Lq'), which is not analytic.
Both Putnam and Achinstein offer arguments in an effort to show that for each of 
their plausible construals, the notion o f ‘partial interpretation’ either is inadequate for 
the RV or is incoherent. It is my understanding that their arguments do not 
convincingly meet their purpose for all construals of the notion. As this is a side issue 
to the present discussion I choose not to divert in order to show why this is so.^° What 
is important to point out in the context of our discussion is that even if their
An interesting assessment of these arguments may be found in Suppe 1974, pp86-95.
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arguments were incorrect or inconclusive, the thesis of partial interpretation evidently 
presupposes the observation-theory distinction. Therefore, (to say the least) the 
obviously problematic distinction affects the tenability of the thesis of partial 
interpretation.
We saw how the first two functions of correspondence-rules, namely providing 
explicit definitions and cognitive significance to Vt terms, were abandoned and 
substituted by reduction sentences and partial interpretation. What about the third 
function, that of specifying the admissible experimental procedures for applying the 
theory to phenomena or the various sorts of correspondences holding between theory 
and observation. Suppe (1974, pp 102-109) argues that the account of 
correspondence-rules inherent in the RV is inadequate (for the purposes of 
understanding actual science) on the following three grounds: (1) They are 
mistakenly viewed as components of the theory rather than as auxiliary hypotheses.
(2) The sorts of connections (e.g. explanatory causal chains) that hold between 
theories and phenomena are inadequately captured. (3) They oversimplify the ways in 
which theories are experimentally applied to phenomena.
The first criticism is that the RV considers TC as axioms of the theory. Hence C is an 
integral part of the theory. So if a new experimental procedure is discovered it would 
have to be incorporated into C, thus resulting in a new set of rules C ' and 
consequently in a new theory TC'. But obviously the theory has not undergone any 
change, rather we have just improved our knowledge of how to apply it to 
phenomena. So we must think of correspondence-rules as auxiliary hypotheses. This, 
as he admits, is not incompatible with the thesis of partial interpretation. When C was 
regarded as providing explicit definitions then they did form an integral part of the 
theory, but once explicit definition is given up it is no longer necessary to construe C 
as a component of the theory.
The second criticism is based upon Schaffner’s (1969) consideration that there is a 
way in which theories are applied to phenomena, which is not captured by the RV’s 
account of correspondence-rules. This is the case when various theories from outside
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T are borrowed and used to describe a ‘causal sequence’ which obtains between the 
states described by T and the observation reports. These causal sequences are the 
descriptions of the mechanisms involved whereby particular states of the physical 
systems cause the measurement apparatus to behave as it does. Thus they supplement 
theoretical explanations of the observed behaviour of the apparatus by causally 
linking TC to the observation reports. If this use of C is recognised then it is best that 
they are dissociated from the core theory and be regarded as auxiliary hypotheses. For 
example, such auxiliary hypotheses are used to establish a causal link between the 
motion of an electron {Vt term) and the spectral line {Vo term) in a spectrometer 
photograph, or the influence of the molecules of a gas {Vf term) on the gas pressure 
{Vo term). The point Schaffner is making is that the relation between theory and 
observation reports comes about by the use of these auxiliary hypotheses. The latter 
are frequently used to establish explanations of the behaviour of physical systems by 
linking the theoretical predictions to observational reports via causal mechanisms, 
hence they are themselves scientific laws. Without recognising the use of these 
auxiliaries the RV may only describe a type of theory application whereby theoretical 
states are just correlated to observational states.
Finally, the third criticism is based on Suppes’ (1962, 1967) analysis of the
complications involved in relating theoretical predictions to observation reports. As
an example of what Suppes claims takes place, consider that theoretical predictions
are typically predictions derived from continuous functions. An observation report
however is a set of discrete data. Now in order to reach the point where the two can
be compared several modifications take place on the side of the observation report.
For instance, the theory’s predictions may be based on the assumption that certain
idealising conditions hold, e.g. no friction. Assuming that in the actual experiment
these conditions did not hold, it would mean that to achieve a reasonable comparison
the observational data will have to be converted into a corresponding set that reflects
the result of an ‘ideal’ experiment. In other words, the actual observational data must
be converted into what they would have been had the idealising conditions obtained.
This conversion, Suppes argues, comes about by employing appropriate ‘theories of
data’. So, regularly, there will not be a direct comparison between theory and
observation, but a comparison between theory and observation in conjunction with
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theory of data. Suppes’ analysis is more complicated and far more detailed and we 
shall encounter it in subsequent Chapters, as it is an integral part of the Semantic 
View of scientific theories. For the moment what has been said is adequate to make 
his point: actual scientific practice, and in particular theory application, is far more 
complex than the description given by the RV’s account of correspondence-rules.
2.4 Theory Consistency and Meaning Invariance
Feyerabend criticised the Logical Positivist picture of scientific theories on the 
grounds that it imposes a meaning invariance condition and a consistency condition 
on them. By the consistency condition he meant that, ‘...only such theories are ... 
admissible in a given domain which either contain the theories already used in this 
domain, or which are at least consistent with them inside the domain. ’ [Feyerabend 
1965, pi 64] By the condition of meaning invariance he meant that, ‘...meanings will 
have to be invariant with respect to scientific progress; that is, all future theories will 
have to be framed in such a manner that their use in explanations [or reductions] does 
not affect what is said by the theories, or factual reports to be explained.’ {Ibid., 
p i64] Feyerabend’s criticisms are not aimed directly at the RV, but rather at two 
other claims of Logical Positivism, namely the theses of the development o f theories 
by reduction and the covering law model o f scientific explanation, both of which are 
intimately connected to the RV.
A brief digression, in order to look into the aforementioned theses, would be helpful. 
Briefly stated, there are two types of development of theories by reduction. First, 
there is a development of a scientific theory, TC, by expanding its domain to include 
new systems or phenomena. Expanding the set of theoretical postulates T to T ' could 
accomplish this. Thus the original theory TC is said to be reduced to Examples 
of such a kind of theory reduction are the expansion of classical particle mechanics to
’ ' We have seen that within the partial interpretation account of correspondence-rules, expanding the 
set C do not necessarily imply viewing the result as a new theory, hence changes in C does not relate 
to such kinds of reduction.
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the mechanics of rigid bodies, and the ‘absorption’ of Galileo’s laws into Newtonian 
mechanics and gravitational theory. The main characteristics of such reductions are 
that the descriptive terms employed in both theories have approximately the same 
meanings, and that the domains of the two theories are qualitatively homogeneous.^^ 
A second type of development involves the reduction of one theory (secondary) into a 
second more inclusive theory (primary). In such kinds of reduction the theory may 
employ ‘... in its formulations ... a number of distinctive descriptive predicates that 
are not included in the basic theoretical terms or in the associated rules of 
correspondence of the primary... [theory]’ [Nagel 1979, p342]. That is to say, the Vt 
terms of the secondary theory are not necessarily all included in the primary theory. 
Nagel is mainly concerned with this type of reduction, and he builds up his case 
based on the example from the history of physics of the reduction of 
Thermodynamics to Statistical Mechanics. Indeed, he claims that reductions of the 
first type may be regarded as a special case of the second type, though he does not 
pursue this claim further. There are several requirements that have to be satisfied for 
this type of theory reduction to take place, two of which are: (1) The Vt terms for 
both theories involved in the reduction must have unambiguously fixed meanings by 
codified rules of usage or by established procedures appropriate to each discipline, 
e.g. theoretical postulates or correspondence rules. (2) For every Vt term in the 
secondary theory that is absent from the theoretical vocabulary of the primary theory, 
assumptions must be introduced which postulate suitable relations between these 
terms and traits represented by theoretical terms in the primary theory. Furthermore, 
with the help of these assumptions all the laws of the secondary theory are logically 
derivable from the primary theory.
The covering law model of scientific explanation (or Deductive-Nomological 
explanation) is, epigrammatically, explanation in terms of a deductively valid 
argument. The sentence to be explained (explanandum) is a deductive consequence of
See Nagel 1979, pp336-339.
See Nagel 1979, pp345-358. Although Nagel presents a larger set of conditions that have to hold in 
order for reduction to take place (pp. 336-397), these are the two only relevant for the purpose of the 
argument presented here.
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a set of law-premises together with a set of premises consisting of initial conditions or 
other particular facts involved (explanans). For the special case when the conclusion 
is a scientific theory, T\ the covering law model can be formulated as follows: a 
theory T explains T  if and only if T together with initial conditions constitute a 
deductively valid inference with consequence T. In other words, if T  is derivable 
from T together with initial conditions then T  is explained by T. It is patent that 
reduction and explanation of theories go hand in hand. If T  is reduced to T, then T 
explains T  and conversely.
Feyerabend points out that Nagel’s two assumptions -(1) and (2) above- for theory 
reduction respectively impose a condition of meaning invariance and a consistency 
condition to scientific progress. The thesis of development of theories by reduction 
imposes on science that it restricts itself to theories that are mutually consistent. But 
the consistency condition requires that terms in the admissible theories for the domain 
must be used with the same meanings. Similarly it can be shown that the covering 
law model of explanation also imposes these two conditions. In fact the consistency 
condition follows from the requirement that the explanandum must be a logical 
consequence of the explanans. Since the meanings of the terms and statements in a 
logically valid argument must remain constant, an obvious demand for explanation is 
that meanings must be invariant. Feyerabend objects to both of these conditions and 
argues his case by drawing examples from the history of scientific progress. For 
example, the concept of mass does not have the same meaning in relativity theory as 
it does in classical mechanics. Relativistic mass is a relational concept between an 
object and its velocity, whereas in classical mechanics mass is a monadic property of 
an object. Similarly, Galileo’s law asserts that acceleration due to gravity is constant, 
but if Newton’s law of gravitation is applied to the surface of the earth it yields a 
variable acceleration due to gravity. Hence Galileo’s law cannot be consistently
This overlap between reduction and explanation is the reason why Feyerabend’s arguments are 
indiscriminately sometimes directed against the development of theories by reduction and other times
against the covering law model.
The condition of r 
observation language.
meaning invariance is also entailed by RV’s requirement for a theory-neutral
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derived from Newton’s law. Thus he establishes that neither meaning invariance nor 
the intimately related notion of theory consistency, characterise actual science and 
scientific progress.
2.5 The Received View Obscures Epistemologically 
Important Features of Scientific Theories
The objection that the RV obscures several epistemologically important features of 
scientific theories is implicitly present in all versions of the Semantic View of 
theories. Suppe, however, brings this out explicitly in the form of a criticism. To 
clarify the sort of criticism presented by Suppe we must refer to an alternative picture 
of scientific theories, the Semantic View. Since I shall occupy myself with the 
presentation of the Semantic View in the next Chapter, I shall try to clarify the 
criticism with only a brief account of some features of this alternative view.
The rationale behind Suppe’s argument is the following. It is patent that science has 
managed, so far, to go about its business without involving the observation-theory 
distinction and all the complexities that it gives rise to. Thus, he suggests, the 
distinction is not required or presupposed by science; it must be extraneous to an 
adequate analysis of scientific theories. So the important question for him concerns 
not the adequacy or not of an analysis of scientific theories that employs the 
distinction, i.e. the issue on which many of the criticisms of the RV have focused, but 
whether the observation-theory distinction ‘... is required for an adequate analysis of 
the epistemological structure of theories. ’ [Suppe 1972, p9]
See Feyerabend 1962, 1963, 1965, 1970, 1981. Feyerabend’s views have been criticised by 
numerous authors. For example objections to his views have been raised based on his peculiar analysis 
of ‘meaning’, on which his position relies. His views are hence not presented here as conclusive 
criticisms of the RV; but simply that they, to say the least, cast doubt on the adequacy of the theses of 
theory development by reduction and the covering law model of explanation.
See Suppe 1972, 1977, 1989 (chapter 2, in which Suppe 1972 is incorporated).
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By relying and expanding on Suppes’ analysis of ‘theory of data’, he argues that 
because of its reliance on the observation-theory distinction, the RV employs 
correspondence-rules in such a way as to blend together disparate aspects of the 
scientific enterprise. Such aspects are the design of experiments, the interpretation of 
theories, the various calibration procedures, the employment of results and 
procedures of related branches of science, etc. All these ‘disparate aspects’ are being 
lumped into the correspondence-rules. Although these features can be clarified by 
relevant changes in the correspondence-rule account, he claims that even if this is 
achieved the correspondence-rule account will still obscure epistemologically 
important features of scientific theorising.
In applying a theory to phenomena, contrary to the implications of the RV, we do not 
have any direct link between theoretical terms or entities and observational terms or 
entities. In a scientific experiment we collect data about the phenomena, and often 
enough the process of collecting the data involves rather sophisticated bodies of 
theory. Experimental design and control, instrumentation and reliability checks are 
necessary for the collection of data. Moreover, sometimes generally accepted laws or 
theories are also employed in collecting these data. All these features of 
experimentation and data collection are then employed in ways as to structure the 
data into forms (which he calls, ‘hard data’) that allow the application of the theory. 
In fact, theory application according to Suppe involves contrasting or comparing 
theoretical predictions to these ‘hard data’, and not to something directly observed. 
‘Accordingly, the correspondence rules for a theory should not correlate direct- 
observation statements with theoretical statements, but rather should correlate ‘hard 
data’ with theoretical statements.’ {Ibid., pi 1] Suppe admits that this could potentially 
be built into the correspondence-rules, but he claims that such changes cannot be 
done without obscuring epistemologically important features of scientific theorising.
The sciences, he argues, do not deal with all the complexities of phenomena. Rather 
they isolate a certain number of physical parameters by abstractions and idealisations.
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He maintains that these parameters are used to characterise physical systems,^^ which 
are highly abstract and idealised replicas of phenomena. A classical mechanical 
description of the earth-sun system of our solar system, would not deal with the 
actual system, but with a physical system in which some relevant parameters are 
abstracted (e.g. mass, displacement, velocity) from the complex features of the actual 
system. And in which some other parameters are ignored (e.g. the intensity of 
illumination by the sun, the presence of electromagnetic fields, the presence of 
organic life). In addition, the physical system does not involve these abstracted 
parameters in their full complexity. Indeed it idealises the system by ignoring certain 
factors or features of the actual system, that may plausibly be causally relevant to 
these parameters and the actual system as a whole. For instance, it may assume that 
the planets are point masses, or that their gravitational fields are uniform, or that there 
are no disturbances to this system by external factors and that the system is in a 
vacuum. What scientific theories do is attempt to characterise the behaviour of such 
physical systems not the behaviour of directly observable phenomena.
Although this is admittedly a rough sketch of the actual argument, it is not hard to see 
that the aim of the argument is to lead to the conclusion that the raw phenomena are 
connected to a scientific theory via the physical system. That is to say, the connection 
between the theory and the phenomena is a comparison between a physical system 
and the ‘hard data’. The foundation of this connection requires an analysis of theories 
and theory-applications that involves a two-stage move. The first move involves the 
connection between raw phenomena and the ‘hard data’ about the particular physical 
system in question. The second move involves the connection between the physical 
system and the theoretical postulates, etc., of the theory. In this picture we see that the 
physical system plays the intermediate role between phenomena and theory. This role 
is what is operative, for Suppe, in illuminating several epistemological features of 
scientific theorising. It is important that we note that the correspondence-rules ‘... 
amalgamate together the two sorts of moves ... so as to eliminate the physical 
system.’ [Ibid., p i 6 ]
It will be explained in Chapter 3 that Suppe’s use of the term ‘physical system’ is related to the 
notion of what logicians would refer to as a ‘semantic model’.
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The second move usually involves a deductive connection from the theory to the 
physical system. What is required in addition to the postulates of the theory, in order 
to accomplish this connection, are boundary and initial conditions. No additional 
correspondence-rules are required. The first move is much more complex than what 
the RV is willing to admit. The transition from the phenomena to the physical system 
reduces, inter alia, to ‘problems of measurement’, ‘experimental design’, 
‘interpretation and correction of raw data’, ‘employment of theories from other 
branches of science’, ‘counterfactual claims of the sort: had these idealised conditions 
been met the phenomena would have behaved in such and such ways’. So, according 
to Suppe, correspondence-rules must give way to this two-stage transition, if we are 
to distinguish the epistemic features of physical systems. I concede to Suppe that he 
discerns essential features of scientific theorising (at a time when they were entirely 
absent from philosophical debate), such as abstraction and idealisation, which do 
indeed indicate that the RV obscures epistemological features of scientific theories. 
However, as we shall see in subsequent Chapters, his proposal falls short of 
satisfactorily addressing them.
2.6 Hempel’s Proviso Argument
In one of his last writings, Hempel warns against axiomatisations of theories in first- 
order language and more generally objects to analyses of theories through 
formalisations. Pertaining to the inferential function of theories, he raises two kinds 
of problems that impair the deductive status of empirical theories. He assumes that a 
theory is construed as an ordered pair that consists of a set T of the basic principles of 
a theory, and a set C of correspondence rules (he uses the term ‘interpretative 
statements’ or ‘bridge principles’). As understood so far in this Chapter, let the 
sentences or formulas of T be formulated by the use of a theoretical vocabulary Vt,
Hempel, (1988). His immediate intention is not to distance himself from Logical Positivism, but to 
maintain a more liberal view of theories from that of the RV analysed in this chapter.
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and the sentences about the phenomena be formulated by the use of an observational 
vocabulary Finally, let the correspondence rules provide partial interpretation of 
the terms in V t  by means of the terms in Vo.
Consider now Hempel’s example. If we try to apply the theory of magnetism for a 
simple case we are faced with the following inferential situation. From the sentence 
is a metal bar to which iron filings are clinging’ (Sqj), by means of a suitable 
correspondence rule we infer 'b is a magnet’ (Stj). Then by using the theoretical 
principles in T, we infer ‘If b is broken into two bars b] and 6 2 , then both are magnets
and their poles will attract or repel each other’ (St2 ). Finally using further
correspondence rules we derive the sentence ‘If 6  is broken into two shorter bars and 
these are suspended, by long thin threads, close to each other at the same distance 
from the ground, they will orient themselves so as to fall into a straight line’ (So2 ).^  ^
Thus, Hempel attributes a basic structure to theoretical inferences:
(where the notation P —^—>7? indicates that R  is
inferred from P by using sentences from Q). If the inferential structure is indeed 
deductive then it can be read as follows: S qj in combination with the theory 
deductively implies S02. This, as Hempel points out, is tantamount to saying that the 
theory deductively implies the conditional sentence S o i^ S q 2  in Vq. Hempel 
concludes that this deductivist construal faces two difficulties which he calls ‘...the 
problem of theoretical [or inductive] ascent and the problem of provisos. ’ [Ibid., p21]
Let us look at how he explicates the first problem. In the foregoing inferential 
structure, the first inferential step presupposes that with the help of correspondence 
rules, S fi  is deducible from S q i. However, a search into the theory of magnetism will 
yield no general principle that, whenever iron filings cling onto a metal bar then the
In an effort to avoid the complications caused by the observation-theory distinction, Hempel does 
not talk of observational vocabulary. Instead he makes use of the notion of ‘antecedently understood’ 
vocabulary, which may also consist of theoretical terms that are available and understood 
independently of the particular theory. It makes no difference to this argument what notion is 
employed.
See Hempel 1988, p20.
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bar is a magnet. In fact, the bar may be made of lead and covered by an adhesive thus 
iron filings will cling to it, and the theory does not preclude such possibilities. In 
short, the theory does not warrant a deduction from Soi to Sji. Hempel concludes:
‘Hence, the transition from Soi to Sn  is not deductive even if the entire theory of 
magnetism is used as an additional premise. Rather, the transition involves what I will 
call inductive or theoretical ascent, that is, a transition from a data sentence expressed in 
Vq to a theoretical hypothesis Sn that would explain, by way of the theory of magnetism, 
what the data sentence describes.’ [Ibid., p22]
To clarify the second problem, that of provisos,^^ it is best to look into the third 
inferential step from St2 to S0 2 . What is necessary here is for the theory of magnetism 
to provide correspondence rules that would turn this step into a deductive inference. 
The theory however clearly does not do this. In fact, the theory allows for the 
possibility that the magnets orient themselves in a way other than a straight line, for 
example if a strong magnetic field of suitable direction is present. This consideration 
leads to the recognition that the third inferential step presupposes the additional 
assumption that there are no disturbing influences to the system of concern. Hempel 
uses the term ‘provisos’, ‘...to refer to assumptions ...[of this kind]..., which are 
essential, but generally unstated, presuppositions o f theoretical inferences." [Ibid., 
p23] Provisos are also presupposed in the inferential step from Sn  to St2 , ‘ ■ for if 
the breaking of the magnet takes place at a high temperature, the pieces may become 
demagnetised.’ [Ibid., p23] Therefore, provisos are not just presupposed in the 
application of a theory, but also in ostensibly deductive inferences within the theory, 
i.e. from one Vt sentence to another.
What is the character of provisos? Hempel argues that they cannot be viewed as just 
ceteris paribus clauses, as they do not call for the equality of certain things in a vague 
and elusive manner, instead they call for the absence of disturbing factors. So he 
suggests we may view provisos as assumptions o f completeness. For example, in a 
theoretical inference from one sentence Si to another S2 , a proviso is required that 
asserts that in a given case ‘... no factors other than those specified in Si are present 
that could affect the event described by ^ 2  ’ \Ibid., p29] As for example is the case in
Because I shall use this argument in a later chapter, in a different context and for a different purpose, 
I shall go through it in length.
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the application of the Newtonian theory to a two star system, where it is presupposed 
that their mutual gravitational attraction are the only forces the system is subjected to. 
It is evident that:
‘ . a proviso as here understood is not a clause that can be attached to a theory as a 
whole and vouchsafe its deductive potency by asserting that in all particular situations to 
which the theory is applied, disturbing factors are absent. Rather, a proviso has to be 
conceived as a clause that pertains to some particular application of a given theory and 
asserts that in the case at hand, no effective factors are present other than those explicitly 
taken into account.’ [Ibid., p26]
An immediate implication is that laws cannot be written down in an explicit way 
because they are subject to an indefinitely large number of provisos. In attempting to 
formulate the number of restrictions (implicit in the provisos) we run the risk of 
reducing the law to a trivial statement. Hence Hempel seems to imply that our only 
rational choice is to accept the incomplete character of scientific laws. Moreover, 
Hempel cautions us as not to confound provisos, viz. assumptions of completeness, 
with epistemic requirements for complete and total evidence:
‘A proviso ...calls not for epistemic but for ontic completeness: the specifics expressed 
by Sj must include not all the information available at the time (information that may 
well include false items) but rather all the factors present in the given case that in fact 
affect the outcome to be predicted by the theoretical inference. The factors in question 
might be said to be those that are ‘nomically relevant’ to the outcome, that is, those on 
which the outcome depends in virtue of nomic connections. ’ [Ibid., p29]
Let us look into his example closely. By the use of the Newtonian theory T we try to 
infer from Si a sentence S2 . Hempel proposes that this inference can be schematised 
as (P aS jaT )^S 2 , where P is the proviso that all the influences the system of the two 
stars is subjected to are specified in Sj. Thus for the chosen system, P  must imply the 
absence of not just other mechanical forces, but also of electric, magnetic and other 
forces that may influence the system. Hempel wonders ‘...whether this proviso can 
be expressed in the language of celestial mechanics at all, or even in the combined 
languages of mechanics and other physical sciences.’ [Ibid., p30] A scientific theory 
gives an account of a certain domain of empirical phenomena, so for instance the 
Newtonian theory of gravitation does not assert or deny the existence of 
nongravitational forces. This may prima facie lead to the conclusion that provisos 
transcend the conceptual resources of the theory. But as Hempel points out, this is not 
the case for the above example, since in Newton’s 2"  ^ law F=ma stands for the total 
force on the body. Thus the proviso can be expressed in the language of the theory:
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the total force exerted on each of the two bodies is due to the gravitational force 
exerted upon one by the other, and that this force is determined by the law of 
gravitation. But in applying the theory to particular cases it must again be subject to 
provisos, to the effect that all relevant factors affecting the system have been 
accounted for in the computation of the total force.
We see that Hempel’s challenge is that theoretical inferences are not deductively 
valid because they presuppose provisos. We can also see that in going from observed 
facts to theoretical claims, the move is not deductive but it involves a theoretical or 
inductive ascent. Both of these features of theories impair the status of two obvious 
implications of the RV; (1) that theories are deductively connected sets of statements 
that stretch all the way to the phenomena and (2 ) that some of these statements, the 
laws of the theory, are empirical universal generalisations.
2,7 General Remarks on the Received View
The RV is intended as an explicative and not a descriptive picture of scientific 
theories. We have seen that even as such it is vulnerable to a great deal of criticism. 
Although I have not presented the major arguments against the RV with the intention 
of discrediting it altogether, one cannot help wondering whether even if the RV was 
formulated in such a way as to avoid the preceding criticisms would the result aid our 
understanding of science in any significant way? During the last few decades 
Philosophy of Science has made an important methodological turn. In the quest to 
provide a description of scientific theories, it is now occupied with the study of actual 
science as practised by working scientists and not some rational reconstruction of 
theories.
The RV construes scientific theories as being canonically formalisable. Nothing was 
said about formalisation issues and it will not be taken up now. Nevertheless, what is 
worth mentioning is that the RV identifies theories with their linguistic formulations, 
i.e. collections of propositions that can be axiomatised in a first-order language with
37
identity. Attention to the syntactic character of the RV was not given because it is an 
element that does not belong exclusively to the RV. The demise of the RV has given 
rise to the Semantic View of theories, which eliminates the role of language from 
theoretical representation of phenomena. Theories are, according to the Semantic 
View, classes of mathematical structures, and theoretical representation is 
accomplished by matching one of these structures to the data. Therefore the Semantic 
View is an attempt to retain formalisation as the major tool of analysis of scientific 
theories. This is done by shifting the emphasis from proof-theory to model-theory, at 
the expense of the representational character of language. It is common, however, to 
regard theories as languages constituted by interpreted collections of statements 
without divorcing logical syntax from meaning as the RV suggests. Through the latter 
understanding of theories, language (and in particular mathematical equations) is 
understood as one of the means of theoretical representation. It is with this sort of 
syntactic spirit that I now turn to critically assess the Semantic View of theories.
38
3 The Semantic View of Scientific 
Theories
3.1 Introduction
The overwhelming weaknesses of the Received View together with the developments 
in Set Theory, particularly by the Bourbaki attempt to develop a set theoretical 
representation of the entire of mathematics, inter alia led to a new school of thought 
regarding the nature of Scientific Theories. This school was initiated and motivated 
by the work of Patrick Suppes, which when taken up by other philosophers branched 
out into two directions. These came to be named the Semantic View of Theories 
(associated with the work of van Fraassen, Suppe, Giere and others) and the 
Structuralist Approach (associated with the work of Sneed, Stegmüller, Moulines, 
Balzer and others). Although the two labels are improvised inventions and are not 
widely regarded as accurate, I shall retain them. Some authors, however, tend to use 
the label ‘Model-Theoretic Approach’, which I am inclined to find more accurate and 
applying to both of these branches.
Suppes is primarily concerned with arguing that set-theoretical axiomatisation of 
theories not only is a convenient means of representing theories, but is superior in 
various respects to standard formalisations (i.e. formalisation in first-order language 
with identity). Within the structuralist approach claims about the primary significance 
of set-theoretical structures in science, vis-à-vis the significance of formal language 
structures, are backed by worked out examples of set-theoretical axiomatisations, e.g.
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classical particle mechanics, classical collision mechanics, relativistic collision 
mechanics, decision theory etc. (Balzer et al. 1987). In addition, within the 
structuralist program, attempts are made to elucidate the character of scientific 
progress and theory individuation. The Semantic approach takes from Suppes the 
model-theoretic view of theories and expands in this direction to maintain the claim 
that theories are families of models (i.e. mathematical structures). Differences among 
the two approaches exist, to name a few: (a) The Structuralist approach maintains a 
theoretical/non-theoretical distinction, hence positions itself closer to the Received 
View, whereas the Semantic approach does not. (b) In the Structuralist approach a 
canonical language of theory formulation (viz. set theory) is prescribed, whereas the 
Semantic approach allows for the language formulation to be dictated by the subject 
matter of the particular theory, (c) The structuralist approach treats theories as 
dynamic organisms and allows for theory individuation on the basis of a theoretical 
core and a core of intended applications, whereas the Semantic approach treats 
theories in a rather ‘static’ way where theory development is viewed as a sequence of 
independent theories.
Strictly speaking however, both approaches are structuralist, in the sense that both 
emphasize the structural features as opposed to the physical content of scientific 
theories. Hence, for the purposes of my arguments I do not think that much exists as 
to significantly distinguish the two approaches, other than the mathematical and 
idiomatic preferences of their proponents. In my work, I shall be focusing on the 
Semantic View, which I will henceforth refer to in abbreviation SV.
Before I enter into an analysis, elucidation and eventually critique of the SV of 
theories as it appears in the works of Van Fraassen, Suppe and Giere, I shall begin 
with a brief overview of the work of Suppes. I do this on the one hand with a 
historical conscience, but on the other because the proponents of the SV retained 
many of his views and adopted others with only minor alterations. Hence, 
comprehending the main elements of his work can assist us in understanding the SV.
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In the 1950’s and 1960’s Patrick Suppes^^ was one of the major denouncers of the 
attempts by the Logical Positivists to characterise theories as formal (first-order) 
calculi supplemented by a set of correspondence rules. His objections to the Received 
View led him, on the one hand, to indicate that in scientific practice the 
theory/experiment relation is more sophisticated than what is implicit in the RV. 
Theories (or more accurately theoretical predictions) are not confronted with ‘raw’ 
experimental data but with what he calls ‘models of data’. On the other hand, his 
disinclination to the RV led him to propose that theories should be viewed as 
collections of models of the theory. The models are possible realisations (in the 
Tarskian sense) that satisfy all valid statements of the theory, and these models are 
entities of the appropriate set-theoretical structure. Both of these 
insights/contributions have been operative in the conception and shaping of the SV, 
hence they call for elucidation.
3.1.1 Set-Theoretical Axiomatisation of Scientific Theories
Suppes’ attempt to move towards set-theoretical axiomatisations of theories rested 
mainly on the contention that standard formalisations of scientific theories are a far 
too simple sketch. Firstly, no substantive example of a scientific theory is worked out 
in a formal calculus, and secondly its ‘...very sketchiness makes it possible to omit 
both important properties of theories and significant distinctions that may be 
introduced between different theories’ [Suppes 1967, p57].
The simplicity of set-theoretical axiomatisations can be illustrated by looking at 
examples of such. What follows is a set-theoretical axiomatisation of Classical 
Particle Mechanics (CPM), which in essence is a definition of a CPM system as 
indicated by the intended physical interpretation.^"^
Suppes 1957, 1961, 1962, 1967, 1967a, 1969.
See for instance, Suppes 1957 where he develops a CPM set-theoretical axiomatisation. I supply the 
intended physical interpretation only for purposes of clarity.
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Statement of Kinematical Axioms: Intended Physical Interpretation of
Axioms:
Axiom 1 ; The set P  is finite and non-empty. P  is the set of particles. Every p  eP  represents
a particle (corpuscle).
Axiom 2: The set T is an interval of the real Every te T  represents an instant of time, 
number line.
Axiom 3: For p e P , the vector Sp(t) is twice S p(t)  represents the position of particle p  at 
differentiable on T. time t, in 3-dimensional Euchdean space.
Statement of Dynamical Axioms:
Axiom 4; For p e P , m(p) is a positive real m(p) is the numerical value of the mass of 
number. particle p.
Axiom 5; Forp .qeP , and teT , Newton’s 3'"^  law. f(p,q,t) is the internal force
f(p, q ,t)=-f(q,p, t) (of a 2-particle system) that q exerts on p  at t.
Axiom 6: For p .q e P  and teT , The direction of the force between p  and q is
S p(t)  Xf(p, q, t)= - S q ( t )  Xf(q,p, t) along the axis joining their positions.
Axiom 7: For p  eP  and t eT, This is Newton’s 2"^  Law of motion, where s
m{p)  's (/) = 2] f { p ,  q, t) + g{p ,  t) designates the 2"^  time derivative, and g  is the
external force on p.
All the above predicates are defined in terms of notions of set theory, hence the name 
set-theoretical predicates. The structure p={P, T, s, m, f, g) is then a system of a 
CPM if and only if it satisfies the above axioms, which are to be recognised as 
components of the definition of a CPM system. Such a system is obviously 
constituted by a limited class of primitive concepts, but consequences are entailed. 
The theorems of classical particle mechanics can be proved and derivative concepts 
can be defined. Such a structure (i.e. anything satisfying the above definition) is what 
logicians would label a (semantic) model of the theory, or more accurately a class of 
models. The convenience of using set theory to axiomatise scientific theories stems 
from the fact that, in addition to general set theory literally all of classical 
mathematics can be utilised in the mathematical framework within which to operate.
An obvious objection is that a standard formalisation can be used to express the 
axioms and theorems of the theory and subsequently define the class of semantic
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models metamathematically, as the class of structures that satisfy the theorems of 
CPM. But what Suppes is proposing is that such a procedure is unnecessarily 
complex and tedious, and that the class of intended models can be singled out without 
any reference to syntax. Set-theoretical axiomatisations are hence to be viewed as 
providing the procedure by which the class of intended models of the theory is 
uniquely determined. In other words the means by which to directly define the class 
of models. Moreover, the separation of the set-theoretical characterisation of 
structures from the (syntactical) axioms of the theory allows for the introduction and 
use of axiom-free notions about models, such as isomorphism of structure.
One could ask, presuming that scientific theories can be expressed in, or have a 
description in set theoretical terms, does this justify the claim that they should be 
identified with set-theoretical structures? This question can be considered as an 
offspring of a more general one: just because scientific theories exhibit several 
structural features, and thus can be described by a mathematical structure, or satisfy a 
mathematical structure, does this justify the claim that they can be identified with the 
structure? I think that to address such questions one must look into the structural 
descriptions of theories and attempt a comparison with actual scientific theorising. 
Later on I shall be arguing among other things, in the context of the SV, that 
structural representations are only rational reconstructions of theories (in the sense 
described in Chapter 2), despite the insistence of some of its proponents to the 
contrary. That is to say, structural representations provide one way by which to 
explicate the finished product, i.e. the theory, but do not provide an adequate 
description of actual scientific theorising. For now, I will just claim that Suppes 
seems to have intended set-theoretical axiomatisations as rational reconstructions of 
scientific theories and not as accurate descriptions of actual scientific theorising. 
Unlike its predecessor (the RV), the basis and mode of reconstruction are not 
‘statements’ (i.e. linguistic entities) but structures (i.e. extralinguistic entities). Prima 
facie, the advancement this mode of axiomatisation makes over the RV is that it is 
less laborious and less awkward. But this is not all Suppes points to.
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3.1.2 Models of Data
Models of data, according to Suppes, are possible realisations of the experimental 
data. Just as there exist possible realisations of a theory (i.e. models of a theory), 
there also exist possible realisations of the experimental data. It is to models of data 
that models of the theory are contrasted. In other words, the theory/experiment 
relation is a mapping of structure. The RV would have it that the theoretical 
predictions have a ‘direct analogue’ in the observation statements. This view 
however, is, according to Suppes, a distorting simplification. To substantiate these 
claims, Suppes points to the fact that theories are loaded with theoretical concepts 
that have no direct experimental analogues. Furthermore, the confirming 
experimental data are discrete and finitistic in character, in contrast to the models of 
the theory that, by and large, contain continuous functions or infinite sequences. To 
adequately establish the link between theory and experiment various steps are 
invo lved .M odels of data are defined in terms of possible realisations of the 
experimental data, which can be thought of as evaluations of experimental evidence. 
That is, by various processes that involve the experimental design and the theories of 
experiment (experimental parameters, auxiliary theories etc.), we induce a 
transliteration of the raw data into a ‘language’ that bears a less indirect relation to 
the models of the theory. In order for this to be achieved, as Suppe points out in his 
own contribution to the theory of ‘models of data’, firstly experiments must be 
carried out in controlled and isolated circumstances. Secondly, various influencing 
factors that the theory does not account for, but are known to influence the 
experimental data, must be accommodated by an appropriate conversion of the data 
into canonical form.^^ This transliteration results in a set-theoretical structure, one 
that reflects the experimental data after several elements have been taken into 
account, e.g. experimental design and procedures, ceteris paribus conditions that are 
assumed to hold, the theories of experiment and auxiliary theories etc. Accordingly,
See Suppes 1962. Admittedly, Suppes’ use of the example from Learning Theory indicates the 
various complexities involved in this process. Without intending to do any injustice to his analysis, I 
here present a much-simplified picture that suffices for the purposes of this work.
See Suppe 1974, ppl02-109, and 1989 chapter 4, where he expands on Suppes’ analysis.
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the finished product that Suppes dubbed ‘models of data’ are structures expressed by 
set-theoretical predicates that bear a direct link to the models of the theory. Suppes’ 
picture of science as an enterprise of theory-construction and empirical testing of 
theories involves establishing this ‘hierarchy of models’, roughly consisting of the 
general categories of models of the theory and models of the data. Furthermore, since 
the theory/experiment relation consists of a comparison of mathematical structures, it 
allows him to invoke the mathematical notion of isomorphism o f structure to identify 
the link between theory and experiment. Hence, Suppes can be read as urging the 
thesis that defining the structures or models of the theory and checking for 
isomorphism with models of data, is a rational reconstruction that does more justice 
to actual science than the RV does.
It is noteworthy that the backbone of a structuralist account of theories is the sharp 
distinction between models of theory and models of data. The traditional syntactic 
account of the relation between theory and evidence, which can be captured by the 
following simple schema: TaA ^ E  (where, T stands for theory, A for auxiliaries, E  
for empirical evidence), is rejected. In its place the following schema is erected: 
A aE\-^Md, MreS, and Md~Mt. Where, Md stands for model of data, M t for model of 
theory, S  for the theoretical structure, i-^ for ‘...used in the construction o f...’, e for 
the relation of membership, and % for the relation of isomorphism. In short, this 
distinction implies that pure ingredients of the theory are used to construct the models 
of the theory, and everything else used in the attempt to relate theory to experimental 
evidence enters in the construction of the data models.
The proponents of the SV adopt the above distinction with reverence. Where the SV 
does digress from Suppes’ theory is in the adoption of a canonical language (such as 
set theory) in which the mathematical structure is presented. The proponents of the 
SV share with Suppes the claim that we start from an unstructured set of 
measurements, and in the process we give them some structural form, but according 
to the proponents of the SV the latter tends to be dictated by the language of the 
theory and the auxiliaries employed. It is evident that Suppes’ use of set theory gives 
rise to a picture of scientific theories which is totally disengaged from problems
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concerning the language of theories, such as the problems of counterfactuals and 
modalities. In fact the use of set theory tends to emphasise an extensional character to 
scientific theories, where the modal structure is concealed. The Semantic View on the 
other hand, avoids this problem for in the latter the presentation of the structure is 
chosen as to let ‘...the appropriate language be dictated by the specific scientific 
subject under investigation’ [Giere 1985, p76].
In the last decade or so, we have witnessed a significant amount of philosophical
work that explores the role of scientific models in the theoretical representation of
phenomena. This newly born tradition focuses on questions of how models represent
real physical systems and how they relate to theory. It is important from the outset to
distinguish this philosophical tradition from structuralist (model-theoretic) views of
scientific theories, and indeed the SV. Both philosophical accounts maintain that
models are devices of scientific representation. This common feature, however, is not
sufficient to render the two accounts compatible with each other. The model-theoretic
approaches differentiate themselves from the logical positivist program on the
grounds that language plays essentially no role in theoretical representation.
Language, whether the language of set-theory or that dictated by the subject matter of
a particular science, is given the expressive role of presenting the classes of models
(i.e. mathematical structures). Theoretical representation is thus reduced to some
form of structural mapping. Implicit in model-theoretic approaches is therefore the
idea that science only gives the structure, as opposed to the physical content, of the
phenomena. This idea can be put forward in the following schematic way; once the
structure of the theory is defined we make available the class of intended models for
modelling the particular physical domain. This is roughly what scientific theorising
consists of in the model-theoretic view. The view that models are scientific
representation devices is not however a monopoly of the model-theoretic approaches.
The spirit of my approach in the remaining of this work is that scientific theories are
collections of interpreted statements to be understood literally. Although language is
one of the means of representing something extralinguistic, i.e. the world, I do not
understand theories as representing the world in any direct sense. In fact, an
intermediary medium of representation is necessary in the majority of cases: the
scientific model. It is with this disposition that I intend to criticise the SV and not for
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restoring arguments in favour of Logical Positivism. But before I enter into the 
various dimensions of my argument I want to scrutinise the SV in an attempt to 
understand it, to understand its use of the notion of ‘model’, and to extract its most 
important implications.
3.2 The Semantic View of Scientific Theories
The major proponents of the SV of scientific theories are van Fraassen, Suppe, Giere, 
Lloyd, da Costa and French.^^ In my treatise of the SV I will rely primarily on van 
Fraassen’s ‘state-space’ approach and Suppe’s ‘relational-systems’ approach. The 
differences among the two are inconspicuous but significant in a context that 
ultimately will become clear. Despite the fact that in the recent literature the state- 
space approach has become the predominant representative of the SV because of its 
simplicity, I believe there is a sense in which the two versions complement each other 
-particularly on the fact that the relational-systems approach can accommodate both 
mathematical and non-mathematical theories in contrast to the state-space approach. 
Moreover, Suppe explicitly treats elements of scientific theorising (such as, 
abstraction and idealisation) that require analysis without stripping them from his 
own philosophical and methodological considerations. I will argue that these features 
subsequently render his approach -or more precisely his understanding of the state- 
space and the theoretical representation of phenomena- the most defensible thesis for 
the SV. Apart from this, it is important to note that van Fraassen presents us with a 
fragmented sketch of the SV. It is fragmented because different features are treated in 
different writings at different times, and often different terminology is employed. It is
Van Fraassen 1967, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1980, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1997; Suppe 1972, 
1972a, 1973 1974, 1977, 1979, 1989, 1998; Giere 1985, 1988, 1988, 1991, 1999; Lloyd 1988; da 
Costa and French 1990. Lloyd applies the Semantic View to evolutionary theory. Da Costa and French 
and their collaborators develop a version of the Semantic View that uses partial structures to claim the 
unity of models and theory, i.e. models of the theory are subsumed under a unifying theory structure 
by sharing only parts of their own structure with the theory. Both of these undertakings require 
attention, which 1 do not claim to have given them. It is therefore likely that my arguments do not 
affect their views.
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sketchy because in very few of his writings do we find a detailed analysis of the 
concepts he employs. Subsequently it is left to the reader to put all the pieces 
together, an undertaking that may lead to inconsistencies, as well as, injustices to van 
Fraassen’s position. By contrast, Suppe provides us with a complete and to a large 
degree precise exposition of the SV, thus such misapprehensions can be avoided.
We have seen in Chapter 2, that none of the arguments against the Received View 
convincingly lead to repudiating the view that theories can be rationally reconstructed 
as formal calculi augmented by a set of correspondence rules. The collection of 
criticisms rather acted as a catalyst in the recognition that the RV is faced with 
possibly insurmountable problems. The model-theoretic approaches are hence 
constructed as to avoid those problems faced by the RV. There is however, a further 
motivation captured by Suppe in the following argument. Suppe charges the RV that 
it confounds the formulation of a theory with the theory itself. He claims that this is 
not justifiable because a particular theory may be expressed in more than one 
language (linguistic fo rm alism ).In  his words, ‘theories admit of a number of 
alternative linguistic formulations’, for example the Lagrangian or Hamiltonian 
formalisms of CPM and the wave or matrix mechanics of the Quantum theory. So he 
invites us to distinguish between the theory, an extra-linguistic entity, and its 
linguistic formulations. By making a distinction between the theory and the theory 
formulation (justifiably or not), the semantic approach is thus not faced with 
problems associated with an observation/theory distinction or an analytic/synthetic 
distinction in vocabulary terms, because it identifies theories with extra-linguistic 
entities.
The structure of my exposition is the following. I will first analyse the structural 
account of scientific theories as proposed by van Fraassen. In the process I will 
examine the physical interpretation and theory/experiment relation as accounted for 
by the state-space approach. I will then proceed to elaborate on Suppe’s approach, 
analysing its structural account, physical interpretation, and theory/experiment 
relation, with primary focus on the features that distinguish it from that of van
A claim shared by van Fraassen and other proponents of the Semantic View.
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Fraassen. In addition to understanding the SV, the focus in this Chapter is primarily 
to bring to the surface those of its features that are either untenable or distance it from 
actual scientific practices. In doing so, the strategies by which to criticise the SV can 
be illuminated. Thus the basis can be built for expanding on the objections to be 
sketched at the end of this chapter. Criticisms of the SV will follow in the next 
Chapters.
3.2.1 Van Fraassen’s State-Space Version
Van Fraassen is primarily concerned with the internal structure of scientific theories. 
Only in the more recent of his writings does he come to endorse Giere’s work on how 
theoretical models, and more generally theories, are applied. I will begin by outlining 
the structural elements he attributes to theories and then proceed to construct the 
initial and the more recent of his views for applying them.^^
3.2.1.1 The Structural Elements of Scientific Theories
Van Fraassen’s view of scientific theories is that they consist of three features, (1) a 
state-space that represents the states of a physical system, (2 ) a set of elementary 
statements about measurable physical magnitudes, and (3) a mapping (satisfaction 
function) of the elementary statements onto the state-space. The objects of concern of 
scientific theories are physical systems. Typically, mathematical models represent 
physical systems that can generally be conceived as admitting of a certain set of 
states. State-spaces are the mathematical spaces the elements of which can be used to
Van Fraassen has through the years changed his mind about certain characteristics of the SV. This 
has been the consequence of his own rethinking of several of the elements of the approach, but also 
because of other people’s contributions. Although I am here presenting the major elements of the SV, 
we must not loose sight of the fact that it is still a ‘paradigm’ in development. As such I do not think 
the most defensible thesis for it has yet been constructed, hence presenting ‘older’ as well as ‘newer’ 
versions of it, and various people’s contributions to it are necessary ingredients to a comprehensive 
understanding.
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represent the states of physical systems. It is a general term used to refer to what for 
example physicists would label as phase space in classical mechanics or Hilbert space 
in quantum mechanics. A simple example of a state-space would be that of an n- 
particle system. In CPM, the state of each particle at a given time is specified by its 
position q={qx, qy, qz) and momentum p=(px, Py, Pz)  vectors. Hence the state-space of 
an «-particle system would be a Euclidean 6«-dimensional space, whose points are 
the 6«-tuples of real numbers (qjx, qiy, qiz, • ■ • ,  qnx, qny, qnz, • • • ,  Pix, Piy, piz,  • • • ,  Pnx, 
Pny, Pnz)- More generally a state-space is the collection of mathematical entities such 
as, vectors, functions, or numbers, which is used to specify the set of states that a 
particular physical system could allow, in different words it prescribes all possible 
instantiations of a system.
State-spaces unite clusters of models of a theory, and they can be used to single out 
the class of intended models just as set-theoretical predicates would for Suppes’ 
analysis. The presentation of a theory consists of a description of a class o f state- 
space types. The way to understand this can be demonstrated by means of an 
example. CPM systems are «-particle systems represented by a state-space which is a 
6«-tuple of real numbers. This would mean that a A:-particle system and an «2-particle 
system, where will need a different state description of different dimension. In 
order for this to be accommodated into the state-space approach van Fraassen 
identifies the theory with the class of state-space types. Where, each state-space type 
is the set of states Sn associated with the «-particle system. For example, Sk is the set 
of states of a A:-particle system, s^ of an m-particle system and so forth. The class of 
such types for CPM is the class of an infinite number of state-spaces, each associated 
with an «-particle system of different dimension. More generally, as van Fraassen 
puts it ‘[wjhenever certain parameters are left unspecified in the description of a 
structure, it would be more accurate to say ...that we described a structure-type.’ 
[1980, p44] The Bohr model of the atom, for example, does not refer to a single 
structure, but to a class of structure types that share some general characteristics. 
Once the necessary characteristics are specified it gives rise to a structure for the 
hydrogen atom, a structure for the helium atom, and so forth. Another reason for 
identifying the theory with a class of state-space types is that, in theories such as the
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Special Theory of Relativity the frame of reference determines a particular 
configuration imposed on phase space (given by the Lorentz group of 
transformations). We may thus construe a state-space type either as consisting of the 
set of states of a system of particular dimension for all frames of reference of that 
system; or as the set of states for a particular dimension and a particular frame of 
reference.^^
In addition to the state-space, the theory (according to Van Fraassen) characterises 
physical systems by the use of a class of measurable physical magnitudes. Such 
physical magnitudes are represented in classical mechanics by real valued functions 
defined on the state-space, whereas in quantum mechanics they are represented by 
Hermitian operators. A set of elementary statements about the system is utilised. Each 
elementary statement formulates a proposition that asserts a particular value (or range 
of values, Borel sets -a view van Fraassen adopts in the more recent of his writings) 
for a particular physical magnitude at a particular time.^^ Thus, for instance, an 
elementary statement U=U{m, h, t) expresses the proposition that: the physical
It should be pointed out that, a non-equivalent way to the above is to identify the theory with the 
union set of 5,’s, in which case there will be one state-space representing all types of all dimensions. 
That the two ways are not equivalent is explained in Tarski and Vaught 1957. Couched in Tarski’s 
language of relational systems (we could roughly view relational systems as state-spaces) it can briefly 
be put as follows: a union of relational systems (state-spaces) is an arithmetical extension o f its 
components if it is a directed class of relational systems. We (informally) define p  to be an 
arithmetical extension of one of its subsystems 9i if, p  is an extension of 91, and whenever every 
element of 91 satisfies any formula of a first-order language in 91, they also satisfy it in p ,  and 
conversely. Now, let K be a directed class of systems if  any two systems in K have a common 
extension which is also in K. Tarski and Vaught explain that if, K is a directed class then the union 
class of K is also an extension of each system belonging to K. Now since the class of state-spaces 
described above is non-directed, and given that two mathematical systems are elementarily equivalent 
if  every sentence which is tme in one is also true in the other, it follows that the two ways are not 
equivalent. 1 believe that van Fraassen, as well as all the proponents of the SV, chooses to identify the 
structure with a class of state-space types merely on the grounds that it is closer to the practices of 
scientists.
In quantum mechanics of course the situation is different, but it can easily be accommodated if  
elementary propositions are understood as asserting the probabilities of the eigenvalues of the 
operators.
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magnitude m (such as the mass of a particle) has value b at time t. The truth or falsity 
of the formulated propositions depends on the state of the system in concern. Hence a 
relation between the state-space and the set of elementary statements expresses a 
relation between the states of the space and the values of physical magnitudes of a 
system. This relation is established by means of a satisfaction function h(U), which is 
a mapping of each elementary statement onto a region of the state-space that satisfies 
the proposition expressed, i.e. U is true of the system if and only if h(U) represents 
the actual state of the system.
As an example consider the three-dimensional motion of a classical particle. The 
particle is in a state {m, r, v), if it has mass m, position r={xi, X2 , xj), and velocity 
v=(yi, V2, vj) at a particular time t. If U expresses the proposition that the kinetic 
energy of the particle at time t equals E, then h{U)={{m, r, v); . Hence, h(JJ)
can be understood as depicting the set of states that satisfy U. So far for the sake of 
simplicity of exposition, I have ignored time dependence. To be more accurate 
however, we must note that the factor of time can be introduced into the SV by 
specifying how the state of the system evolves. Van Fraassen stresses that 
‘...sometimes ‘state’ is used in such a way that a system (though undisturbed) has 
different states at different times, and sometimes such that a system remains in the 
same state unless it is subject to interaction’ [van Fraassen 1970, p329]. He suggests 
that in the first case, the satisfaction function is viewed as time-independent but the 
location of the system in state-space is viewed as evolving in time (applicable to 
isolated systems). In the second case, the satisfaction function is viewed as time- 
dependent (applicable to interactive systems), in which case it would mean that the 
system remains in the same state unless it is subject to interaction. However, physical 
magnitudes could change even though the system remains in the same state.^^
How does all this fit together into van Fraassen’s picture of scientific theories? The 
state-space defines the mathematical models that constitute the theory. The 
satisfaction function maps the regions of the state-space to propositions about 
measurable physical magnitudes of the theory. Thus the link with empirical
See van Fraassen 1972, for examples of these roles of the time variable.
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measurement is established. As van Fraassen admits (1970, p329), this may almost 
sound like an operationalist thesis. Yet the correspondence rules of the RV cannot 
capture all the constituents of this picture, since the elementary statements of the 
theory are confronted with experimental reports (in Suppes’ sense of models of data). 
Herein lies, I believe, a departure from Suppes’ set-theoretic approach. Models of 
data are not expressed as set-theoretical predicates but as sets of statements about 
measured quantities. These sets of statements are formulated in the appropriate 
language of the theory in question, and this is enabled by the fact that the structure of 
the state-space is defined in that same language.
Another aspect of van Fraassen’s view is that the state-space provides the 
interpretation of the elementary statements. Moreover, the state-space together with 
this set of statements and the satisfaction function form a language associated with a 
given th eo ry .T h is  is not a language within which the theory is formulated, but one 
‘... in which statements about the subject matter of the theory can be formulated. 
Exploring the structure of the elementary language is one way of exploring what the 
theory says about the world.’ [van Fraassen 1972, p312, the emphasis is mine.] Since 
all elementary statements are mapped onto the state-space, the mathematical structure 
of the space is induced onto the meaning relations among the predicates used to 
characterise a physical system. Certainly the laws of the theory (which should not be 
identified with the axioms or a subset of the axioms in a syntactic reconstruction of a 
theory) also induce restrictions. But as Mackinnon (1979, p522) points out, ‘in any 
given formulation of a theory there is a clear distinction between statements which 
are true by virtue of meaning relations and statements which are true by virtue of 
laws.’ "^^ If for a certain kind of physical system X, the theory specifies a state-space 
H, a set E  of elementary statements, and a satisfaction function h, then a semi­
interpreted language comprises of the triple L={H, E, h). A couple M={loc, A) is a
Sometimes van Fraassen refers to such a language as semi-interpreted language (1967 and 1970), 
and sometimes as elementary language (1972).
The interested reader may inquire into van Fraassen 1967, 1969, 1970. Of particular interest is van 
Fraassen’s attempt in addressing meaning relations among predicates as a substitute to explicating the
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model for L, where loc is a function assigning a location to X 'm  H. A semantic 
definition of truth can then be given in terms of the state-space: U eE is true in 
M={loc, X) i f  and only i f  loc{X) e  h{U). Through this definition we can discern two 
important features of the SV. First, the motto of the SV, ‘the class of models is 
defined by means of the state-space’, is to be understood as a direct definition of the 
class of mathematical structures (the set of ob jects).Second , the satisfaction 
function provides the physical interpretation of theories, by mapping the experimental 
reports of physical systems onto regions of the state-space. These physical 
interpretations are implicitly specified and are presumably subject to change. The 
semi-interpreted language is thus partially interpreted, but not in a Camapian sense. It 
is partially interpreted in the sense that elementary propositions are mapped onto the 
state-space. A full interpretation comes about by means of the location fimction that 
relates the physical system to the state-space.
These considerations that van Fraassen takes us through are essentially an attempt to 
assign to language a purely descriptive role. That is to say, the representation capacity 
is stripped away from language and shifted to the theory structure and the models of 
the theory. Language is given the purely expressive role of defining the structures that 
constitute the theory.
3.2.1.2 Applying the State-Space Approach
We can look at the Newtonian description of the solar system as a particular physical 
system by which to make sense of the SV.^  ^We must note the fact that the operative 
notion in this system is that of relative motion. Hence for the sake of the argument we
notion of the intent of a predicate. An attempt that reveals part of the motivation which underlies the 
Semantic View.
It is among the claims of the proponents of the SV that this is conspicuously different from the sense 
of ‘model’ as an interpretation that satisfies a set of statements (the axioms and theorems of a theory). 
An interpretation, that is, that matches a set of statements to a set of objects for which certain relations 
hold. This issue will be addressed in more detail in section 3.3.
A system that van Fraassen himself chooses to use for his description, 1980, pp44-46.
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can ignore Newton’s notion o f ‘true motions’, i.e. motions relative to absolute space. 
In describing the behaviour of the system, Newton chooses to speak of apparent 
motion, which is motion relative to the earth, i.e. the observer, and of relative motion 
of the planets. In general, one can speak of relative motion with respect to the earth, 
or the sun, or any inertial frame of reference. As van Fraassen points out, the relative 
motions of the planets ‘...form relational structures defined by measuring relative 
distances, time intervals, and angles of separation. ’ [1980, p45] He calls these 
relational structures appearances, which can be regarded as the equivalent of models 
of data. Within the mathematical model (i.e. an element of the state-space for CPM) 
of this physical system, ‘... we can define structures that are meant to be exact 
reflections of those appearances... ’ {Ibid., p45]. These structures are what are known, 
in van Fraassen’s jargon, as empirical substructures. Empirical substructures are 
defined, so to speak, by the satisfaction function of the theory. The latter singles out 
those regions of the state-space that satisfy those elementary statements, which 
formulate propositions about the motions of the planets. Van Fraassen’s view is that, 
claims of theory representation of observable phenomena are claims about 
isomorphism between all actual appearances and the empirical substructures of some 
model of the theory. For instance in the case of the Newtonian solar system, the 
appearances (i.e. the observation reports about relative distances, time intervals and 
angles of separation) are contrasted against the appropriate parts of the state-space. 
Van Fraassen’s view is that, if the theory is empirically adequate then the 
appearances are embedded in the models of the theory, or they are isomorphic to the 
empirical substructures of some model. Since the state-space is to be understood as a 
cluster of models of the theory, it includes many models in which the world is a 
Newtonian mechanical system. In fact the state-space includes (unites) all logically 
possible models, as the following ‘completeness’ dictum suggests: ‘In one such 
model, nothing except the solar system exists at all; in another the fixed stars also 
exist, and in a third, the solar system exists and dolphins are its only rational 
inhabitants.’ [van Fraassen 1987, p i l l ;  and 1989, p226]^^ Hence, if the theory is
This view does not only imply that the state-space unites the models of the theory, but also that by 
virtue of its infinite class of models the theory includes the best model for the representation purpose at
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empirically adequate we can presumably find a model of the theory in which we can 
specify empirical substructures that are isomorphic to the appearances or data model.
We can use van Fraassen’s own encapsulation of his picture of scientific theories to 
recapitulate the above:
‘To present a theory is to specify a family of stmctures, its models', and secondly, to 
specify certain parts of those models (the empirical substructures) as candidates for the 
direct representation of observable phenomena. The structures which can be described in 
experimental and measurement reports we can call appearances', the theory is 
empirically adequate if it has some model such that all appearances are isomorphic to 
empirical substructures of that model.’[Van Fraassen 1980, p64]
I have made no allusion to the empirical adequacy requirement, vis-à-vis ‘truth 
requirements’, for theories because in my discussion the debate over scientific 
realism and anti-realism is of no particular relevance. In order to make sense, 
however, of the notion o f ‘empirical substructures’ we have to look into two essential 
ingredients of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. The first is that of the 
observable/nonobservable division regarding features of the models. Appearances are 
relational structures of measurements of observable aspects of the physical system, 
e.g. relative distances and velocities. Hence the empirical substructures are those 
parts of the model that are presumed to be isomorphic to the observable aspects of the 
physical system, i.e. the appearances. The second ingredient is that of modality in the 
models. Van Fraassen allows modalities only to exist within our models. For instance 
the model allows for any sequence of states for different initial conditions. This 
however is only a consequence of our model construction; it says nothing about 
physical modalities, which van Fraassen rejects and insists that beliefs of this sort are 
unwarranted: ‘To be an empiricist is to withhold belief in anything that goes beyond 
the actual, observable phenomena, and to recognise no objective modality in nature.’ 
[Ibid. p202] He contends that in our measurements we are only able to observe the 
actual occurrences. Van Fraassen’s modal agnosticism is without doubt an interesting 
subject for philosophical inquiry, yet the point relevant to the present discussion is 
that the empirical adequacy requirement ‘... concerns actual phenomena: what does 
happen, and not what would happen under different circumstances’ [Ibid., p60], as
hand, and furthermore that the theory provides all the instructions necessary for choosing that model. 
These implications of the SV will be explored and criticised in Chapters 4 and 5.
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this marks one of the major differences between van Fraassen’s and Suppe’s 
approaches. This requirement of course has as corollary the fact that all appearances 
must be isomorphic to empirical substructures of the model. This, as Suppe points out 
[1989, p i02], has another dimension. It would require that all physical systems in the 
domain of the theory occur in isolated circumstances and under idealised conditions.
To conclude the presentation of the state-space approach, we must make reference to 
a significant amendment/addition van Fraassen makes to his original conception of 
the nature of theories and their representation of phenomena. By adopting from the 
work of Giere, he identifies a theory with two elements, ‘...(a) the theoretical 
definition, which defines a certain class of systems; (b) a theoretical hypothesis, 
which asserts that certain (sorts of) real systems are among (or related in some way 
to) members of that class’ [van Fraassen 1989, p222]. The theoretical definition 
evidently consists in the definition of the class of models, i.e. the state-space or the 
class of state-space types. The theoretical hypothesis is however a linguistic entity, it 
asserts that a certain model or class of models (the empirical substructures) is/are 
isomorphic to the appearances (or models of data).^^ In other words, theoretical 
hypotheses are asserted claims that an individual real system exhibits -all or possibly 
some of the features of- the structure of a model in the defined class. They could also 
be used to make general claims that for a certain class of real systems all members 
exhibit the structure.
Giere suggests the relation of ‘similarity in respects and degrees’, rather than ‘isomorphism’, 
between models and phenomena, because he admits that isomorphism is too strong a demand (special 
emphasis must be added to the fact that Giere is not confining ‘similarity’ only to the observable 
aspects of the models). However, his notion of similarity has been criticised convincingly for its 
vagueness. One way to interpret Giere’s use of the notion is (along the same lines as Suppe) to 
consider it as suggesting that models inherently involve abstractions and idealisations, in which case it 
would fall prey to the criticisms that follow in the subsequent Chapters.
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3.2.1.3 Theoretical Representation by Means of the State-Space
In figure 3.1 I present a schematic of the view proposed by van Fraassen (as with 
every picture, of course, an element of abstraction is unavoidable). We can use this 
figure to recapitulate van Fraassen’s approach. There is a class of real systems in the 
world for which a particular language (call it elementary language) may be used to 
characterise certain features of the former. These features are the particular relations 
that determine the scope of the theory, e.g. mechanical relations determine the scope 
of CPM. Certain parameters are hence developed in the language as to address the 
subject matter of each domain. The relation that exists between the use of language 
and the real systems (the world) is not addressed (one is led to assume that it is a 
subject for empirical investigation, rather than one of proper philosophical inquiry). 
The language only serves the purpose of defining a class of structure-types called the 
state-space types. This class of structures (in Section 3.3 it will be labelled ‘families 
of theoretical models’) is made available for modelling the domain of the theory.
The real systems are subjected to experimentation, where measurements of data 
involve not only experimental design and data recordings but also corrections of raw 
data accounting for ceteris parihus conditions, experimental calibrations etc. The 
results are models of the data or appearances, which are structures defined in the 
language of the theory (the dotted lines in the diagram indicate the use of the 
language of the theory in constructing models of data). The SV, in van Fraassen’s 
version, claims that a certain relation exists between the models of the data and an 
empirical substructure of the state-space. This relation is one of embedding or 
isomorphism, and it is expressed by means of a linguistic entity called a theoretical 
hypothesis.
Thus we may conclude that theoretical representation involves the definition of the 
theory structure. Defining the theory-structure yields an indefinite number of models, 
which become available for representing the phenomena in the theory’s scope. The 
application of a theory consists in determining which model of the theory is best
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Definition
State-space:
Classes of structures, 
families of theoretical 
models, available for 
modeling the domain (or 
scope) of the theory. 
Empirical substructures 
are the observable 
aspects (subsets) of these 
structures.
\
Theoretical Hypotheses: 
claims of isomorphism. 
(Mapping)
Language: employed to 
characterise the subject 
matter of the theory. 
 -^------------
Appearances 
Models of Data
or
Experimental procedures, 
such as calibrations etc., 
filter the raw data and 
transliterate them into the 
language of the theory.
\
Real Systems
Figure 3.1
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suited for representing a particular physical system. Once the model is chosen, the 
representation relation it bears to the corresponding data model is of structural nature, 
i.e. isomorphism or embedding. More precisely, the data model is isomorphic to an 
empirical substructure embedded in the model. This view of theory-application, and 
subsequently of theoretical representation, can be disputed on two fronts. Firstly we 
can argue intrinsically, i.e. within the spirit of the SV (as we shall see, Suppe’s 
dispute with van Fraassen’s version is along this line), that isomorphism of structure 
is rarely if ever detected in actual scientific practices. But secondly, and more 
importantly we can argue extrinsically, i.e. outside of the spirit of the SV and 
consequently against the SV, that a number of unsatisfactory and often unjustifiable 
and highly disputable assumptions underlie this view of theoretical representation; (1) 
That in actual scientific theorising, there can be a sharp distinction between models of 
theory and models of data. (2) That in actual scientific theorising when we define a 
theory-structure we immediately lay down an indefinite number of models that are 
available for modelling the theory’s domain. (3) That the actual scientific models 
used in theoretical representation approximate, in one form or another, one or some 
models of the theory, or that they are the pragmatic counterparts of corresponding 
models of the theory. (4) That the methods and processes of construction of actual 
representation models are irrelevant to how these models relate to theory and to how 
they function in scientific inquiry. (5) That modelling in science, i.e. the construction 
of representation models, is done by having a model of the theory as a starting point.
We shall see in the next section (3.2.2) how Suppe gives an alternative to van 
Fraassen’s representation relation. However, we shall also see that his account also 
relies on the above assumptions. Indeed, I fail to see how any rational reconstruction 
of scientific theories that uses mathematical structures could avoid these assumptions.
3.2.2 Suppe’s Relational-Systems Version
Suppe’s analysis of his version of the SV is much more elaborate than any other. 
There is however one drawback that makes its assimilation fatiguing, the fact that he 
uses an uncommon and idiosyncratic terminology. He does this because he wants to
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establish a general terminology that can be used with reference to all theories, 
mathematical and non-mathematical. This terminology will be explained as I proceed 
with my explication of his version of the SV, by supplying my own examples from 
classical mechanics. My own examples, whose objective is to make my presentation 
more intelligible, are carefully chosen so that Suppe’s view is not distorted.
As pointed out earlier, Suppe attempts to construct a version of the SV that can also 
accommodate non-mathematical theories. In doing so he identifies the theory with 
structures that are more general than the state-space, for which state-spaces are 
canonical models of the former. He claims three reasons for doing so. Firstly, as 
mentioned, he wants to also accommodate in his approach non-mathematical theories. 
Secondly, if theories are identified with configurations of numbers imposed on phase 
spaces, or more generally state-spaces, then theories like CPM would be comprised of 
an infinite number of theories, each representing an «-body system of a different 
dimension. We have seen in section 3.2.1.1 however, that van Fraassen does not 
identify the theory with a state-space but rather with a class of state-space types. He 
does so precisely as to avoid this problem. Therefore, I believe Suppe’s second 
reason can be dismissed. Thirdly, in some theories, as for example the Special Theory 
of Relativity, each frame of reference may be construed as determining a different 
class of configurations imposed on phase spaces. But the way these phase spaces are 
interconnected, namely by way of the Lorentz group of transformations, is a central 
part of the theory. Hence it would be a mistake to view such configurations imposed 
on phase spaces as the theory. But as Suppe himself recognises, this problem can also 
be avoided by considering the Lorentz transformations as laws of coexistence, and 
the configurations of all frames of reference as being imposed on the same phase 
sp a c e .T h u s , it is my opinion that the only sustainable argument for Suppe’s 
relational-systems approach as opposed to the state-space, is that it is more general 
and allows the accommodation of non-mathematical theories into the framework of 
the SV. This is not an argument, however, to be looked upon with contempt, for
See Suppe 1974a, pp227-228, and Suppe 1989, ppl03-106, for an analysis of these points.
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Suppe sanctions the SV as a respectable contender for understanding the nature of all 
scientific theories and not just those given in terms of a mathematical formulation/"^
3.2.2.1 The Relational-Systems Approach
According to Suppe, scientific theories are extralinguistic structures that qualify as 
semantic models of their linguistic formulations. Theories characterise particular 
classes of phenomena known as the intended scope o f the theory. However 
phenomena are not characterised in their full complexity, but certain factors or 
parameters (not necessarily measurable) are abstracted from them and used in the 
description of physical systems.'^^ Physical systems are abstract in the sense that they 
utilise only the abstracted parameters to characterise phenomena. These parameters 
are the defining parameters o f the physical systems since they are used to wholly 
describe their behaviour. For example, the intended scope of CPM is the class of all 
mechanical phenomena of interacting bodies, and its defining parameters are the 
position and momentum vectors. Physical systems are abstract replicas of 
phenomena, in the sense that they are what the phenomena would have been if their 
behaviour depended only on the selected parameters. For example, a real pendulum is 
subject to a large number of influences, among them disturbances due to the medium 
in which it oscillates. CMP would not describe the behaviour of a real pendulum, but 
of a respective abstract physical system that would be assumed to operate, for 
instance, in vacuum.
I will be using the same terminology and notation as Suppe 1989, which is his most elaborate work 
and on which I rely heavily. The reader should be cautioned however, that I analyse Suppe’s general 
version of the SV by employing CPM as an example (i.e. a mathematical theory). This should not 
cause any ambiguity as long as the feature of generality is recognised in his analysis, and it is 
distinguished from the state-space approach. Suppe himself emphatically attempts to establish the 
connection of mathematical theories with his own analysis to stress this generality. See for instance his 
1989, pp 104-106, where he employs a variant terminology of exposition for mathematical theories. For 
purposes of simplicity, I have chosen to ignore the latter terminology.
For the remaining of this section, ‘physical system’ will be used to denote this particular notion
developed by Suppe, which becomes evident in the discussion that follows.
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The defining parameters of each physical system are the basic parameters of its 
associated theory, hence all physical systems are described in the language of the 
theory. The values of the defining parameters are physical q u a n tit ie s .A possible 
state of a physical system is a set of simultaneous values of the defining parameters. 
Physical systems are in one possible state at any given time, though this particular 
state may change over time. The behaviour of a physical system is the time evolution 
of its states. Suppe invites us to view the unique sequence of states a physical system 
assumes over time as its ‘history’. A complete characterisation of a physical system 
would involve the specification of the possible states it can assume in conjunction 
with its history.
The physical system (in Suppe’s terminology) is the medium of theoretical 
description, but since it is constructed from abstracted parameters, the description is 
counterfactual. The physical system, and subsequently the theory, describes what the 
phenomena would have been had their behaviour been subject only to influences from 
the abstracted parameters. The behaviour of actual phenomena may of course be 
subject to other unselected parameters, for which the theory does not account. Within 
the theory’s intended scope, each physical system S  will correspond to a causally 
possible phenomenon P, e.g. the pendulum physical system which is described by 
ignoring a large number of influencing factors corresponds to an actual pendulum in 
the world. This correspondence is counterfactual, S is what P  would have been if P 
were influenced only by the selected parameters and were the idealised conditions 
imposed by the theory met.
We may define the class of physical systems that correspond to causally possible 
phenomena within the theory’s intended scope, in the above manner, to be the class 
of causally possible physical systems. One of the jobs of a scientific theory is ‘...to
We can think of the physical quantities as the equivalent of van Fraassen’s measurable physical 
magnitudes, although I stress again that for Suppe these may be qualitative in nature and hence not 
measurable. Suppe himself gives the example of ‘colour’ fitting the prerequisite of being a defining 
parameter, in which case the physical quantities would be ‘differentiated colours’. Another example of 
a physical quantity would be probability distribution functions.
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exactly circumscribe the class of causally possible physical systems’ [Suppe 1989, 
p84]. This is done by determining the class of theory-induced physical systems (a 
notion that is explained below). And the truth or falsity of a theory is determined by 
whether the two classes are identical or not. If the class of causally possible physical 
systems is identical to the class of theory-induced physical systems then the theory is 
true, and false otherwise. Suppe contends that theories have two features, viz. they are 
propounded extralinguistic structures and they consist of a class of theory-induced 
physical systems. He suggests that these two features that can most easily be 
accommodated by analysing theories as relational systems (in a Tarskian sense) that 
consist of ‘...a domain containing all (logically) possible states of all (logically) 
possible physical systems... ’ [Ibid., p84] together with the laws of the theory defined 
over that domain. The laws of the theory indicate which states are physically 
possible and which sequences of states the physical system can assume. Therefore, 
the laws of the theory determine the relations of the theory, and consequently 
eliminate some logically possible states from qualifying as candidates for the 
behaviour of physical systems.
We are thus faced with the following picture. The extralinguistic structure consists of 
the domain of all logically possible states. The theory however also consists of certain 
attributes defined over the domain. These attributes are the laws of the theory, such as 
the general categories of laws o f succession, coexistence, and interaction holding for 
either deterministic or statistical cases. For example, if the laws of the theory are laws 
of succession then the attributes will be relations of succession, if they are laws of 
coexistence then the attributes will be equivalence relations, and so forth. The 
attributes of the theory have two functions. Firstly, they indicate the sub-domain of 
physically possible states in the domain of the logically possible states. Secondly, 
(together with initial conditions) they indicate the sequences of states a physical 
system can assume. In conjunction these two features of the attributes of the theory
It may, prima facie, seem that van Fraassen’s equivalent to this is the state-space. State-spaces 
however, as mentioned earlier, can be viewed as particular instances (or canonical iconic models) of 
Suppe’s relational structures, if  unique sets of «-tuples of numbers are assigned to each and every state.
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determine the class of theory-induced physical systems, which we can read as the 
class of theoretically possible physical systems determined by the laws of the theory.
As an example to help visualise Suppe’s analysis, consider the following. The linear 
harmonic oscillator is a theory-induced physical system, because it is the result of 
Newton’s 2""* law, which relates the position vector as given by a particular force 
function to its second derivative. It is at a level of abstraction (i.e. only the potential 
energy fimction, V=V2kx^, is specified) that bears a very distant resemblance to actual 
phenomena. But the key feature of systems like the linear harmonic oscillator is that 
they consist of mere definitions of a mathematical function (e.g. the potential energy). 
Given the constraints imposed upon them by the laws of the theory, functions such as 
this give rise to what Suppe calls theory-induced physical systems. Theory-induced 
physical systems do not directly relate to the world, but they ‘circumscribe’ causally 
possible physical systems. In other words, the linear harmonic oscillator is an abstract 
mathematical structure that nevertheless circumscribes other more ‘concrete’ forms of 
oscillators, such as the torsion pendulum or the mass-spring system. Both of the latter 
can be regarded as causally possible physical systems that characterise causally 
possible phenomena in the aforementioned counterfactual way.
It is worth looking at what takes place here. The linear harmonic oscillator, a 
‘mathematical instrument’, has the following equation of motion: x + {klm)x = 0, 
which is the result of applying Newton’s 2"  ^ law to the foregoing potential energy 
function. The mathematical model itself fixes the interpretation of the mathematical 
constituents of this equation: periodic oscillations are assumed to take place with 
respect to time, % is the displacement of an oscillating mass-point, k  and m are 
constant coefficients that may be replaced by others. The torsion pendulum on the 
other hand, although it is also a ‘mathematical instrument’, resembles in various 
respects an actual causal phenomenon: an elastic rod connected to a massive object, 
e.g. a disc, whose normal to the tangent oscillates about an equilibrium position. Its 
equation of motion is 6 + (AT//)^ = 0 where, 6 is the angle of twist, K  is the torsion 
constant and I  is the moment of inertia. The torsion pendulum equation is identical in 
mathematical form (or isomorphic in structure) to the linear harmonic oscillator
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equation, therefore angular oscillations must be harmonic. In identifying a theory- 
induced with a causally possible physical system, we unavoidably exercise aspects of 
physical interpretation, in particular, that aspect which Giere has dubbed 
‘identification’ of mathematical te rm s .F o r  instance, in the torsion pendulum we 
transform the language of ‘the displacement of an oscillating mass-point. . . ’ to that of 
an ‘object of specific geometric form that undergoes angular oscillations about a 
specified axis under abstract and idealised circumstances’. The behaviour of the 
linear harmonic oscillator is carried over to the torsion pendulum, but the affixed 
feature of geometric form reduces it from mathematical abstraction to a level that can 
reasonably be associated to actual occurrences in the world. Suppe seems to overlook 
what is involved in moving from mathematical abstract equations to the same 
equations affixed with an ingredient that allows associations with the world. Yet this 
element of identifying mathematical symbols with specific aspects of real systems 
can easily be accommodated into his picture. In fact, it is my contention that this 
understanding of the theory structure, namely the distinction between theory-induced 
and causally possible physical systems, captures an element of actual scientific 
theorising that van Fraassen’s picture obscures {viz. that particular aspect of 
‘identification’ mentioned above). It is partly for this reason that I have earlier 
claimed that Suppe’s picture is more defensible than van Fraassen’s is. This 
distinction also has an additional consequence that renders it closer to actual science - 
the fact that it allows for the elements of abstraction and idealisation to emerge as 
significant features of scientific theorising. Before I begin to analyse these aspects of 
Suppe’s theory, I will enter into a brief digression to explicate the use of language.
Giere introduces a useful distinction between interpretation  and identification. ‘ ...[Interpretation] is 
the linking of the mathematical symbols with general terms, or concepts, such as ‘position’.
... [Identification] is the linking of a mathematical symbol with some feature of a specific object, such 
as ‘the position of the moon’.’ [Giere 1988, p75] I take it that interpretation, in Giere's sense, is fixed 
by the semantic models, 1 also take it that in van Fraassen’s version, identification is presumably 
established by the satisfaction function that maps elementary propositions onto regions of the state- 
space. By no means do I mean to imply that in Suppe’s version of the SV the process of identification 
is exhausted at the stage of identifying a theory-induced with a causally possible physical system, or 
that it applies only to this stage of theoretical construction.
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3.2.2.2 The Theory Formulation Language
According to Suppe we must distinguish between the theory and the linguistic 
formulation of the theory. A formulation of a theory, says Suppe, is a collection of 
propositions, which may consist of a few specified propositions together with all their 
deductive consequences that are true of the theory. These propositions typically 
constitute the theory formulation language, which is used not only to describe the 
theory but also to refer to physical systems and to phenomena within the theory’s 
intended scope. To explicate this, Suppe makes use of the distinction in strict and 
amplified usage of propositions. Under strict usage, a proposition is used to describe, 
and refer to a particular system. For instance under such usage a proposition will be 
used solely in reference to the theory and not to phenomena. Under amplified usage, a 
proposition is used indifferently to describe, and refer to different systems. Amplified 
usage is such that the same proposition can simultaneously describe features of the 
theory as well as of physical systems and phenomena. Propositions in the theory 
formulation language must admit of amplified usage, so that theoretical predictions 
via physical systems can be related to experimental measurements. But since 
propositions that admit of amplified usage also admit of strict usage (not vice-versa), 
propositions may also be used strictly with reference either to the theory or to 
physical systems or to phenomena.
The key features of propositions in the theory formulation language can be discerned 
by investigating their strict usage in theories, or physical systems, or phenomena. 
Suppe’s analysis of the relation between theory formulation languages and theories is 
in many respects similar to van Fraassen’s analysis. We already noted that the values 
of a physical parameter p  are given by a physical quantity q. A set of elementary 
propositions in the theory formulation language is utilised to express that p  has value 
q at time t. An elementary proposition (p is true of a state s in the domain of the theory 
(or of a subset h{(p) of the domain), if 5 has value q for parameter p  at time t. The 
mapping h of elementary propositions to states or subsets of states of the theory is 
known as the satisfaction function. In accordance with some logic (e.g. Boolean 
algebra mod-2, for CPM), elementary propositions may be compounded together.
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Together ‘ . . .the set of propositions, the theory, the satisfaction function h, and the 
logic of the theory determine a language o f physical description, which is a 
sublanguage of the theory formulation language’ [Suppe 1989, p89]. This sub­
language is capable of describing physically possible states of the theory and 
consequently the physically possible states of physical systems. The language of 
physical description together with an augmented logic peculiar to each theory, in 
which the laws of the theory can be expressed (e.g. differential equations in CPM), 
forms the theory formulation language.
We may recall that a physical system in the class of theory-induced physical systems
may be construed as the restriction of the theory to a single sequence of states. It may
therefore seem that propositions of the theory formulation language may be used to
describe and refer to theory-induced physical systems. In other words, propositions
that are true (or meaningful) of a particular physical system would also be true (or
meaningful) of the theory. Although this would not mean that all propositions true (or
meaningful) of the theory would also be true (or meaningful) of all physical systems.
They would only be true (or meaningful) of some physical system, (e.g. a proposition
true or meaningfiil of a two-body system in CPM cannot necessarily be so for a three-
body system). Yet, as Suppe points out, the theory formulation language is not
sufficient to characterise physical systems. The reason for this is that one of the aims
of a theory is to exactly circumscribe the class of causally possible physical systems.
If the class of theory-induced physical systems happens to be identical to the class of
causally possible physical systems then the theory formulation language will suffice,
since whatever proposition is true of a theory-induced physical system (hence of the
theory) is also true of a causally possible one and conversely. The language, however,
is the means by which we check for the identity of these two classes. In other words,
there must be a way to establish that, if propositions are true of a causally possible
physical system then they are also true or false of the theory and conversely. Notice
that the logic of the theory formulation language restricts the ways in which
elementary propositions may be compounded together. As a result, some propositions
that may be true of causally possible systems are excluded from the theory
formulation language, hence the falsity of the theory cannot be established because
such counter-instances to the theory cannot be stated in that language. Suppe
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proposes that an expanded theory formulation language (to which the theory 
formulation language is a sub-language) be used to describe all causally possible 
physical systems. He gives only a very general description of the elements of this 
language: The logic of the language should not impose any restrictions on the 
admissible truth-functional combinations of propositions, that it should possess an 
adequate mechanism ‘...to describe any logically possible behaviour of any logically 
possible physical system...’ [Ibid., p91], thus resulting in an expansion of the 
deductive logical apparatus of such a language."^^
Finally, Suppe considers the strict usage of propositions in the suggested expanded 
theory formulation language with reference to phenomena. According to an account 
of factual truth that he develops in a separate work, the world consists of 
‘particulars’. T h e  phenomena in the theory’s intended scope will be systems of 
these particulars, which possess intrinsic properties and enter into intrinsic relations 
that need not be observable. Suppe calls such systems, phenomenal systems, and 
further clarifies that each causally possible phenomenon is a causally possible 
phenomenal system. To relate to our earlier example, a phenomenal system would be 
an actual torsion pendulum apparatus consisting of an elastic rod connected to a 
massive object, which are the system’s observable object particulars. It must be added 
that to every such phenomenal system there corresponds a causally possible physical 
system of a given theory. Since elementary propositions assert that a physical 
parameter p  has a physical quantity q at time t, and since p ’s are kinds of attributes 
that particulars may possess, then elementary propositions can be used to describe 
phenomenal systems, i.e. to refer to particulars and predicate attributes in phenomenal 
systems. Physical systems, it was mentioned, are relational systems that have a
Although this is not a matter of concern and investigation in the present work, it does not seem to me 
an exaggeration to conjecture that these demands on an expanded theory formulation language are an 
indirect attempt to accord to scientific languages the descriptive power of set theory. It is therefore a 
laborious task to allow the subject matter of a theory to dictate the language formulation.
I shall not examine his theory of factual truth. The interested reader may inquire into Suppe 1973. 
For the sake of my discussion, let me just emphasise that objects are particulars but particulars are not 
necessarily just objects. By particulars Suppe refers to existing things or substances, mental or 
physical, each of which possesses many characteristics like qualities, properties or relations.
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domain of states and attributes (the physical parameters) defined over these states. 
Similarly phenomenal systems are relational systems with a domain of particulars 
with intrinsic characteristics such as properties the particulars possess or relations 
they enter into.
Through these considerations Suppe essentially attempts to assign to language a 
purely descriptive role. Just as for van Fraassen, the representation capacity is 
stripped away from language and shifted to the theory structure and the physical 
systems. In the SV, language is given the purely expressive role of defining the 
classes of mathematical structures that constitute the theory, and comparing these to 
structures about the phenomena that are described in the same language.
S.2.2.3 The Structural Relation Between Physical and Phenomenal Systems
Suppe’s claim is that to each phenomenal system P corresponds a physical system S. 
I would like to address the sort of correspondence between P  and S  that Suppe 
suggests. It was mentioned earlier that theories characterise classes of phenomena in 
their intended scope, and that they do not do this by describing these phenomena in 
their full complexity. Instead, Suppe’s understanding is that certain parameters are 
abstracted and employed in this characterisation. In the case of CPM, these are the 
position and momentum vectors. These two parameters are abstracted from all other 
characteristics that phenomenal systems may possess because they are assumed to be 
the only ones influencing mechanical systems. The notion of abstraction is here used 
in an Aristotelian sense, i.e. in the sense of subtraction or removal from."^  ^ Suppe
There is the tendency among philosophers to confuse this notion of ‘abstraction’ with the Duhemian 
use of it. Cartwright, 1989 chapter 5, makes the effort to clarify the distinction between the two uses of 
the term. Duhem’s use of the term is such as to address the idea of symbolic representations of real 
physical objects and their relations. The mere use of symbolic representations of the real imposes on 
scientific theories the ‘medium’ of abstraction. But this is not the use of the term by Cartwright, and 
neither is it by Suppe. Abstraction used in the Aristotelian sense ‘ ...means ‘taking away’ or 
‘subtraction [of] ’ . . . ’ [Cartwright 1989, p i 97], some of those factors that may influence the concrete or 
some of the properties the concrete may possess.
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however impels us to see the process of abstraction going one step further. Once the 
factors, that are assumed to influence the class of phenomenal systems in the theory’s 
intended scope, have been abstracted (isolated) the characterisation of physical 
systems still does not fully account for phenomenal systems. Physical systems are not 
concerned with the actual values of the parameters the particulars possess, e.g. actual 
velocities, but with the values of these parameters under certain conditions that obtain 
only within the physical system its e lf .T h u s  in CPM, where the behaviour of 
dimensionless point-masses are studied in isolation from outside interactions, 
physical systems characterise this behaviour only by reference to the positions and 
momenta of the point-masses at given times. Physical systems are therefore, 
‘...highly abstract and idealised replicas of phenomena, being characterisations of 
how the phenomena would have behaved had the idealised conditions been met. ’ 
[Suppe 1989, p65] How is the correspondence between P and S  to be understood? 
The simple pendulum can serve as an example to ‘fit into’, and by which to visualise, 
the correspondence between P and S\ in other words to make sense of the replicating 
relation.
A theory-induced physical system has to be consistent with Newton’s 2"  ^ law, which 
is understood in Suppe’s theory along definitional lines. A category of systems 
studied in CPM, known as conservative, assume that the total force on the system is
These conditions are, in the literature, repeatedly termed as idealisations. Amongst a large number of 
authors who adopt this terminology some are Giere 1988a, Shapere 1984, McMullin 1985, Laymon 
1985, 1995, Morrison 1997, 1998 and forthcoming (a). These authors have been primarily concerned 
with questions of how  idealisations are used in science. As a consequence, they do not explicitly make 
the distinction between idealised manipulations o f  theories, as opposed to theories propounded as 
idealisations. The only authors to my knowledge that explicitly pursue the latter analysis are Suppe 
and Cartwright 1983, 1989, 1989a, 1992. In attempting to analyse theories as ideahsations one must 
address questions as to what idealisations are and what kinds of idealisations are employed in the 
construction of scientific theories, and finally confront the question of how  theories propounded as 
idealisations may be related to phenomena. Suppe is a starting point but as I shall be arguing his 
analysis is incomplete and subsequently inadequate. It must be added that the aforementioned authors 
use the term ‘ideahsations’ partly because they do not make the above distinction. Once the distinction 
is recognised a more general and accurate term to use is abstractions, as 1 will be claiming in the 
discussion in chapter 6.
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conservative. This is expressed in the mathematical formalism by VxF=0, which is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the force to be conservative. Within the 
physical understanding of the formalism this amounts to the total energy of the 
system being conserved. For conservative forces it can easily be shown that the force 
relates to the potential energy of the system in the following way; F=-VF. In the one­
dimensional case this equation reduces to the well known relation F (ÿ ^ -d V (ÿ /d ^ ,  
where ^ is the generalised coordinate.
The linear harmonic oscillator, assumed initially to be a conservative system, is under 
the influence of a linear restoring force. This is understood to imply that the force 
function has the form where A is a positive constant; or in accordance with
the above relation, that the potential energy function is of the form 
Applying Newton’s 2"  ^ law to this force function yields the equation of motion 
mentioned in section 3.2.2.1, namely
^’ + (Â:/m)^ = 0 (3.1)
The preceding equation of motion applies to the one-dimensional motion of a 
particle, which is displaced from its stable equilibrium position. It is therefore a 
particular application of Newton’s 2"  ^ law that we may refer to as a theory-induced 
physical system following Suppe, or simply view it as a semantic model that satisfies 
the laws of the theory. To repeat an important claim of the SV, such models can be 
directly defined without recourse to syntax.
Any phenomenal system whose mathematically formulated dynamics yield an 
equation of motion identical in form to equation (3.1) qualifies as a linear harmonic 
oscillator. We have already seen that examples of such are the torsion pendulum and 
the mass-spring system. Nevertheless, there are plenty of other phenomenal systems
Harmonic variations occur outside of CPM, e.g. the classical electromagnetic theory and quantum 
mechanics. In quantum mechanics, for instance, the use of the concept of a linear restoring force would 
be of no help, instead in setting up the Schrodinger equation for such systems the notion of energy 
proves to be more helpful. In fact so is the case in CPM, where, as is well known, using the Lagrangian 
or Hamiltonian formalisms to set up the equations of motion proves to be a way to avoid the 
mathematical complexities that the use of the appealing notion of force gives rise to.
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that although they do resemble the linear harmonic oscillator they do not fit it, unless 
additional assumptions are made. In the simple pendulum case, we have an example 
of two-dimensional periodic oscillations. The result is the following equation of 
motion, given in terms of the angle of oscillation variable and its 2"  ^time-derivative:
è  + (g //)s in ^  = 0 (3.2)
An exact analytic solution to equation (3.2) involves the Jacobian elliptic sine 
function. This leads to an expression for the period of oscillation in terms of an 
elliptic integral, which can be quite unmanageable and hence a perturbation 
expansion of the integrand is needed for a convenient general solution. But we can 
simplify the problem by reducing it to the one-dimensional case, thus obtaining a 
simple analytic solution. By assuming that the amplitude of oscillation 6 is 
infmitesimally small (which is another way of saying that the displacement of the bob 
is one-dimensional) then ^ sin ^ , and equation (3.2) reduces to equation (3.1) in terms 
of 9. The process of implementing this assumption is part of the process of 
developing the particular theory-induced physical system, which finds its causally 
possible analogue in the simple pendulum modulo this assumption together with the 
assumptions for a conservative force, a uniform gravitational field, and an 
extensionless point-mass. Some physical implications of the four assumptions 
involved are well known. The pendulum will continue to oscillate indefinitely since it 
is assumed that there is no energy dissipation, and it will do so under the influence of 
a constant downward force since it is in a uniform gravitational field. Both of these 
together imply that the period of oscillation is constant.
However, in the actual phenomenal system we know that such a situation does not 
occur. The actual pendulum apparatus is subject to a number of different factors (or 
may have a number of different characteristics) that may be divided into those 
influencing and those not influencing the process of oscillation, i.e. the mechanical 
process under study. Those factors that we assume to influence its oscillations can be 
further categorised into those internal to the system and to those external to it.^° 
Some internally influencing factors inter alia are the amplitude of the angle of
These categorisations are my suggestion and not Suppe’s.
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oscillation, the mass distribution of the bob and suspension wire, the wire connections 
and the flexibility of the wire. Some externally influencing factors inter alia are the 
gravitational field of the earth (which is assumed to be uniform), the buoyancy of the 
bob, the resistance of the air and the stirring up of the air due to the oscillations. 
Some aspects of the apparatus that are assumed not to influence the process of 
oscillation because they do not depend upon the mass, the velocity or the 
displacement, are for instance the colour of the bob or the illumination of the 
experimental set-up. In modelling the simple pendulum by means of the linear 
harmonic oscillator what is involved, in addition to the obvious approximation {0=0), 
is abstracting the pendulum from factors assumed to influence the oscillations in a 
similar manner as from those assumed not to. Therefore, the replicating relation 
between P  and S  that Suppe urges cannot be understood as one of identity or 
isomorphism or the like. Suppe is explicit about this:
‘The attributes in S  determine a sequence of states over time and thus indicate a possible 
behavior of P  (i.e., a sequence of changing attributes the particulars in P  could have at 
various times). Accordingly, 5" is a kind of replica of P\ however, it need not replicate P  
in any straight-forward maimer. For the state of 5  at t does not indicate what attributes 
the particulars in P  possess at t\ rather, it indicates what attributes they would have at t 
were the abstracted parameters the only ones influencing the behavior of P  and were 
certain ideahsed conditions met. In order to see how S  rephcates P  we need to 
investigate these abstractive and idealising conditions holding between them.’ [1989, 
p94]
To summarise, the replicating relation is counterfactual: if the conditions assumed to
hold for the construction of the theory-induced physical system were to hold for the
phenomenal system, then and only then would the phenomenal system behave in the
way described by the theory-induced physical system. The key notion is that of
abstraction. It was hinted upon earlier that in selecting a few parameters by which to
characterise the phenomena, an ‘isolation’ of the theoretical domain (or the scope of
the theory) is achieved. By means of this kind of abstraction the factors that are
removed are those that are assumed not to influence the (in our case, mechanical)
phenomenal systems. But there is a second kind of abstraction that Suppe tacitly
employs in his theory, where a number of features that are assumed to influence the
values of the parameters used are also removed. In the simple pendulum example
some of these were mentioned above and divided into those internal and external to
the system. The removal of these features from S is done via the foregoing four
assumptions. Obvious examples are, that the assumption with regard to the non-
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dimensionality of a body is the result of abstracting from its actual dimensions, and 
the assumption with regard to a conservative force is the result of abstracting it from 
its surroundings (i.e. conceptually isolating the system from outside interactions). 
Hence, in removing the actual dimensions of the pendulum and consequently the 
actual mass distribution, and in ignoring the retarding effects the medium has on the 
oscillations, the result will be a discrepancy between the theoretical prediction and 
the experimental measurement. That is, the values of the parameters characteristic of 
the state of the physical system S  at time t will not be the actual values characteristic 
of the phenomenal system P. I believe however, and subsequently I will argue, that 
Suppe stops short without recognising that some of the initially abstracted features 
are subsequently re-introduced into our theoretical descriptions. Although Suppe 
points in the right direction and discerns the features of abstraction and idealisation 
involved in our theorising, he fails to recognise that if our epistemic limitations 
permit it, we extend a model of the theory by adding the influencing abstracted 
features back into our theoretical description. This, of course, has an effect on the 
representation relation he advocates, because we need to establish how the resulting 
theoretical construction that contains the addenda (i.e. the representation model) links 
to the theory. Moreover, it has an effect on the understanding of scientific theories 
advocated by the SV, because we need to establish how these constructs relate, if they 
do, to the theory structure.
Despite these disputes with his view, I recommend that we learn from Suppe. He
invites us to distinguish between two ways the counterfactual replicating relation
could be true: The case of pure abstraction, where ‘...it may be causally possible for
P to realise the conditions [assumed to occur in S] such that P ’s behaviour would be
as S indicates’ [ibid., p95]. For instance under satisfactory experimental conditions,
the actual physical pendulum may be isolated from the effects of air resistance or
possibly other outside influences. The other case, a special kind of abstraction, is that
of pure idealisation where ‘... it may be such that it is causally impossible for P  to
realise the conditions [assumed to occur in S\ such that P ’s behaviour would be as S
indicates’ [ibid., p95]. An example is the assumed nonexistence of the body’s
extension or dimension. This distinction and the consequent definitions evidently lead
to the understanding that, ‘abstractions’ can be replicated to a satisfactory degree in
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the laboratory, whereas ‘idealisations’ c a n n o t . I  choose to understand Suppe’s 
definitions, offered to distinguish between abstraction and idealisation, as follows. 
Idealisations are the conceptual means of distorting the phenomena as to reach the 
goal of mathematical simplicity, whereas abstractions are the conceptual means by 
which to confine theoretical descriptions to a limited number of properties or 
influencing factors. The latter are not distortions since the ignored properties can 
potentially be introduced into the description, despite the fact that Suppe ignores this.
3.2.2.4 Theoretical Representation by Means of Relational Systems
In figure 3.2 I present a schematic of Suppe’s SV account. As for van Fraassen’s 
version, the chosen theory language defines a mathematical structure. By means of 
the theory attributes we can single out certain sequences of states from this structure, 
called theory-induced physical systems. These sequences of states are those that are 
physically possible (as explained in section 3.2.2.1) and they are made available for 
modelling the domain of the theory. What distinguishes Suppe’s understanding of the 
state-space is that the physical systems are (in his view) abstract and idealised 
replicas of real systems, and that one of the main objects of the theory is to 
circumscribe the class of causally possible physical systems.
Experimentation on the real or phenomenal systems involves once again the use of 
procedures by which the raw data are transliterated into structures expressed in the 
theory language. In addition however, Suppe claims that in constructing data models 
the abstractions and idealisations involved are partially compensated. This is done 
either by doing the experiment in highly controlled and isolated circumstances thus 
ideally eliminating the unwanted influencing factors, or by determining the effects or 
influences of factors not accounted for in the physical systems. These influences are 
then accommodated into the data models by converting the raw data into what they
It is, I hope, evident that I regard Suppe’s theory of abstraction and idealisation as a good starting 
point, although 1 find it inadequate for the purposes of understanding actual scientific practices. But 
this discussion has to be postponed for now, 1 shall return to it in Chapter 6.
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would have been had these influences not existed. The resulting data models contain 
empirical data about the corresponding physical systems.
The divergence of Suppe’s view from that of van Fraassen is one based primarily on 
the representation relation of theory to phenomena. Suppe understands the theory (i.e. 
the state-space) as being a highly abstract and idealised representation of the 
complexities of the real world. Van Fraassen disregards this because he is concerned 
with the observable aspects of theories and assumes that these can, to a high degree of 
accuracy, be captured by experiments. Thus van Fraassen regards theories as 
containing empirical substructures that stand in an isomorphic relation to the world or 
more accurately, the observable aspects of it. Suppe’s understanding of the theory- 
structure, however, points to a significant drawback present in van Fraassen’s view: 
How can we justify the claim that the data model is isomorphic to an empirical 
substructure of the model or theory, given that the data model is a selective and 
refined form of an experimental report derived from an experiment that takes place in 
highly idealised circumstances? Furthermore, even in the case when a data model is 
in fact isomorphic to an empirical substructure, it is so because the data model is 
converted to what the measurements would have been if the influences that are not 
accounted by the theory did not have any effect on the experimental set-up. Suppe’s 
quarrel with van Fraassen’s view of the representation relation is not just about how 
distant from actual scientific practices this view is. But also about the fact that if and 
when an isomorphic relation obtains the only epistemic inference we can draw is that 
the data model of a highly idealised experiment is isomorphic to an empirical 
substructure. This is a significantly different claim from what van Fraassen would 
urge, i.e. that the world or some part of it is isomorphic to an empirical substructure 
of the theory.
According to Suppe’s understanding of the theory-structure no part of the world is or
can be isomorphic to a model of the theory, because of the elements of abstraction
and idealisation that are involved in our theorising. It is primarily for this reason that I
consider Suppe’s view as the most defensible version of the SV. Nevertheless, the
same assumptions that underlie van Fraassen’s version, which were outlined in
Section 3.2.1.3, underlie Suppe’s version too. Suppe realises that abstraction and
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idealisation are significant features of scientific theorising, yet he does not go far 
enough as to explore them. In order to see the nature of the replicating relation 
between the model of the theory and the real system, he invites us to investigate the 
abstractive and idealising conditions that hold between the two. However, the kind of 
investigation he presumably refers to is a logical one, one that would establish the 
sort of realism he advocates. Chained to his structuralist analysis of theories, Suppe is 
fails to see that -and how- actual representation models in science involve the process 
of linking the highly abstract and idealised concepts of the theory to the real system. 
This is a process that functions conversely to the process of abstraction, which allows 
us to bring our theoretical descriptions closer to the concrete real systems we 
encounter in the world. In Chapter 6, I shall label this process the process of 
concrétisation. In order to analyse the concrétisation process we must look into the 
construction of representation models. Of course, Suppe fails to discern the 
importance of this process because for the SV the linking between theory and 
experiment consists simply in a mapping of structure. An actual representation model 
employed in scientific inquiry has no special status for the SV, it is in principle 
reducible to some model of the theory.
We could put what Suppe teaches us in a rather crude manner; ‘here is the theory, 
what is done is done, now it is the job of the experiment to meet the demands of the 
theory where it can’. Thus, despite the fact that Suppe discerns highly significant 
features of scientific theorising (i.e. abstraction and idealisation), the framework of 
the SV inside which he operates leads him to obscure a most important aspect of 
theory application, that of representation model construction via concrétisation. Just 
as for van Fraassen’s version, so too for Suppe’s version of the SV, the application of 
a theory just consists in determining which model of the theory (i.e. theory-induced 
physical system) is best suited for representing a particular phenomenal system. This 
view, as we shall see in the Chapters that follow, is remarkably distant from actual 
scientific practices, despite the wishes of its proponents.
79
3.3 Clarifications on the Notion of ‘Model’ Inherent 
in the Semantic View
Now according to the SV, theories are families or classes of models. A commonplace 
and prevalent question is what sense is attributed to the notion of ‘model’. It is true 
that in the early stages of the development of the SV its proponents inadvertently use 
the term ‘model’ in the logician’s sense of the notion, that is, as an interpretation that 
satisfies a set of statements. We find for instance Suppes advocating this sense;
‘Our references to models in pure mathematics will, in fact, be taken to refer to 
mathematical logic, that branch of pure mathematics exphcitly concerned with the 
theory of models. The technical notion of possible realization used in Tarski’s definition 
need not be expounded here. Roughly speaking, a possible realization of a theory is a 
set-theoretical entity of the appropriate logical type.’ [Suppes 1961, p i 66]
He continues in the next paragraph:
‘A possible realization of the axioms of classical particle mechanics, is then an ordered 
quintuple p  = (P, T, s, m, f) . A  model of classical particle mechanics is such an 
ordered quintuple. It is simple enough to see how an actual physical model in the 
physicist’s sense of classical particle mechanics is related to this set-theoretical sense of 
models.’ [Ibid., pl67]
Van Fraassen also advocates the same sense:
‘There are natural interrelations between the two approaches [i.e. the RV and the SV]: an 
axiomatic theory may be characterized by the class of interpretations which satisfy it, 
and an interpretation may be characterized by the set of sentences which it satisfies; 
though in neither case is the characterization unique. These interrelations, and the 
interesting borderline techniques provided by Carnap’s method of state-descriptions and 
Hintikka’s method of model sets, would make implausible any claim of philosophical 
superiority for either approach. But the questions asked and methods used are different, 
and with respect to fruitfulness and insight they may not be on a par with specific 
contexts or for special purposes. ’ [van Fraassen 1970, p326]
And finally Giere and Suppe are also tied-up with such an apprehension o f ‘model’:
‘1 suggest calling the idealized systems discussed in mechanics texts ‘theoretical models’ 
or, if the context is clear, simply ‘models’. This suggestion fits well with the way 
scientists themselves use this ...term. Moreover, this terminology even overlaps nicely 
with the usage of logicians for whom a model of a set of axioms is an object, or a set of 
objects, that satisfies the axioms. As a theoretical model, the simple harmonic oscillator, 
for example, perfectly satisfies its equation of motion. ’ [Giere 1988, p79]
‘This suggests that theories be construed as propounded abstract structures serving as 
models for sets of interpreted sentences that constitute the hnguistic formulations. These 
structures are metamathematical models of their linguistic formulations, where the same
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structure may be the model for a number of different, and possibly nonequivalent, sets of 
sentences or linguistic formulations of the theory.’ [Suppe 1989, p82]
From this usage of the notion of model, one is justifiably led to believe that 
propounding and identifying a theory as a class or family of models, without recourse 
to its syntax, only aims at convenience in avoiding the hustle of constructing a 
standard formalisation, and at adaptability of our reconstruction with common 
scientific practices. In short, the difference -between the SV and the RV- is 
methodological and heuristic. At the same time, the standard problems associated 
with the syntax (observation/theory distinction etc.) disappear, one would say almost 
miraculously. Such remarks by the proponents of the SV, as the above, have led some 
authors to question the logical difference between defining the class of models 
directly as opposed to metamathematically.
The latter approach was taken by Friedman and by Worrall in their separate reviews 
of Van Fraassen (1980). Their argument is similar. They ask whether the class of 
models that constitutes the theory according to the Semanticists, is to be identified 
with an ‘elementary class’, i.e. a class that contains precisely the models of a theory 
formalised in first-order language. They both notice that not only does Van Fraassen 
offer no reason to oppose such a supposition, but he even encourages it (as in the 
above quotation). But if that is the case,
‘[tjhen the Completeness Theorem immediately yields the equivalence of van Fraassen’s 
account and the traditional syntactic account [i.e. that of the RV].’ [Friedman 1982, 
p276]
In other words,
‘So far as logic is concerned, syntax and semantics go hand-in-hand -to every consistent 
set of first-order sentences there corresponds a non-empty set of models, and to every 
normal (‘elementary’) set of models there corresponds a consistent set of first-order 
sentences. ’ [Worrall 1984, p71]
If we assume (following Friedman and Worrall) that the Semanticists are referring to
the ‘elementary class’ of models then the preceding argument is perfectly sound. The
SV, in agreement with the Logical Positivists, retains formal methods as the primary
tool for philosophical analysis of science. The only new element of its own would be
the suggestion that, rather than developing these methods using proof-theory we
should instead use formal semantics (model-theory). But van Fraassen is of a
81
different opinion. On two different occasions he resists the construal of the class of 
models of the SV with the ‘elementary class’. W h a t  follows is a rehearsal of his 
argument.
The SV claims that to present a theory is to describe (define) a set M  of models. This 
is the class of structures the theory makes available for modelling its domain. The 
most likely mathematical object to be included in this class is the real number 
continuum. Now his argument goes, if we are able to formalise what is meant to be 
conveyed by M  in some appropriate language, then we will be left with a class N  of 
models of the language, i.e. the class of models in which the axioms and theorems of 
the language are satisfied. Our hope is that every structure in M  occurs in N. 
However, on the one hand the real number continuum is infinite and ‘[tjhere is no 
elementary class of models of a denumerable first-order language each of which 
includes the real numbers. As soon as we go from mathematics to metamathematics, 
we reach a level of formalisation where many mathematical distinctions cannot be 
captured... The moment we do so, we are using a method of description not 
accessible to the syntactic mode.’ [van Fraassen 1987, p i20] On the other hand, ‘[t]he 
Lowenheim-Skolem theorems ...tell us... that N  contains many structures not 
isomorphic to any member o fM ’ [van Fraassen 1985, p302] It is so because he relies 
on the following reasoning; The Lowenheim-Skolem theorem tells us that all 
satisfiable first-order theories that admit infinite models will have models of all 
different infinite cardinalities. Now models of different cardinality are non­
isomorphic. Consequently every such theory will have models that are not isomorphic 
to the intended models (i.e. non-standard interpretations) but which satisfy the axioms 
of the theory. Thus van Fraassen is telling us that M  is the intended class of models, 
and since the limitative meta-theorems tell us that it cannot be uniquely determined 
by any set of first-order sentences we can only define it directly. His final remark 
makes the suggested understanding clearer:
‘The set N  contains ... [an] image M* of M, namely, the set of those members of N  which 
consist of structures in A4 accompanied by interpretations therein of the syntax. But, 
moreover, ... M* is not an elementary class.’ [van Fraassen 1985, p302]
He attributes this misunderstanding to being at the time overly impressed with the completeness 
theorem for quantificational logic. See van Fraassen 1985, pp301-303, and his 1987.
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Evidently, van Fraassen’s argument effectively aims to establish that the purportedly 
defined class of models is not an ‘elementary class’. Nevertheless, his argument has 
not been fully convincing to some sceptics, such as Schaffner (1993) who claims that 
the difference between the RV and the SV approaches to scientific theories is 
primarily heuristic and methodological. I think that Schaffner’s reservations towards 
the SV may be right but not for the reason he claims. It seems that defining a class of 
mathematical structures (which is not the ‘elementary’ class), the intended models, 
can only be done directly without recourse to any syntax. Hence the logical difference 
between the SV and the RV is distinct (despite Friedman’s, Worrall’s and Schaffner’s 
reservations). In addition, the SV is heuristically and methodologically more useful, 
because of its emphasis on models as the vehicles of theoretical representation in 
science. Nevertheless, this is not a sufficient reason for an adequate account of 
theories. The important question for me is, despite the fact that the SV is heuristically 
and methodologically a useful approach, what implications does it have which make 
it an inadequate account of scientific theories? To address this question we must 
examine two of the SV’s implications and their coalescence. The first is the obvious 
implication (which has been explicit throughout this Chapter), that all the models 
must be united under a common structure. The second is that the notion of model 
employed in the SV has two hermaphrodite functions, it is both an interpretation and 
a representation device. Before addressing my objections to these implications of the 
SV, let me first take a closer look at the second.
If we try to look at the notion of ‘model’ simpliciter as employed by the SV, the
immediate question to ask is: Must we continue to think of these individual models,
inM, qualifying as semantic models (i.e. that they are interpretations in the Tarskian
sense of the abstract mathematical formalism)? I think the answer is yes. If we read
the preceding remarks of the Semanticists without identifying the class M  with V,
then it is clear that this understanding follows naturally. But there is, I believe,
another reason stemming from how the Semanticists construe ‘family of models’. To
say that we propound a theory by defining directly a family of models raises the
question of how we are to construe the character of the family relation? Do we
construe it as a class by virtue of the fact that all its individual members satisfy a set
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of equations, or by virtue of the fact that its individual members demonstrate some 
kind of resemblance -without necessarily sharing a common characteristic or in some 
cases having conflicting characteristics between them?^^ But the latter construal 
cannot fit into the SV picture of theories; since, for instance, it would imply that a 
model that consists of both classical and quantum mechanical features can belong to 
the same family structure as a purely quantum mechanical model. But since the 
quantum mechanical features cannot be represented in a classical phase space, the 
mere idea of a uniting state-space conflicts with such a construal. The latter construal 
could also imply that we classify families of models by virtue of the fact that their 
members have for example resembling dynamics. Thus, models representing a linear 
restoring force, whether a classical or a quantum mechanical linear harmonic 
oscillator, belong to the same family. Once again the idea of a common state-space 
structure conflicts with such a construal. Therefore, the family membership proposed 
by the SV could only be the former, namely one based on the satisfaction of the laws 
of the theory.
Furthermore, with such a construal for family membership we could make sense of 
the role of ‘embedding’ of structures. Van Fraassen says that ‘...one structure is 
embedded in another, if the first is isomorphic to a part (substructure) of the second. 
Isomorphism is of course total identity of structure and is a limiting case of 
embeddability; if two structures are isomorphic then each can be embedded in the 
other. ’ [van Fraassen 1980, p43] Thus embedding also plays a part in determining 
family membership. A model belongs to the family of models that is identified with 
the theory, if it is embedded in a wider and more general structure, that of another 
model or more generally of the theory. It is hard to make sense of the notion of 
embeddability of one model in another or in the theory, other than by the satisfaction 
of the laws of the theory for specified parameters by the former.
Subsequently, what would be the next natural question to ask, namely ‘how is the 
class of structures, that is made available for modelling the domain of the theory, to
Hendry 1997, makes a similar point, he calls something similar to the former an ‘intentional 
construal’ and something similar to the latter an ‘extensional construal’.
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be defined?’, finds its answer in the foregoing construal of family membership. 
Although not in an explicit manner, this question has been addressed and by now it 
may seem trivial; The function of the laws of the theory is to define the theory- 
structure and hence the models of the theory.
The best way to proceed to demonstrate this procedure (of defining the models) with 
clarity is by reference to an example. I think further indications to this construal, that 
models are the set of mathematical objects defined by means of the laws of the 
theory, are to be found in the work of another proponent of the SV, who begins with 
the following thesis and proceeds to apply the state-space approach to Evolutionary 
Theory:
‘Under the logical positivist approach, formulation of the logical calculus involves 
viewing the theories as sets of statements. Interpretations that make all the statements in 
the set true -logicians call these ‘models’- may be given for certain theories. In our 
discussion, a model is not such an interpretation, matching statements to a set of objects 
that bear certain relations among themselves, but the set of objects itself. That is, models 
should be understood as structures', in almost all the cases 1 shall be discussing, they are 
mathematical structures, i.e. a set of mathematical objects standing in certain 
mathematically representable relations. ’ [Lloyd 1988, p i 5]
Let me instead consider as an example Hamilton’s equations of motion for a CPM 
system, whose solutions describe the development of a system in time, i.e. they 
function as the laws that govern the system:
^  = ^  and ^  = (3.3)
dt dp dt dx
Evidently, we require a specification of the Hamilton function H=T+V in order to 
solve the above equations, where T stands for the kinetic energy and V for the 
potential energy of the system. Each time we specify a Hamilton function, for a 
particular system, we define a model. Such a model is a mathematical structure that
belongs to the phase space of CPM. Suppose our system is the linear harmonic
oscillator, which can be represented by the Hamilton function:
H = ^  + \kx^  (3.4)
2m
This function is the analogue of a linear restoring force in the Newtonian formalism 
of CPM. So far, we still continue to regard x and p  as just mathematical functions of t, 
and m and k as just constant parameters. The mathematical solutions of Hamilton’s
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equations yield elliptical spirals along the ^-dimension in the 3-dimensional space of 
x-p-t. Projecting this space onto the two-dimensional space of x-p yields an ellipse. 
The parameters m and k  together with specified values of x and p  for given values of t 
determine a class or family of mathematical structures -to put it geometrically, a 
family of ellipses. There is an indefinite number of possible ellipses, representing all 
possible trajectories (sequences of states) in the x-p state-space.
When the variables and parameters (i.e. the theoretical terms like mass and 
momentum) are interpreted (as a first step) as follows, % is the position and p  the 
momentum of a one-dimensional oscillating point-mass of value m, we have the 
‘mathematical image’ of a system performing linear harmonic oscillations that 
behaves according to Hamilton’s equations of m o tio n .A s a second step, we identify 
the mass m with a particular body and the constant k with a particular characteristic of 
an oscillating physical system. Finally given proper -normally, experimental- 
procedures we assign values to m and k, specific to the actual system of concern, and 
we can empirically test whether our model is an ‘acceptable’ representation of the 
physical system. Accordingly, a ‘model’ is a structure given by the equations of 
motion when supplied with a Hamilton function and an interpretation, as described. 
Thus, it seems to me that the sense of ‘model’ advocated by the proponents of the SV
In the Hamiltonian formalism of CPM the phase space plays the role of a geometrical description of 
mechanical systems. Physicists often refer to this as a geometrical interpretation, however 1 think that 
it is just the result of the customary ways of geometrically describing mathematical equations. In 
general it is a space of In dimensions that correspond to the n generalised coordinates and n 
generalised momenta. The phase space representation of the system can be achieved given Hamilton’s 
equations for the particular system-Hamilton function. Each point in the phase space corresponds to a 
definite state of the mechanical system in question, assuming that the system is represented by the 
chosen Hamilton function. Hence definite knowledge of the Hamilton function is required for the 
points of the phase space to correspond to definite states of the system.
In the actual definition of a model the distinction between the mathematical definition of the 
structure and this interpretation procedure are indistinguishable, i.e. the interpretation is part and parcel 
of the definition of the structure. Distinguishing the two serves only to recognise that models defined 
as abstract mathematical structures, by means of the laws of the theory, are indeed semantic models.
The notions of ‘interpretation’ and ‘identification’ are clearly used here in Giere’s sense, see Giere 
1985 and 1988.
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has a dual character. On the one hand, it is used in the sense of an interpretation of a 
set of sentences, thus providing an interpretation of the abstract mathematical 
formalism. On the other hand, it is used as a representation devise, that is, a 
mathematical structure, which after its mathematical terms are identified with 
particular characteristics of a physical system, is proposed for the potential 
representation of that system. I also believe that this understanding that I attribute to 
the proponents of the SV accords well with Giere’s distinction between interpretation 
and identification of mathematical terms. I shall follow Giere’s terminology and refer 
to such models, which have the attributes intended by the proponents of the SV, as 
‘theoretical models’. I n  principle there is an indefinite number of mathematical 
definitions of a Hamilton function, hence not only is there an infinite number of 
logically possible theoretical models but there is also (in principle) an indefinite 
number of families of models (i.e. structure-types). These considerations reveal that 
the SV relies on the assumptions I indicated in sub-section 3.2.1.3, and which I 
recapitulate in the following final Section of this Chapter.
3.4 General Remarks on the Semantic View
Both the Received and the Semantic views employ formal methods for the 
philosophical analysis of scientific theories. There are however, significant 
differences among the two views. One such difference is of heuristic nature. In the 
SV the vehicles of representation are the models of the theory, and the laws of the 
theory function only as ‘defining devices’ of the models (hence they only hold in the 
sphere of the mathematical structure). The models of the theory are directly defined 
by the laws of the theory, and are thus united under a common mathematical 
structure, the state-space. In this work it will be assumed and not disputed -for the 
obvious reason that equations satisfy a structure- that theories can be presented in 
terms of mathematical structures. If the SV were offered as a rational reconstruction 
of scientific theories, i.e. an explication of the structure of theories, it would mean
This notion is, in my view, very close to Suppe’s notion of ‘theory-induced physical system’, if the 
fact that physical systems refer to a specific sequence of states is ignored.
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that it did not aim to describe how actual theories are formulated, but only to indicate 
a logical framework into which theories can be essentially reformulated. This would 
only imply that the SV presents a canonical structural formulation for theories and 
claims that any theory can be given an essentially equivalent reformulation in this 
canonical way. Nonetheless, to identify ihe. theory with a structure (i.e. to construe the 
equations extra-linguistically) is in addition, to assume that the SV account of 
representing phenomena (i.e. the reduction of theory representation to a structural 
relation and the subsumption of all representation models under a unifying theory 
structure) is legitimate. It is this philosophical position that I wish to oppose in this 
work. I have tried to emphasise the fact that not all Semanticists share the same views 
on the representation relation. In particular van Fraassen wants an isomorphic relation 
between -at least the observable aspects of the- theory and experiment, whereas 
Suppe understands theories as being abstract and idealised replicas of phenomena. It 
may therefore seem that particular criticisms will not necessarily inflict ‘discomfort’ 
on both views. I will try to show, however, that in tackling the underlying 
assumptions of the reduction of theory representation to a structural relation will 
indeed inflict discomfort on both views. My criticism of the SV, which will follow in 
the next Chapters, is primarily motivated by my inability to accept the justification of, 
and my lack of satisfaction with, these assumptions. Although I find the SV a 
powerful heuristic tool due to its emphasis on models in scientific inquiry, I do not 
see this as adequate reason to accept its explication of the nature of scientific theories.
I want to repeat the assumptions that, in my opinion, underlie the SV of scientific
theories, in order to set the foundation of my arguments in the coming Chapters. The
SV assumes that there can be a sharp distinction between models of theory and
models of data, and that when we define a theory-structure we immediately lay down
an indefinite number of models that are antecedently available for modelling the
theory’s domain. It also assumes that the methods and processes of construction of
actual representation models can be ignored, for they bear no effect on how these
models function in scientific inquiry. The latter assumption is accompanied by the
mistaken view that modelling in science, i.e. the construction of representation
models, is only done by having a model of the theory as a starting point. Finally, it
assumes that the actual scientific models used in theoretical representation
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approximate, in one form or another, a model of the theory, or that they are the 
‘pragmatic counterparts’ of corresponding models of the theory/^
If our analysis of theories and theory-application is to give the right emphasis on 
models, these assumptions must be avoided. In doing so, however, we need to give 
representation models the special status (in scientific inquiry) of ‘mediators’ between 
theory and experiment. Also we need to restore the capacity of ‘representation’ to 
language, and in particular to the element of denotation that linguistic entities, such 
as mathematical equations, possess. In this work I do not intend to explore the latter 
position in any explicit and elaborate manner, as I have no intention of working out a 
‘theory’ of theoretical representation. My primary focus in the remaining Chapters of 
this work is the former idea: what roles do representation models play, in scientific 
inquiry, that the SV obscures?
In Section 3.3 I urged the claim that the inadequacy of the SV to account for 
scientific theories lies primarily in two of its implications. Firstly, it employs a notion 
of ‘model’ that has two functions -interpretation and representation. Secondly, it 
wants models functioning in these two ways to be united under a common structure. 
In the remaining of this work I will be arguing that to hold both of these positions 
simultaneously is untenable. We have seen that the devices by which the theoretical 
models are defined are the laws of the theory. Hence the laws of the theory provide 
the constraints which determine the structure of these models. Now it is not hard to 
see that models viewed as interpretations (in a Tarskian sense) are united under a 
common structure that may be determined by the laws of the theory. What is 
problematic, however, is the fact that the SV assumes, firstly that models fimctioning
‘Pragmatic counterpart’ is used in the above context to refer to van Fraassen’s view that the notion 
of ‘approximation’ does not require further analysis within a structiuahst analysis of scientific theories. 
I therefore take it that the notion of ‘approximation’ could be eliminated from some versions of the 
SV. This point is clarified at the beginning of Chapter 4. In addition, the use of the term ‘pragmatic 
counterpart’ is associated with van Fraassen’s use of ‘pragmatic’, which enters into his discussion of 
how science only represents the structure of nature, that appears to commit him to a pragmatic view of 
model choice and theory choice. The latter view, which is briefly explained in sub-section 4.1.1, is 
evidently not shared by all proponents of the SV.
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as interpretations are also representation models, and secondly that models 
functioning as representations can be united under a common structure in such a 
trivial way. When we construct representation models we continuously impose 
constraints that alter their initial structure. The departure of the resulting constructs 
from the initial structure is such that it is no longer possible to consider them all as 
united under a common structure.
It is helpful to discern two intertwined general strategies by which to investigate this 
weakness of the SV and its inadequacy to capture the roles played by representation 
models in scientific inquiry. The first is to attempt to show that actual scientific 
models, and the ways they are employed for particular representational purposes, 
reveal that they cannot be viewed as families of theoretical models in the way the SV 
purports. This is a twofold strategy, the first aspect of which is that the representation 
models used in science do not always qualify as theoretical models (i.e. 
interpretations); and its second aspect is that the representation models cannot 
legitimately be grouped under one structure (theory). The second strategy involves 
showing that a simple mapping of the models of data onto theoretical models (or parts 
of them) is not an adequate way to explain the theoretical representation of 
phenomena. Indeed it simplifies and subsequently obscures both actual scientific 
practices and the process of interpretation involved in actual practices. It is in this 
direction that I will now turn. In the Chapters that follow I shall employ both of these 
strategies without attempting to make them explicit and to keep them distinct.
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4 Representation Models in 
Classical Mechanics
4.1 Untenable Implications of the Semantic View
It was shown in Chapter 3, that Hamilton’s equations of motion for each Hamilton 
function could be represented structurally by means of phase space configurations 
(i.e. the two dimensional x-p space comprising of elliptical trajectories). If it were the 
case that we would be able to solve Hamilton’s equations for whichever Hamilton 
function, we would have a ‘complete’ description of CPM systems (and possibly of 
all our theories) in terms of the phase space, available for modelling (hence 
representing) all possible physical systems in the scope of CPM, as advocated by the 
SV. More generally, we would have a limitless number of denumerable families of 
models united by a common structure, ready-made and available for modelling the 
particular domain. Our only remaining task would be to go through the models and 
simply choose which model would best suit for the representation purpose at hand. In 
accordance with the SV, this is what theory-application consists of. The fact that in 
real scientific practice we settle with representation models that are alien to the 
theory-structure, or that they are not the result of only the conceptual resources of the 
theory, would be considered a practical matter related to the mathematical tractability 
and solubility of our equations. The SV instructs us that the compromise, in real 
scientific practice, with a model that approximately captures the features of a physical 
system, is of no philosophical value since a model that exactly fits exists out there in 
the Platonic ‘world’ of the structure. This is unquestionably an ideal case for science,
91
which I attribute particularly to van Fraassen, who is the only proponent of the SV 
who confines himself to an analysis of the structure of scientific theories and only on 
rare occations pays attention to how theories are applied. For van Fraassen is the 
one who explicitly holds that the class of models is assumed complete and 
exhaustive. Lets recall, after all, his ‘completeness’ dictum: that in one model nothing 
except the solar system exists, in another the fixed stars also exist, and in a third the 
solar system exists and dolphins are its only rational inhabitants. We thus would not 
be very far from accuracy if we were to assume that for van Fraassen, and more 
generally for the SV, scientific theorising involves the perpetual construction and use 
of theoretical models in the quest to complete the family of m odels.S etting  aside 
the different technicalities of confirmation theory, this alludes to a view on theory 
testing and confirmation not so far apart from that of the RV. The RV would have it 
that theoretical predictions can be reduced to observation statements; thus, that 
comparing the theory’s deductive consequences to observations can test the theory. In 
the same spirit, the SV sees the theory as flooded with models. The job of the 
scientist is to pick the right model that best represents the physical system at hand. 
Both of these views regard theories as constructs that in principle embody a complete 
and exhaustive description of their intended domains. In other words, in the case of 
the SV, a theory embodies all logically possible structures, which at the point of 
definition become available for modelling the world.
This understanding of scientific theory application conceals a number of unfounded 
implications. Firstly, it assumes that a sharp distinction between theoretical models 
and data models can be maintained. Secondly, that models constructed by pure 
ingredients of the theory represent phenomena (i.e. via the data models extracted
Although van Fraassen has addressed issues like Glymour’s ‘bootstrapping’ method (Barman 1983) 
and Bayesianism (van Fraassen 1989), to my knowledge he does not address the sort of theory 
apphcation that I associate with the process of model construction. I think that Suppe and Giere 
implicitly hold such a view too, although their versions do not require them to hold such a position.
^  Unless we understand the SV as offered for a rational reconstruction of scientific theories, this 
attitude just amounts to wishful thinking, as never have we seen a theory developed by a perpetual 
proliferation of its theoretical models. Other authors before have made the point that in Physics we 
work with a restricted list of Hamiltonians, see in particular Cartwright 1983 essay 7.
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from the phenomena). Thirdly, that ‘interpretation’ is something we add onto a theory 
once we have completed the process of theorising and we have to pay a visit to the 
laboratory. These are the reasons why the SV can dispense with mathematical 
equations (i.e. linguistic entities) and identify the theory with the structure (plus the 
other appurtenances -satisfaction fimction and elementary language, theoretical 
hypotheses etc.), which the equations give rise to. If the above assumptions are 
legitimate it then makes no apparent difference what comes first; the equations or the 
structure. Equations, of course, are linguistic media of representation, which the SV 
considers dispensable once a state-space trajectory is fixed. It could be argued that 
equations are simply delimitation or definition of structure, or that they satisfy an 
abstract mathematical structure. Nevertheless, no matter how one chooses to view the 
relation between equations and structure, it does not strip of equations their linguistic 
character. Furthermore, mathematical equations are the outcome of -frequently 
profound- physical reasoning that is involved in their construction, hence they are the 
carriers of physical content. This understanding of equations motivates the arguments 
that follow, and my intention is to restore the emphasis on the physical reasoning 
involved in setting them up. On the issue of theoretical representation, the SV shifts 
the emphasis to structural relations thus obscuring the physical reasoning involved in 
setting up equations and thus stripping equations of their physical content. It may, 
therefore, be useful to keep in mind a level of distinction, between equations and 
structure.
In Section 2.6 we saw how Hemp el urges the thesis that theoretical inferences are 
loaded with assumptions of completeness or presupposed provisos, in order to 
undermine the claim that scientific theories deductively imply observation sentences. 
In the philosophical background of his argument, as was pointed out, Hempel targets 
the view that theories are deductively connected sets of statements and that some of 
these statements, the laws of the theory, are empirical universal generalisations; in 
other words, he directs his argument against the RV.
In the same set of essays, Giere (1988) addresses the problem of provisos. He argues
that since the Semantic View does not consider theories as sets of statements and
since the laws of the theory are only definitional devices and not empirical
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generalisations in this view, HempeFs argument has an easy solution. Giere's 
solution to the problem is given by means of the following example. In the SV, we 
can construct a model that applies to a particular physical system. Suppose that the 
physical system of concern is a pendulum, then within CPM we can roughly 
characterise a model for pendulums as a system consisting of a suspended weight that
has a period of oscillation, T = iTTyjl/g . It is then, according to Giere, a theoretical
hypothesis whether any particular physical system is a classical pendulum. And he 
continues that ‘[t]he minor problem that no swinging weight exactly satisfies [the 
preceding] equation has an easy solution. For any particular pendulum we can say 
that its behaviour approximates that of a classical pendulum to within specified limits 
on its period of oscillation.’ [Giere 1988, p43] Relying on this premise, Giere goes on 
to conclude that the kind of problem that led Hempel to introduce provisos has an 
easy solution. Not all swinging weights are classical pendulums, if for example a 
powerful magnet, which is properly positioned in the proximity of the weight, 
influences the oscillations then the result is a ‘magnetically augmented pendulum’. A 
new model has to be constructed in order to apply to this particular physical system.
Buried in Giere’s response to Hempel is the underlying position of the SV that 
theoretical representation of phenomena involves some output of the theory. In the 
case of the SV instead of observation statements, the theory outputs a model. This, 
however, is exactly what Hempel combats with his proviso-argument: the theory does 
not represent phenomena. Therefore, Giere does not offer a solution to Hempel’s 
problem, but just an affirmation of the fact that the SV regards theories as complete 
and exhaustive descriptions of their domain, awaiting for the midwife to give birth to 
a suitable model. As I understand Hempel’s problem of provisos, the only satisfactory 
response it can be given by the SV is that of Suppe: that the theoretical model is an 
abstract and idealised replica of the physical system. This statement, apparently, 
presupposes that representation is subject to the fulfilment of provisos. Nonetheless,
It can easily be argued that one can adopt Giere’s claim and still reject the SV of scientific theories. 
It can also be argued that there is an ambiguity in the notion of ‘model’ as used by Giere. He talks of 
models united by a common state-space, yet the examples of scientific models he uses in his argument 
have representational attributes that go beyond the conceptual apparatus of the theory.
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as pointed out in sub-section 3.2.2.4, and as it will become evident in the present and 
subsequent Chapters, this view is very distant from actual scientific practices and in 
addition, it obscures the processes of representation model construction.
In real scientific practice we are forced to stick with our mathematical and numerical 
methods, and in so doing we know we cannot solve -or obtain reasonable 
approximate solutions for- all the equations that our imagination can possibly make 
available. Instead, in our efforts to construct representation models we find ways to 
relate the insoluble equations to more tractable ones. Prima facie^ this may seem like 
a purely practical issue, but after closer examination we notice that such procedures 
often require (significant) departures in the physics involved. As far as van Fraassen 
is concerned, however, this can be overlooked:
T o  say that a proposition is approximately true is to say that some other proposition, 
related in a certain way to the first, is true. To say that a model fits approximately is to 
say that some other model, related in a certain way to the first, fits exactly.’ [Van 
Fraassen 1985, p289]
Although I find the analogy between ‘relations of propositions’ and ‘relations of 
models’ ambiguous, it is on the relations of models that I want to focus.^^ In what 
ways can one model be related to another, such that they both are part of a common
Clearly van Fraassen uses the word ‘proposition’ in the sense of ‘statement’. The chances of stating 
a word or phrase (e.g. an equation) to describe the behaviour of a physical system accurately would be, 
for a variety of reasons, remote. To say that our statement partially or approximately captures the 
behaviour of a physical system makes sense, as we are contrasting this statement to previously existing 
statements that were used for the same purpose, or to statements that will plausibly be asserted in the 
future, or to statements that describe the phenomena. Despite the fact that it may be a difficult task to 
explicate the relation of approximation between any of the two. In analogy however, to say that the 
actual model we use to describe a physical system approximates a model of our theory that exactly 
represents the phenomena is to contrast something that ‘exists’ with something that will never ‘exist’ 
(i.e. the theoretical model will never have a solution otherwise we would have used it to begin with). 
Hence, van Fraassen’s analogy seems flawed on two grounds. Firstly, he assigns the relation of 
approximation to two ‘entities’ that in principle carmot be contrasted empirically. This is a different 
relation to the one we mean when we say that two statements relate approximately to each other. 
Secondly, his position is just blind faith in the assumption that the physical concepts of the 
approximate model can be reduced to a handful of theoretical concepts that constitute the exact model. 
There is no reason why the physical components of the two models could not be different.
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mathematical structure (i.e. a state-space) and it is possible to use one in representing 
phenomena but not the other? If van Fraassen’s claim is construed narrowly then it is 
essentially vacuous. Most people would -with hindsight to Relativity Theory and 
Quantum Mechanics- agree that no Newtonian model fits the world (or a part of it) 
exactly. Instead, let me construe it as claiming the following;
To every model used in representing phenomena (within the scope of the 
theory) by virtue of its tractability, there corresponds a model in the state- 
space -presumably there is no difference in the features of the physical 
system, accounted for in the two models that stand in this relation to each 
other. The latter intractable model can then be said to fit the phenomena 
‘exactly’, as opposed, and always relative, to the tractable model.
In other words, this other intractable ideal model exhausts the theoretical aptness for 
description. Just as the damped harmonic oscillator fits most phenomena better than 
the linear harmonic oscillator, so there is a model in the Platonic world of the state- 
space that fits the phenomena not only better but in the best possible way the 
particular theory of CPM could possibly allow. Similarly, although since Poincare’s 
attempts very little progress has been made in solving the three-body problem, and 
indeed any n-body problem for n>2, its solution is in principle there in the state- 
space, and we would be able to get to it had our mathematical or numerical methods 
allowed it. The fact that we model the problem differently, e.g. the restricted version 
of the three-body problem, only shows that we try to fit a model that resembles the 
ideal one and fits the phenomena approximately. In this sense, van Fraassen and 
possibly other proponents of the SV would claim, ‘approximation’ requires no special 
attention, there is no need for a theory of verisimilitude or approximate truth. The 
particular circumstances dictate what constitutes a good approximation; that is, what 
model reasonably resembles the ideal.
To assert that the intractable exact theoretical model stands in a certain relation to the 
approximate or tractable model used in actual practices rests on the following two 
presuppositions: (1) That no new physical features are introduced in, or removed
I believe that this is very close to what van Fraassen has in mind.
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from, the latter model. (2) That representation models are at all times constructed by 
having some theoretical model as a basis. These are not assumptions that can 
justifiably be held a priori, however. They can only be asserted after proper 
investigation of the actual models used for representation purposes by scientists. And 
after establishing that the methods and ways by which they are constructed do not 
rely on the introduction of new physical features (or the subtraction of others), or on 
knowledge that comes from beyond the confines of the particular theory in question. 
And after establishing that each and every representation model is constructed by 
having a theoretical model as a basis. To argue against the second presupposition it is 
easier to use any other theory but classical mechanics as an example. I shall therefore 
postpone this argument until Chapter 5, where I shall try to demonstrate two distinct 
ways by which representation models of the nuclear structure are constructed. In this 
Chapter, I shall confine myself to demonstrating that representation models in CPM 
include physical features that go beyond the conceptual resources of the theoiy. 
Hence, that it is unjustifiable to hold that they relate approximately to theoretical 
models. I will therefore attempt to employ the first aspect of the twofold strategy 
suggested at the end of Chapter 3. Namely, that the representation models used in 
science do not always qualify as theoretical models.
4.1.1 The Purported Structural Description of Nature
It is important that we first re-examine the theory/experiment relation, as urged by the 
proponents of the SV, in order to clarify my claim that the SV rests upon a sharp 
distinction between theoretical models and data models. In the process, I hope to 
show the importance this distinction plays for the SV, as revealed by van Fraassen’s 
attempt to argue for a structuralist representation of phenomena.
The proponents of the SV hold that, to present a scientific theory is to present a 
family of models. These theoretical models are to be compared with or contrasted 
against models of data. The data models are experimental reports that are selective 
and refined representations of phenomena. To construct a data model we gather the 
raw experimental data and transliterate them by accounting for the experimental
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design and procedures, ceteris paribus clauses that may hold for the system of 
concern, the several theories of experiment, the several auxiliary theories and so 
forth. Once we are finished with these operations the resulting constructs are 
mathematical structures, which are to be contrasted against the theoretical models, i.e. 
other structures. This view, therefore, allows to draw the inference that ‘...the 
semantic approach implies a structuralist position: science’s description of its subject 
matter is solely of structure. ’ [van Fraassen 1997, p522] Understanding science in this 
sense means searching for how the two structures (theoretical and data model) are 
related. Three kinds of structural relations are proposed in response to this quest. Van 
Fraassen holds that the relation is one of isomorphism or embedding, Giere that it is 
one of similarity, and Suppe that the theoretical is an abstract and idealised replica of 
the data model.
We notice that the SV implies two distinct facets to the theoretical representation of 
phenomena. Firstly as mentioned above, there is the nature of the structural relation 
between theoretical and data models. And secondly, there is the way by which the 
data models relate to the raw experimental data.^ "^  We are forced to assume, and 
(following the discussion in Chapter 3) I believe correctly, that the SV implies that 
the theoretical models are pure ingredients of the theory, and all the auxiliary theories 
and the entire conglomeration of background knowledge that the scientist inherits 
goes to constructing the data models. As was already noted in Chapter 3, the 
traditional account of theory application, which can be captured by the following 
simple schema: TaA ^ E  (where, T stands for theory, A for auxiliaries, E  for empirical
In the present work attention is primarily given to the first of these representation facets, not out of 
personal idiosyncrasy, but because the proponents of the SV have offered very little to the study of the 
second facet. Other than the original study by Suppes on Learning Theory and some ideas offered by 
Suppe (spread throughout his writings), 1 am not aware of any careful and detailed studies in the 
various sciences. It is left entirely to the reader to imagine the different situations in the different 
sciences that this representation facet may hold. Indeed, the arguments offered by the proponents of 
this view most frequently remain in the form of general conjectures. For example, because in quantum 
mechanical experiments we are dealing with immense numbers of data, via appropriate statistical 
techniques we give them some structural form the result of which, the Semanticist suggests, is in 
essence a data model.
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evidence), is abandoned and replaced by: AaE\-^Md, M jœS, and Md^M t. Where, Md 
stands for model of data, M t for model-type of the theory, S for the theoretical 
structure (i.e. class of models), for ‘...used in the construction o f...’, ç  for the 
relation of inclusion, and % for the relation of isomorphism, embedding or the like. 
This attempt to explicate the theory/experiment relation implies a sharp distinction 
between the pure conceptual ingredients of the theory that are used to construct the 
models of the theory, and every other part of our knowledge used in the construction 
of the data models. The inadequacy of this view to capture significant elements of 
science will be exposed in the duration of the rest of the Chapter.
Because theoretical representation of phenomena is, according to the SV, a purely 
structural relation, the SV is faced with the following problem. Assume that we have 
a model of a theory in which there are N  distinct entities. If we choose a set of the 
same cardinality in the world, then (because same cardinality implies the existence of 
a correspondence) we have an implicit transfer of the relations in the model to that 
chosen set. Therefore, cardinality permitting, the world satisfies the model and 
consequently the theory. There is a corollary to this problem, if theoretical 
representation is purely a structural relation then the same theoretical model can 
represent two data models from entirely different domains, i.e. isomorphic data 
models from different sets of objects can be embedded in the same theoretical model. 
Van Fraassen (1997) recognises this problem and addresses it through the following 
example. The same exponential curve might be the shape of two distinct data models, 
such as, one from bacterial population growth and one from radioactive decay. But 
since data from radioactive samples are not relevant to a theory about bacteria, it is 
simply not relevant that a data model obtained in studies of radioactivity is thus 
structurally related to the bacterial population model. So, there may be something 
more to theoretical representation, besides the structure of the phenomena.^^
This discussion is meant only to emphasise the importance of the distinction between theoretical and 
data models for the SV, by pointing to one of its uses by van Fraassen. The particular use itself leads 
van Fraasen, as will be seen, to a pragmatic view of model choice and theory choice. This view, which 
is not necessarily shared by all proponents of the SV, will be criticised in Chapters 5 and 6.
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Van Fraassen allows this requisite: ‘The data model is important not in itself, but in 
its role of representation of the phenomena. ...we must insist that this role does not 
consist simply in having a certain structure. The claim of adequacy [of a theory to the 
phenomena] is with respect to the structure of real phenomena described in terms of 
the relevant parameters of the theory.’ [Ibid., p524] So the challenge to structuralism, 
he continues, is ‘.. .that the theory does not confront the observable phenomena, ... in 
and by themselves, but only certain descriptions of them. ’ [Ibid., p524] This problem 
may induce the temptation to think that there must be something about the 
phenomena, besides their structure, that matters to theory representation. For 
example, we could think that there must be a naturally privileged description of the 
phenomena, to which we are forced to attribute special ontological status. But van 
Fraassen disputes this requirement. He dismisses this challenge by claiming that for 
the users of the theory (i.e. us) the claims, ‘the theory is adequate to the phenomena’ 
and ‘the theory is adequate to the phenomena as described’, are pragmatically the 
same, therefore nothing ontological follows. So, he asks, what is it about the data 
model, other than its structure, that makes it important to a scientific theory?
‘We must add, using our own language, that for example this data model summarises 
certain findings about bacteria, or about radioactive decay, as the case may be. Because 
representation is something we do, and not something that exists in nature independently 
of what we do, our claim of adequacy for the theory must involve reference to how we 
are using both models -data model and theoretical model- to represent our subject 
matter. ’ [Ibid., p525]
Van Fraassen’s argument appeals to pragmatics by relying primarily on two premises. 
On the one hand, the division of scientific models into models of the theory and 
models of data; and on the other hand, on the claim that representation must involve 
reference to how we use these models to describe and represent the world. Do these 
premises reflect actual scientific theorising? In the course of this Chapter, both of 
these will be challenged. The theoretical representation of phenomena by means of 
the division of models into ‘theoretical’ and ‘data’ models, as the SV suggests, is in 
fact a simplification; actual practices indicate a much more complex 
theory/experiment relation. In my discussion of the pendulum, I shall argue that to 
turn the linear harmonic oscillator model into a representation model of the 
pendulum, we must blend it with experimentally determined parameters. The case of 
the pendulum is a clear indication that the linear harmonic oscillator represents
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nothing in the real world, and in order to turn it into a representation device we must 
go beyond the conceptual resources of the theory. This goes to show that in actual 
science the theoretical structures are not contrasted to data models. The terminus a 
quo of a representation model, may be (in a large number of cases) a theoretical 
model, but only in physics books are theoretical models ‘contrasted’ to phenomena. 
When we want to construct a theoretical representation of the real world, the situation 
is not so neat and orderly, as we shall see in Section 4.3.
The question of how we use the theoretical and data models to represent is, in my 
view, derived from the question of what we employ in our models to turn them into 
representations and how we determine the features that are to be included in our 
representation models. There seems to be two underlying intuitions to van Fraassen’s 
claim. Firstly, we as the agents of using structures to represent phenomena fix the 
relation between structure and nature and thus single out on pragmatic grounds the 
theoretical model to be used for representation. This view seems at odds with 
scientific practices. It is not we alone who single out the structure but we through our 
interaction with the world, e.g. through our experimentation. In the discussion of the 
pendulum, we shall see that a number of empirical laws and experimentally 
determined parameters are employed to construct the representation model. The 
choice of these laws and parameters determines the particular representation model as 
opposed to other isomorphic structures. To say that these parameters are chosen on 
pragmatic grounds is to ignore our interaction with the world. This point, of course, 
only goes to indicate that van Fraassen regards theoretical models as constructs that 
possess the capacity for representing phenomena, whereas my claim is that 
representation models are devices that are partially independent from theory. Van 
Fraassen’s second intuition is that the subject matter of a theoretical model is fixed at 
the point of comparison to the appropriate data model. This understanding seems to 
me consistent with the view analysed earlier, that models are simply picked out from 
the ‘womb’ of the theory and offered for the potential representation of a physical 
system. This intuition will also be challenged in the course of this and consequent 
Chapters. In fact, my thesis is that the theory is always understood as ‘what it is a 
theory o f, i.e. what the terms of the model equations denote, and that this is
manifested at every stage en route to constructing representation models.
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4.2 Using Models to Represent Physical Systems
4.2.1 A Useful Distinction: The Ideal vs, the Concrete Model
To analyse van Fraassen’s ‘approximation relation’ amongst models, we must look 
into actual constructions of representation models. As in this Chapter I will be 
restricting myself to CPM, it is useful to propose a distinction by which to work. By 
virtue of the nature of their relation to theory, there are two ways by which to view 
scientific models that are meant to represent phenomena. Let me call the first kind the 
ideal model (modeli) and the second kind the concrete model (m o d è le ) .Let us 
assume that both of these kinds of models can function as representations of 
phenomena. Hence, in order for the two classes of models to be considered disjoint, 
the distinction must be understood with respect to what conceptual resources are 
used for the construction of models from each class in representing phenomena. The 
modeli should be understood as a construct in which only the conceptual resources of 
the theory are utilised. By contrast, I wish to understand the modèle as a construct in 
which much else besides the conceptual resources of the theory are utilised.
Let us examine the distinction more closely. The ideal model is derivative of the 
theory, whether it is viewed as an interpretation of the language or as a directly 
definable mathematical structure consisting of a set of mathematical objects and 
relations they enter into (as examined in Section 3.3), is of no consequence to the 
argument. In CPM ideal models are those for which there is definite knowledge of the 
system-Hamiltonian, and hence for which points in phase space correspond to definite 
states of the system. Those models that qualify as members of the modeli class we 
usually cannot articulate in any mathematically useful way, but (most frequently) 
only with intractable sets of equations consisting of unspecified parameters. In fact
^  This distinction is only meant to facilitate my analysis for models of CPM and not to hold 
universally. In fact, it will become clear in Chapter 5 that for nuclear models this distinction is useless.
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only a handful of them are theoretically useful and they are what Giere recognises as 
being exemplars in a Kuhnian sense, i.e. models upon which other models can be 
modelled, such as the Linear Harmonic Oscillator or Orbits in an Inverse Square 
Force Field. Viewed from this perspective, the class of theoretical models, advocated 
by the proponents of the SV, is the class of ideal models, hence each theoretical 
model is a modeh. Now, I am willing to admit that these models have the capacity of 
representing phenomena, at least in CPM. But, I shall try to argue that it is an 
obscuring simplification to regard the actual models used in science for representing 
phenomena as models in this sense. To put it differently, it is unjustifiable and 
misleading to identify the models physics students are taught in standard textbooks 
with the actual models scientists construct to explain the phenomena and make 
predictions. What are concealed or obscured, by such views, are the complexities in 
methods and processes involved in modelling phenomena, as well as the nature of the 
resulting construction. Underlying such views is, of course, the conviction that pure 
theory is or can be the only source for the construction of representation models.
It is true that in many cases models, that can be said to belong to the modeh class, are 
used to model and represent physical systems. In some of these cases the resulting 
equations of motion are analytic and with exact solutions. Such would be the case for 
the isolated mass-spring system, which with the proper idealising assumptions we can 
to a satisfactory degree model in terms of the equation of motion for a linear 
harmonic oscillator. In other cases the ideal model does not result in analytic 
equations, yet approximate solutions to such equations are available and the use of 
the particular modeh is advanced (such is the case when the equations give rise to 
some elliptic integrals). In the latter case, we have what Redhead (1980) suggested as 
one of the two possible points of view of approximation, namely approximate 
solutions to exact equations. Consider his example:
‘For the equation d y jd x  -  Xy =  0  we might expand our solution as a perturbation
series in A, the nth order approximation being just
1 + + A^x^/2 !+... + À "  '/(t7 — 1)!
if  we consider the boundary conditionnai âtx=0.'’[Ibid. p i50]
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The second view of approximation that Redhead suggests is when we look for exact 
solutions to approximate or simplified equations. In the example above, y„ is an exact 
solution to the equation dyldx-Xy + X’'x'~'l{n-\)\ = Q, which for small A is
approximately the same as the original equation above.D esp ite  the fact that ideal 
models may be used in theoretical representation of phenomena by the use of 
approximation techniques, a modeh can only represent isolated physical systems, 
under experimental conditions that do not seem to hold outside of the laboratory. In 
order to convert the modeh into a representation of the real world, or some part of it, 
we must introduce additional features to it.
Concrete models contain a set of equations that may be soluble either by exact or 
approximate available methods, but since this may also be true about a large number 
of ideal models the characteristic of mathematical tractability is not the place where 
to search for the distinction. The distinction I want to promote between modeh and 
modèle is not one based on tractability, but one based on the physical reasoning 
involved in our model construction. In using models from the modeh class to model 
physical phenomena we utilise the theory and its conceptual apparatus in a direct 
way. When such a procedure results in a model with an insoluble set of equations and 
simultaneously with no contribution to our physical insight,^^ then the theory - 
construed narrowly as a class of models- is useless on its own. We have to look at the 
problem from outside the ‘theory-prism’ in order to construct a modèle that captures 
in concrete ways the features of a physical system. In its generality, this is not a claim 
that can be convincingly defended in the case of CPM. For the class of theoretical 
models to be useless in the construction of representation models, we must encounter 
modelling cases where theoretical models play no role in the heuristic. I shall argue 
that we encounter such cases in modelling features of the nucleus, but this argument 
has to wait until Chapter 5. Most frequently in CPM this is not the case. Indeed, the
As Redhead stresses ‘ ...the two approaches are equivalent in the sense that if  we consider an 
approximate solution % for an exact [equation] ...we can always specify [another equation] .. .which is 
‘approximately’ the same as the first, for which y» is an exact solution. ’ [Ibid. p i 50]
^  Recall that very often much of our physical insight into the behaviour of real systems comes from an 
analysis of the solutions to the equations of the model that purportedly represents the system.
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most frequent method of construction of concrete models that we encounter in CPM 
has an ideal model as a starting point. However, the resulting modèle departs in 
significant ways from the modeh employed at the outset. The primary reason for this, 
as I shall be arguing, is that the concrete factors added to the modeh to turn it into a 
representation of the physical system, do not originate from the conceptual apparatus 
of the theory.
It may seem that by restricting myself, at this stage, to CPM I am making the case for 
the SV. To use Quine’s phrase CPM is a scientific ‘limit myth’, and as such it offers 
itself as a paradigm case to the Semanticist, and in particular to Suppe’s 
understanding of the state-space, for two reasons. Firstly, all models used for 
representation purposes (whether they belong to the modeh or modèle class) are, in 
one way or another, related to the theory structure. To put it in the jargon of the SV, 
the models that do the representation of the phenomena within the scope of CPM are 
either the theoretical models that comprise the theory, or models that use the former 
as a basis in their construction. In both cases, it may be argued (although I explicitly 
express my doubts about this), the theoretical constituents of the models are pure 
ingredients of the theory of CPM. Secondly, Newton’s laws hold only for inertial 
reference frames. We know that the species of inertial systems is fictional. In fact, 
inertial reference frames can be regarded only as idealisations or approximations of 
actual non-inertial systems. For example, to describe the motion of a particle relative 
to a body that is rotating with respect to an inertial frame would clearly be a 
complicated matter. However, the problem can be made relatively easy by 
introducing non-inertial forces as correction factors to Newton’s 2"  ^law. These forces 
are usually referred to as the centrifugal and Coriolis forces. They are not forces in 
the usual sense of the word; they are introduced in an artificial manner as a result of 
the arbitrary requirement that we be able to write down an equation that is valid in a 
non-inertial reference frame and that resembles Newton’s equation. When these 
forces are introduced into Newton’s equation, for a particle in a non-inertial frame 
experiencing an effective force Fejf, then the resulting equation looks as follows: 
= ma^ = ma^ -  mœ x (ü) x r) -  Imco x . The second term is the centrifugal force
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and the third is the Coriolis force.^^ To put this point in terms of the jargon of the SV, 
we do not introduce another set of models to deal with representations that are more 
realistic. Instead, by introducing ‘fictional’ correcting terms we improve on the 
equations defined by Newton’s laws, i.e. we do this because of the arbitrary 
requirement to construct models that belong to the ‘family’. Yet despite all this, it is 
because CPM is a ‘limit myth’ that we can use it to reveal those aspects of physical 
reasoning that facilitate our theoretical representation of phenomena, and that go 
beyond the narrow construal of the theory as a class of abstract structures. So my 
attempt in this Chapter is in the same spirit as most philosophy of science. Proceeding 
under the assumption that CPM is a paradigm example of a scientific theory, if it can 
be shown (even partially) that the SV fails to account for some of its significant 
features then it can be shown that it is an inadequate view of scientific theories.
Despite the fact that in CPM most of the modelling of phenomena is done by using a 
modeh as basis for the representation model construction, if we focus our attention on 
the methods of construction we can still discern two distinct ways by which the 
construction is achieved. These two distinguishable general procedural-modes of 
construction of a modèle for CPM systems can be instructive. The first mode directs 
us to see how the resulting modèle can be used for representing a real system. By 
utilising a modeh, initially we may disregard some of the features of the physical 
system; as is the simple case when the equation of motion of the two-dimensional 
oscillating pendulum, which does not generally have exact solutions (as described 
briefly in Chapter 3), with proper assumptions is reduced to that of a linear harmonic 
oscillator. In such cases, we do not model the actual physical system but some 
features of it, and the modelling is done by the use of other familiar models with 
known solutions. But in order to use the model to represent something real, inter alia 
we have to reintroduce the abstracted features, as is the case when the pendulum is 
used to compute the Earth’s acceleration due to gravity. The ways and procedures by 
which these features are ‘reassembled’ are what make the difference between the 
ideal and the concrete models. In order to establish the mathematical representation
See Goldstein 1980, and in particular chapter 4, for an elaborate account of the mathematical 
formalism leading to this equation.
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of these features we need to employ an assemblage of empirical laws and 
experimentally determined parameters. Hence, it may be argued that the influencing 
factors present in the concrete model are not derivatives of the theory. I shall present 
the case of modelling the pendulum as an example of this sort.
The second mode of construction is a totally theory-dependent method. This being 
the case, we would expect that it would be the best case scenario for the 
understanding of scientific theories given by the SV. Yet, my examination yields 
quite the opposite inference. This method directs us to see how specific adjustments 
to the general modeh can be made in order to learn about the physical content of the 
theory. Via this method, we modify the physical problem (sometimes in radical 
ways), not so that we can fit it into the theory, but to study specific aspects of the 
model in question. This can sometimes be done by introducing further idealisations, 
thus distorting the physical situation even further. The result is not proposed for an 
adequate representation (although it can be viewed as such), rather it is primarily used 
to gain some insight into the physical properties of the system. In doing so, the 
physical reasoning involved in our practices indicates that our view of what theories 
are is intertwined with what the theory is about, i.e. what the elements of our 
equations denote. This cannot be captured by a rational reconstruction of theories as 
classes of models, where the representation relation is reduced to a relation of 
structures. An example that falls into this category is the ‘restricted version of the 
three body problem’, which will be examined in detail later.
Concrete models are the result of these general modes of construction. They are
models that come about by using ideal models as their basis (at least, in CPM). But
the physical reasoning involved in constructing them is essential to their use in
representation. Investigating how modèle relates to modeh will help us see whether
the representation relations suggested by the proponents of the SV have any gravity
or, indeed, any legitimacy at all. In the next chapter, I shall extend my argument to
claim that in many cases in modern physics we cannot convincingly defend the
position that a modèle is constructed solely by means of having a modeh as a starting
point. In fact, I shall argue that in constructing concrete models that can be used to
represent nuclear phenomena, our physical reasoning derives from the conceptual
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apparatus of more than one of our theories. This process sometimes leads to 
representation models with conflicting features. Furthermore, I shall argue that in 
looking at the concrete models in a historical dimension we detect an influence on 
each by its predecessors.
4.2.2 ‘Theory Entry’
Before beginning to look into the relation of modèle to modeli, we must first look into 
how physical systems are modelled. Cartwright (1983) has dubbed this process 
‘theory entry’. Despite the fact that her discussion is couched in the parlance of the 
logical positivists of bridge principles and internal principles, what is important here 
is the kernel of her argument, which is how we fit facts to equations. The ‘fitting of 
facts to equations’, she suggests, is a process that can be divided into two stages. As a 
first stage we prepare an informal description of the phenomenon such as to 
‘... present the phenomenon in a way that will bring it into the theory. ’ [Cartwright 
1983, p i33] In this stage we use our background knowledge and try to confine the 
description to those elements that will allow us to match an equation to the behaviour 
of the physical system. But this is not enough, for not any equation is soluble. In fact 
we need to know in advance what boundary conditions and what approximation 
methods can be used in the solution of the resulting equations. In the second stage, 
we look at the description through the prism of the theory and dictate the necessary 
equations, boundary conditions and approximation methods.^^
Let me try to demonstrate this process by means of a simple example from Classical 
Mechanics that we can fit into an ideal model without exerting ourselves (a familiar 
example that can be found in most books on Partial Differential Equations or 
Mathematical Physics). Imagine a flexible stretched string in a horizontal orientation 
(along the %-axis), of length L and mass per unit length //, attached on the left side to a
Of course, Cartwright intends this view as a simplified and ideahsed picture of what actually takes 
place, and so it is intended here.
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fixed support and on the right side to a tightening screw. This is very much like the 
situation we encounter in various stringed musical instruments. The string 
experiences a tension T along the %-axis by the supports at each end. T is defined as 
the magnitude of the force exerted by the two supports on the string, so the net force 
on the horizontal portion of the string is zero. The force will generally stretch the 
string a bit, and possibly deform the support at the left end. We assume however that 
the supporting system is rigid and that nearly all of the deformation occurs in the 
string.
If the stretching is not excessive then Hooke’s law can be applied to the system, so 
that the initial tension in the string is taken to be equal to some force constant 
multiplied by the length of stretch. Now suppose the string is stretched further, say by 
plucking it. Or consider an arbitrary deformation of the string, so that its transverse 
displacement in the ^/-direction at a distance x from the left end is )/(%). The extra 
stretching associated with this deformation is equal to the arc length of the string 
minus the initial length:
^ ^ \  + [ y { x ) f d x - L  (4.1)
When the displacement y(x) is small compared to L and there is a sufficiently smooth 
variation so that the slope y{x)  is small compared to one, the square root in the above 
integral can be approximated by retaining only the first two terms of a binomial 
expansion, yielding an approximated stretching:
\[\  + \ f ] f J x - L  = ^][y{x) fdx  (4.2)
0 0
The tension will be equal to the force constant times the total stretch, which will be 
the initial stretch plus the second order quantity given by equation (4.2). Since 
equation (4.2) tells us that the increase in length is quadratic in the relative amplitude 
of the deformation, the extra stretching will be small compared to the amount of 
initial stretch given to the string. Thus in a first-order approximation model it can be 
neglected. This is another way of saying that we may assume the tension to change 
insignificantly when the string is plucked. All the preceding reasoning is done with 
the sole intention of justifying the assumption that the tension on a vibrating string is
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approximately constant. This will eventually allow us to fit the description of the 
system to the intended equation of motion.
To get an equation of motion for the string we employ Newton’s 2"  ^law, which states 
that the acceleration of an infmitesimally small segment of the string is equal to the 
net force on the segment. We focus on a small arbitrary segment of the string between 
X and x+Ax. The vertical displacement at time t can be represented as a function of 
two variables j^(x,/). The mass of the segment is //Ax. Thus the ^ -component of the net 
force on the segment can be written as:
//Ax
dx'
(4.3)
Now it can easily be seen that the transverse force exerted on the segment by the 
neighbouring segments of string depends on the slope of the string at the ends of the 
segment. Let 6 \ and 6 2  be the angles between the string and the horizontal axis at the 
left and right ends of the segment respectively, then:
tan ,^ - (4.4)
/  x+Ax
The ^/-component of the force on the segment due to the adjacent string parts is just 
Ts,m9 2 -Tsm6 \. For small angles, consistent with the first-order calculation used here, 
the difference between sin^ and tan^ is neglected. If we also neglect other forces, 
such as the weight of the segment and friction on the segment, Newton’s 2"  ^ law can 
now be written as:
(  dy^
//A x^Y  = T (tan 6  ^-  tan ^ , ) = T
V ^ ^ / x + A x
(4.5)
If this equation is divided through by //Ax then in the limit as Ax turns to zero we 
have:
dt^ jLi dx'
(4.6)
It is important to note that in writing down Newton’s 2"  ^ law we have ignored the 
term due to the external forces. We could have grouped together all other forces 
acting on the segment into one function, by letting F(x, t) be the jK-component of the 
sum of all external forces acting on the string per unit length in the x-direction. In
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more accurate contexts, F{x,t) must be included in both of the following equations 
(4.7) and (4.8), for it is part of Newton’s law.^' On dimensional grounds, the quantity 
Tl/u must have the units of the square of speed. It turns out that this quantity is equal
to the square of the speed of waves on the string. Hence, defining c = we can
write equation (4.6) in the usual form of the scalar wave equation'.
The scalar wave equation was the model intended from the start. It has the benefit of 
having a well-known general solution. To reach the point of fitting the physical 
system to the equation we had to go through a process of physical reasoning which 
involved the justification of several assumptions such as the constancy of the tension. 
Of course, the idealising assumption about the constancy of the tension could be 
avoided, in which case in the limit of equation (4.5) as Ax turns to zero T  would be 
considered a differentiable variable and the result would be the homogeneous Sturm- 
Liouville equation of motion:
d  (  r j.dy^  d^ y
ax = 0 (4.8)a /'
Only for certain particular forms of the functions T and /v can solutions to this 
equation be obtained in terms of simple functions. For arbitrary functions T and // 
there is no general method of solution to the homogeneous Sturm-Liouville 
equation.
The preceding example may seem, of course, a case that demonstrates the heuristic 
advantages of the SV. It shows how a physical system can be fitted into one of the 
theoretical models (exemplars) of the theory. But I have chosen such an example only 
to demonstrate the process of theory-entry, and not to claim that this is the only way
For example, if the external force acting on the string is gravity then F{x,t)=iig', other possibilities 
include a damping force then F(x,t)=-^y where Vy is the velocity in they^-direction; or a linear restoring 
force in the y-direction, F(x,t)=-ky.
In various areas of mathematical physics, particularly in quantum mechanical problems, this type of 
equation frequently occurs in its inhomogeneous form, with the right-hand side not equal to zero.
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by which this process is achieved/^ The main issue in this example (which of course 
is not offered as a criticism of the SV) is that, in attempting to construct a theoretical 
description of a physical system we must either distort the actual picture (as in the 
case of justifying the constancy of the tension) or totally ignore factors that may 
influence the phenomenon (as in the case of air damping). This is the reason why 
Cartwright claims that ‘...the ‘right kind of description’ for assigning an equation is 
seldom, if ever, a ‘true description’ of the phenomenon studied...’ [Cartwright 1983, 
p i33] And this is not all. We can also discern that there is a wealth of physics in 
modelling a physical system. Beginning with the unprepared description through to 
the fitting of the equations, the procedure is not just one of matching a mathematical 
structure to the physical system at hand. More generally, we could say that to define 
force functions, or Hamiltonians, we need physical descriptions of the physical 
systems and mechanisms involved in their construction. It is these descriptions that 
explain the choice of the force functions. Indeed, our descriptions of the physical 
systems aim to fit them into one of the models in the available list of force functions 
(or Hamiltonians). By the mere fact that the list is confined to a few (exemplar) 
models, to expect that our resulting models represent the set of objects of the physical 
system and the relations they enter into is, to say the least, a simplification.
Of equal importance is another role that these descriptions have. They tell us what 
factors have been omitted from the force function and they act as guidelines to what 
corrections we must make in order to match theory to experiment. I take this to be the 
key issue in the context of my discussion; the idea of theory entry becomes important 
in theory-application because it opens up the scene for a third stage, that of 
theoretical representation. This involves the ‘moulding’ of the equations as to capture 
as many of the physical features of the system as our knowledge and limitations 
allow. There is no -independent from experience- reasons why these corrections 
should be confined to the conceptual resources of the theory, as the following 
example of the pendulum indicates. The general question, to be explored next is what 
happens when we attempt to model real physical systems, by removing the idealising
A different kind of theory-entry can be discerned for the example of the liquid drop model of the 
nucleus, which is examined in length in Chapter 5.
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assumptions and introducing into the external force function those factors that were 
initially omitted in the process of theory-entry. Focussing our attention to this aspect 
of modelling, we discern that representation models (of the modèle class) do indicate 
signs of theory independence.
4.3 The Simple Pendulum: Measuring g
The straightforward model of the simple pendulum has been discussed by Morrison, 
in an attempt to show that despite ‘... close links with theory there is an important 
sense in which we can see the pendulum model functioning independently, as an 
instrument that is more than simply a vehicle for theory.’ [1999, p48] The core of her 
argument is that in order for an accurate theoretical model as this to accurately 
represent the respective physical system, we must add several correction factors. The 
addition of the correction factors contributes to the model’s independence from 
theory because it makes it more concrete and allows it to function as an entity in its 
own r i g h t . I  wish to add to the argument that the model functions as an independent 
entity because the correction factors are introduced by physical considerations that 
transcend the theory’s conceptual apparatus.
Let us assume for the sake of brevity that ‘theory-entry’ for the pendulum has been 
achieved by a description of the motion that has the following main characteristics: a 
mass-point bob supported by a massless inextensible cord of length / oscillates about 
an equilibrium point. The equation of motion of such a system was already given in 
chapter 3 and noted that it gives rise to elliptic integrals (ignoring, as noted above, the 
term due to external forces):
sin^ = 0 (4.9)
I consider my discussion of the pendulum as complementing hers in some ways. Although the 
conclusions drawn are certainly not identical, this is primarily due to the fact that I expand the 
argument in a different direction and use it for a different purpose.
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If infinitesimal displacements are assumed, then it can be reduced to the equation of 
motion of the linear harmonic oscillator, which is the starting point:
0 + ^ 0  = 0 (4.10)
The solution of this equation yields a relation among the period To, the cord length / 
and the acceleration g  due to the Earth’s gravity. Knowledge of the cord length and 
the period will allow us to solve for the acceleration of gravity:
(4.11)
The experimental problem of determining g, therefore comes down to measuring I 
and To. However, To is far from an acceptable range of accuracy to the experimental 
value of the period T, since it is known that the actual pendulum apparatus is subject 
to influences (some of which belong to the omitted external force function) that are 
not accounted for in the idealised assumptions underlying equation (4.10). Nelson 
and Olsson (1986) give a known, but not necessarily exhaustible, list of influencing 
factors: (i) finite amplitude, (ii) finite radius of bob, (iii) mass of ring, (iv) mass of 
cap, (v) mass of cap screw, (vi) mass of wire, (vii) flexibility of wire, (viii) rotation of 
bob, (ix) double pendulum, (x) buoyancy, (xi) linear damping, (xii) quadratic 
damping, (xiii) decay of finite amplitude, (xiv) added mass, (xv) stretching of wire, 
(xvi) motion of support. These influencing factors, some of which increase and others 
decrease the period, can be grouped into four categories based on their causal origin: 
the finite amplitude correction, the mass distribution corrections, the air corrections, 
and the elastic corrections. Nelson and Olsson proceed to show how the value To can 
be corrected by introducing the different correction factors into the equation of 
motion.
Now, ideally what would be expected here is for all of these influencing factors and 
their mutual interactions to be included in an appropriate mathematical expression, 
using the conceptual resources of the theory. This would result in a model close to the 
ideal. We could then follow van Fraassen and speak of the relation between this 
fictional model and the ideal as one of pure approximation. Approximation in this
Nelson and Olsson 1986, Nelson 1981, and Olsson 1976 offer a thorough and elaborate analysis of 
the pendulum theory/experiment match.
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case would be introduced in a mathematical context and it would be of a pragmatic 
nature; we would have inserted into the approximate model all the factors that 
influence the physical system, and their mutual interactions, and solved the resulting 
equations by some appropriate (perturbation) method. The relation between the 
fictional model and the ideal model would require no further scrutiny. No matter how 
appealing it may seem, this is, however, a fictional scenario with the self-evident 
ending: the model equations are unattainable.
What takes place instead, which is not peculiar to the pendulum, is that the 
mathematical functions, for each influencing factor, (because their corrections to the 
period are small compared to To, they are assumed to add linearly) are inserted into 
the equation of motion (4.10) in a cumulative manner. Employing the principles of 
superposition for differential equations, we are left with a system of linearly 
independent equations, each with a different influencing factor. From the solutions, 
the total value of the correction is computed by adding all the effects linearly. So far 
in this story, the SV seems to work well but there are two interconnected problems 
that we should not undervalue. Firstly, if it is assumed that some of the linearly 
independent equations are solved by some appropriate approximation method (which 
is what actually takes place), then following Redhead’s suggestion of viewing 
approximations, it is the case that different approximations will yield somewhat 
different force functions. Many of these are not experimentally distinguishable. Thus, 
we have no non-arbitrary way of singling out the preferred modeh even in principle. 
Hence, Van Fraassen’s a priori assumption of the relation between modèle and 
modeh (being one of approximation) is unfounded. In addition, as we shall see, since 
these force functions are usually determined by the employment of empirical laws 
(and empirically determined parameters), the status of the latter is operative in the 
construction of modèle.
The proponent of the SV is left with the option of claiming that the model is singled out purely on 
pragmatic grounds. This line, however, seems to ignore that the concrete model postulates mechanisms 
at work in the physical system. I shall attempt to argue against this kind of response in Chapter 5.
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Secondly, it is not just the mathematical constraints that force us to integrate the 
individual effects, rather than combine the causes and their mutual interactions into 
the external force function and simultaneously remove any idealising assumptions. 
What is at stake in this problem, i.e. filling in for the external force function and 
removing the idealising assumptions, is not necessarily a straightforward process. It is 
one which is performed by the employment of a variety of theories and of our 
knowledge from disparate areas of physics, in an effort to extend the domain o f 
application of the theory beyond the scope of the class of its theoretical models.
Exempli gratia^ we could examine the corrections due to the finite amplitude, the 
finite radius, the buoyancy, the air damping and the string stretching. The correction 
due to the finite amplitude is made by solving equation (4.9). Solving this by a
perturbation expansion gives us the following correction for the period;
2
AT = sin^”(^^/2) where, 6 0  is the maximum angular
n=\
displacement.
A real pendulum has a bob of finite size, a suspension wire of finite mass and in 
addition, the wire connections to the bob and the support have structure. All these 
factors have some contribution to the oscillations. Their effects are incorporated into
the physical pendulum equation: T = In-yjljMgh . Where, I  is the total moment of
inertia about the axis of rotation, M  is the total mass and h is the distance between the 
axis and the center of mass. Depending on the shape of the bob we could calculate its 
moment of inertia and thus compute its contribution to the period of oscillation. If we 
assume that the bob is a perfect sphere of radius a then,4^^ = m/^[l + %(a//)^], 
M  = m, and h - l . Using this information for the rigid body mechanics of a perfect 
sphere, we compute a theoretical correction to the period, AT = .
Knowledge of / and a can thus be used to compute the correction value. In a similar 
manner the correction contributions due to the wire connections and the mass and 
flexibility of the wire can be computed.
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Since the pendulum experiment takes place in air, it is expected that by Archimedes’ 
principle the weight of the bob will be reduced by the weight of the displaced air. 
Since under such circumstances the effective gravity is reduced, this increases the 
period. The correction is AT = where iria is the mass of the displaced air.
In addition, the air resistance acts on the oscillating system (pendulum bob and wire) 
to cause the amplitude to decrease with time and to increase the period. Initially, we 
started with a law of force and used it to find a model for the description of the 
physical system. The reverse general problem of finding the law of force that may be 
responsible for a particular correction factor of the starting model is of equal 
importance. The Reynolds number for each component of the system determines the
law of force for that component: R -  pVLlrj where, p  and are the fluid density and
viscosity respectively, and V and L are characteristic values of velocity and length. 
The drag force is usually expressed in terms of a dimensionless drag coefficient Cd, 
which is a function of T: F  = Y-^C^Apv^. For values o fR<\, the force is proportional 
to the velocity; and for values of 10^<i?<10 ,^ the force is proportional to the square of 
the velocity. It can be shown that a quadratic force law should apply for the pendulum 
bob, whereas a linear force law should apply for the pendulum wire. Hence, it makes 
sense to establish a damping force which is a combination of both linear and 
quadratic velocity terms (b and c are physical damping constants):
F = b\v\ + cv^ (4.12)
To determine these physical damping constants we, employ the work-energy 
theorem, assume an appropriate velocity function v=J{6 o,t), assume conservation of 
energy and match them to experimental results. We proceed to solve the equation of 
motion. Since the effects of both damping forces are small we can regard them as 
independent perturbations and set up the following linearly independent equations of 
motion:
ë  + {b/m)Ô + (g ll)e ^O  (4.13)
0 -  {cllm)0^ + (g /l)0  = 0 (4.14)
Equation (4.13), which represents the linear damping, can be solved analytically to 
yield a correction factor: AT = % (6 /2m )X g/%  Equation (4.14), however, can 
neither be solved exactly, nor is it analytic, since the sign of the force must be
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adjusted each half period to correspond to a retarding force. By an appropriate 
perturbation expansion, we obtain the correction factor; AT = % .
The length of the pendulum is increased by stretching of the wire due to the weight of 
the bob. By Hooke’s law, when the pendulum is suspended in a static position the 
increase is A/ - m g ik  = m gl^jE S, where S is the cross-sectional area and E  is the
elastic (or Young’s) modulus. The dynamic stretching when the pendulum is 
oscillating is due to the apparent centrifugal and Coriolis forces acting on the bob 
during the motion. We model this feature by using the spring-pendulum system to the 
near stiff limit. The result is the following coupled equations of motion:
(\ + ^ )G + 2à^ + œ le = 0 (4.15)
= 0 (4.16)
Where, 6  is the deflection angle, ^ is the fractional string extension, / is the dynamic 
and Zo the static pendulum length, and = l^+ m g /k , I = z^{\ + ^ ) . And where.
is the pendulum frequency and co^  = ^fkjm is the spring (string) 
frequency. Solving this system of equations yields a correction factor for the period:
I think we can see that the processes involved in turning an ideal model into a 
concrete one are diverse and hide a number of complexities. Once the model has been 
chosen, it is necessary to construct the mathematical apparatus to find a solution. One 
such example is, equations for finding the values of experimental observables. These 
equations usually contain some parameters (e.g. the physical parameters in equation 
(4.12)), the values of which are determined by comparison to experiment. Because of 
these adjustable parameters, agreement with experiment is not what guarantees the 
accuracy of the model. Frequently, entirely different models, each with its own 
parameters, provide equally good and plausible descriptions of a physical system. 
Another feature of the construction, which is obvious in the pendulum, is the 
employment of different empirical laws for determining the various force laws used 
in the concrete model. Archimedes’ principle, the Reynolds number and the drag 
force expression, and Hooke’s law are such examples. These laws (as well as the
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physical parameters), which for the case of CPM may be antecedently available, have 
no connection, in a deductive sense, to the theory. The RV would have 
accommodated them into its correspondence rules or bridge principles; the SV 
however has no other place but the models of data, into which to accommodate them. 
This would, of course, be a distortion of the picture. What we are faced with is a 
blending of experimental parameters and empirically determined laws together with a 
model of the theory to produce a modèle The theoretical model is a pure derivative 
of the theory and in order to turn it into a representation of a real system we must 
blend it with these ingredients.^^ All this can be leapfrogged by the Semanticist, who 
could respond that this resulting representation model is a model in the theoretical 
structure, where all the experimentally determined parameters are just parameters of 
the model, adjusted in various ways as to match the theoretical prediction to the 
experimental measurement. But we have seen at the very start that there is no non- 
arbitrary way of singling out this model if the methods employed in the construction 
of modèle are neglected. Adopting an analysis of scientific theories that undervalues 
the methods by which a modèle is constructed, is, to say the least, a mere 
reconstruction, that seems to lead some proponents of the SV to a complete denial of 
the ontological commitments of the theory and of the (auxiliary) empirical laws.
Although the SV could be made to work as a rational reconstruction, so far as the 
example presented here and I believe for most CPM models,^^ it does so by distorting 
the meaning of the external force function F  in Newton’s 2"^  law. This function is 
treated as the unspecified part of the law, so it is assumed that anything can be 
substituted for it and thus that it gives rise to an indefinite number of nested models. 
But F  is that part of the law which is about the real system of concern. The law can be 
used to define classes of structures, but once the ideal structure is chosen we need to 
examine the real system to fill in for F. Because, F  is about how the behaviour of an 
assumed ideally isolated system is affected when it is allowed to interact with real
Of course, for the theoretical model to say anything about the world it must be supplemented with 
initial and boundary conditions, a question that I have chosen to ignore. I believe that an argument on 
similar grounds can be given about the introduction of such conditions into the theoretical model. 
Because as mentioned earlier, in CPM we frequently use a modeli as a basis for the construction.
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things (or be part of a system of real things). In order to capture this ‘change’ in the 
behaviour we cannot just ‘fiddle around with’ mathematical functions until we find 
the one that works; we must do that by observing and manipulating the specific real 
system.
Moreover, once we have chosen a starting model we are faced with the task of 
relaxing some of the idealisations involved in its construction. I say ‘relaxing’ 
because a complete removal is a limiting case. As we see in importing the finite 
amplitude requirement into the concrete model, we are led to an approximate solution 
to the resulting problem. And in importing more realistic dimensions for the bob and 
cord, we employ rigid body mechanics with its accompanying idealisations (e.g. a 
perfect spherical shape for the bob). Finally, in attempting to account for more 
realistic features of the oscillating pendulum (e.g. the dynamic stretching) we model 
the result by means of an analogy to another familiar modeh that also carries its own 
idealisations, e.g. the spring-pendulum model at the near stiff limit. Because the 
correction factors are numerically small, the remaining idealisations and other 
physical assumptions (that by no means are exhausted by the examples mentioned) in 
the concrete model may seem nebulous. But their presence is perspicuous in the claim 
that modèle is a model that represents a real system. No matter how far we go in 
bringing the theory close to the phenomena, it seems that the inferential application of 
claims of the above kind are always subject to the fulfilment of pertinent provisos.
All this reasoning, which is unquestionably not exhausted by the examples given, 
leads to the conclusion that the family of ideal models may in many instances play a 
heuristic role in the construction of a concrete model. Nevertheless, no matter how 
rich the theoretical structure is, the construction itself relies on the ontological 
commitments of the theory and the auxiliaries used, and on a wealth of physical 
reasoning that extends beyond the confines specific to the theory and not just on 
structural features. The positive part to the argument will be pursued further in the 
next Chapter: that the elements of the processes involved in constructing concrete 
models, and not some abstract structure that levitates on top of these processes, can 
teach us about the function of representation models.
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4.4 The Restricted Three-Body Problem
The «-body problem in Celestial Mechanics can be formulated (in the Newtonian 
formalism) as follows: Assume that a system of n bodies consists of point-masses 
at /*/, where /=1,2...«, and the are expressed with respect to an inertial frame of
reference. Letting r-. = Yj -  r , where rij=rji, then the equation of motion of ntj is
W i = (4.17)
;=1 'iy
Where is the Newtonian gravitation constant, and the summation excludes the j=i 
case. For a complete solution of the «-body problem, 6« constants of integration are 
needed and only ten are known.
For the 2-body problem («=2), equation (4.17) gives rise to the following two 
equations of motion:
Wj/j = (4.18)
= k — y -  (4.19)
These are equivalent to six second-order differential equations that require twelve 
arbitrary constants of integration for a complete solution. All constants can be found 
and the problem can be solved analytically.^^
The 3-body problem (n=3) consists of three equations of the following form:
(4.20)
1^2 1^3
These give rise to nine second-order differential equations. These equations describe 
the motion of the three point-masses subject only to their mutual gravitational
See Goldstein 1980 and Danby 1988.
A detailed solution to this problem can be found in Goldstein 1980, and Danby 1988.
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attractions.^^ The problem requires eighteen arbitrary constants of integration for a 
complete solution. However, only twelve integrals can be found .A lthough  many 
particular solutions to it have been found, the general problem remains -and possibly 
is- insoluble, despite the efforts, for over a period of roughly two hundred years, of a 
most distinguished list of mathematicians and physicists including Lagrange, 
Laplace, Jacobi and most notably Poincaré. What is of interest in our discussion is 
that although perturbation solutions^^ can give adequate results, within acceptable 
experimental error, physicists insist in studying particular solutions to the problem. 
One of the claims I want to urge is that in cases where exact general solutions to 
models do not exist and concrete models (in the sense discussed in the previous 
section, of filling in for the external force function and relaxing idealising 
assumptions) cannot be constructed, it is from the study of particular solutions that 
we can gain insight into the physical properties of the motion, and not from just 
finding an approximate solution to the general problem. In search of such particular 
solutions, we impose further restrictions to the original model thus narrowing down 
its domain of application.^"^
81 dq dH dp dH
In the Hamiltonian formalism the equations of motion are -----= ------  and ----- = --------- , which
dt dp.. dt dq..
give rise to eighteen first-order differential equations, with potential energy V and Hamilton function
'*23 /"s. ''1 2  2m ,
The six integrals of the motion of the centre of mass, the three integrals of angular momentum, and 
the energy integral, together with the elimination of time and the elimination of what is known as the 
ascending node.
Perturbation calculations can always be used to determine numerically the effects introduced by a 
third body or even many bodies. Indeed perturbation theory is an essential part of Celestial Mechanics.
Particular solutions are those that, either the geometric configuration rotates about the centre of 
mass, or expansions (or contractions) take place in which the mutual distances between the three 
bodies remain in constant ratios to each other. More generally, they are solutions in which the 
geometric configuration of the three bodies remains invariant with respect to time. For instance, if  the 
initial conditions are such that the velocity vectors of the three bodies all lie in the plane defined by the 
bodies, then the motion will always be in that plane.
122
The restricted version of three gravitating bodies treats the case in which the mass of 
one of the bodies is infmitesimally small (this body is historically known as the 
planetoid). The two bodies of finite mass move in circular orbits about their common 
centre of mass under the influence of their mutual gravitational attraction (forming a 
2-body system in which the motion is known), and the planetoid moves in their field. 
Thus, the formulation of the problem introduces a further idealisation to the original 
problem: the infinitesimal mass does not influence the motion of the other two 
bodies. In addition, care must be taken to note the restrictions imposed on the system: 
the two finite-mass bodies move in circular orbits, and the axis joining them also 
rotates about the same point. Thus, the restricted 3-body problem can be looked upon 
from another perspective, as an isolated 2-body system into which we introduce one 
influencing factor, the planetoid. The question asked however is not how the 2-body 
system is perturbed (since it is assumed not to be), but how a 2-body force field 
influences the motion of the small body. Looked upon from this perspective the 
‘restricted model’ is not a more idealised version of the 3-body model, but a more 
concrete version of the 2-body model. Although the additional feature of the 
infinitesimal mass is an idealisation if taken on its own, the actual models to be 
contrasted are the isolated two-body system with the restricted three-body problem. 
This I believe is the reason why what physicists call particular solutions are just 
different techniques of studying some of the physical properties of the system, i.e. a 
more ‘concrete’ version of a soluble model (the 2-body system) is used to learn about 
-some aspects of- an insoluble model (the 3-body system).
To set up the differential equations of motion for the restricted version of the problem 
we may, choose the unit of distance so that the constant distance between the two 
finite masses is equal to unity, choose the unit of time so that ^^=1, and choose the 
unit of mass so that the sum of the two masses is also unity, where m\ = \-fu and /W2 =/W. 
Now, if we let the origin of the coordinate system be at the centre of mass and choose 
axes rotating with the masses such that they both lie along the %-axis then we can 
derive from the equations of motion of the planetoid and a defined function, known 
as the modified potential, an equation for the velocity of the planetoid:
v' = + ^ ( l - ^ ) + ^ - C  (4.21)
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C is a constant, and the coordinates of the planetoid with respect to the rotating axes 
are r=(x, y, z). Equation (4.21) is known as Jacobi's integral of the restricted 3-body 
problem. For a complete solution of the problem, five more integrals are needed 
which are not known. Nevertheless, many properties of the motion can be found from 
a study of Jacobi’s integral. Some examples are. Tisserand’s criterion for the 
identification of comets, the surfaces of zero relative velocity, the positions of 
equilibrium, and the stability points of equilibrium. Let us take a close look at the 
first of these examples.
If we let the infinitesimal mass have position vector r'=(x', y \  z') with respect to non­
rotating axes, with the same origin as before, and let z be the axis of rotation, then
where p  is the position vector with components (x\ y', 0) or (x, y, 0). Then it can 
easily be shown that Jacobi’s integral takes the following form:
r ’^ - 2 z - ( r 'x r ’)= J i L - C  (4.23)
In this form, the equation can be useful because, if we identify m\ with the Sun, and 
m2 with Jupiter and the planetoid with a periodic comet, then we can identify some of 
the observables in equation (4.23) with some of the properties of the Sun-Jupiter- 
comet system. If by observation we can find the position and velocity of the comet at 
any time, then we can calculate the elements from: r '^ = 2 / r - l / a ,  and
z (r 'x  r ')  = ^ a ( \ - e ^ )  co s/, where a is the mean distance from the Sun. Substituting 
these expressions into equation (4.23), setting r approximately equal to r\, and 
supposing that the comet is observed when far from Jupiter (i.e. before a close 
approach to Jupiter) so that r\ and ri are large and nearly equal, then the result is:
— + lJa{\-e^)Q O Si = C (4.24)
a
If we attempt to observe the comet (for a second time) after a close approach to 
Jupiter, since Jupiter exerts perturbations to the motion of the comet, the elements of 
the comet will have changed. It is possible that they will have changed considerably 
so that identification of the comet is difficult, i.e. we cannot be sure whether it is the
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old comet or a new one. But C is a constant throughout, so if we let ai, ei, ii refer to 
the old orbit and a2 , ^2 , h  to the new orbit, we should (approximately) have;
— h 2,-yJ ct^  (1 — 6^ )  COS Z] = ------h 2,-yJ CI2 ( i  ~  ^2 )  2^ ( 4 .2 5 )
This is commonly known as Tisserand’s criterion of identification of comets. A 
number of elements are tacit in this example, there is for instance the blending of the 
theoretical equation with experimental results. But for this to take place, 
representation must be partly a matter of denotation, i.e. the elements of our equations 
must be understood as denoting elements of the physical system, and partly a matter 
of empirical investigation. Accordingly, Tisserand’s criterion is based on an implicit 
understanding of ‘theory’ as what the theory is about. This is part of the reason why 
all the mathematical idealisations and approximations imposed on the system are 
validated. And it is also part of the reason why, despite the fact that we cannot have a 
complete solution to the model, we can still use the equation that describes the 
motion of the planetoid to learn something about the properties of the motion.
But there is one other dimension to this example. The restricted 3-body problem is 
not just mathematical entertainment for physics students: it demonstrates some of the 
ways in which we can explore the physical properties of a system. In cases when the 
most we can do in solving a theoretical model (3-body problem) is a perturbation 
expansion (which may lead us to accept the adequacy of the model by an approximate 
match of the model predictions to the experimental measurement), we are left with 
the task of exploring these properties. This is the reason why the restricted 3-body 
problem received so much attention. It is a way to reveal some of these properties that 
are not simply deductive consequences of the model equations. It seems that even in 
cases where a model is chosen directly from the structure to represent a real system 
and nothing much can be done to improve the representation (as we were able to do 
in the pendulum example), we can still break down this model into more specific 
cases and learn from the latter. We do it because we are in search of the subject 
matter of the theory, which is its physical content (e.g. the physical mechanisms or 
properties picked out by its equations or the relata that the elements of its equations 
denote) and not just the structure (e.g. the relations) displayed by its models.
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4.5 Conclusion
I have tried to argue that the relation of modeli to modèle is a complex relation of 
bringing the theory as close to phenomena as our available tools allow. Implicit in the 
argument is that these processes are part of our scientific theorising that cannot be 
overlooked by a simplifying mapping relation between theoretical models and data 
models. No doubt both theoretical and data models do play their own individual role 
in the theory/experiment match. But there is an awful lot more that we must keep in 
mind for an accurate analysis of theory application. We have seen how models in 
CPM are constructed by physicists for representation purposes and for learning about 
particular aspects of the physical systems they ostensibly represent. We have seen 
how these models are loaded with physical parameters that are used because they tell 
us something about the real system. From this story we begin to see that urging the 
thesis that these models are somehow related to the corresponding ideal models in the 
state-space is a priori thinking which is validated only by an ideal conception of what 
a theory is. The physical features of representation models cannot be captured by this 
kind of understanding of theorising. Van Fraassen’s idea that to every concrete model 
used to represent phenomena there corresponds a model in the state-space, to which 
the former is an approximant, is an invalidated a priori position.
My quarrel with the SV is not about the vehicles of representation. These vehicles are 
models (although I would be cautious in claiming that models are the only vehicles of 
representation). The questions I raise focus on what the representation models are, 
and in particular whether they can be understood by studying the theory on its own. 
Even if the proposal of the SV proves to be correct about the analysis of the structure 
of scientific theories, and theories are convincingly shown to be after all families of 
models united by a common structure, I would still find it difficult to follow their 
suggestion and understand the relation between theory and experiment as a simple 
mapping. The representation relation is a complicated matter and it needs an 
intermediary; the concrete model. There is no Taw of theorising’ which says that 
concrete models should be unqualified derivatives of the theory. In fact, there is no 
reason why they should not include elements that may even conflict (or contradict)
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with elements of the theory, if the goal is to understand the world and not just to 
explore the logical consequences of a particular theory.
We can also see that van Fraassen’s understanding of theoretical representation, as a 
structural relation between a theoretical model and a data model, is unwarranted. The 
theoretical representation of phenomena by means of models is done by the gradual 
construction of concrete models. The terminus a quo of the latter, may be (in the 
majority of cases in CPM) theoretical models, but the terminus ad quem is a theory- 
independent construction. The features added to the concrete models in order to make 
them as accurate representations as possible, show that the questions the scientist is 
confronted with are about what causal factors and indeed what physical properties are 
sanctioned to turn a model into an accurate representation of phenomena. Van 
Fraassen’s question of how the theoretical and data models represent is, in my view, 
off the mark. The former represents nothing (in the real world) without the modèle 
intermediary. The latter does not quite seem to be what the proponents of the SV 
envisioned. Moreover, a sharp distinction between a theoretical model and a data 
model seems to exist only in the tidy mind of the ‘reconstructing’ philosopher.
In the light of the examples and objections presented here, we can make a more 
definite claim; that -if there is any value to the Semanticist story- the state-space can 
only be understood (following Suppe) as an abstract and idealised replica of 
phenomena. However, we must add significant qualifications to this thesis: (1) that 
the state-space is a structure that unites only the models of the theory, (2) that the 
laws of the theory can be used to define a finite class of exemplars upon which other 
models can be modelled, and finally (3) that the representation relation is mediated by 
the concrete m o d e l s . T h e  first and second of these qualifications imply that the 
scope of the structure is just a handful of abstract and idealised models. The second 
and third qualifications imply that we use these models as a basis for the construction 
of representations of the world. The third qualification implies that representations of
Whether the theory is identified with the state-space (i.e. a structure) or whether mathematical 
stmcture is just one of the modes of the theory’s equations, is a matter beyond the present discussion. 
Note, however, that my argument is not conditional on any one of the two assumptions.
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the world require the intermediary modèle, into which we may need to utilise the 
entire conglomeration (or relevant parts) of our background knowledge before we can 
extend the domain of theorising to the world.
These qualifications obviously diminish the importance of the uniting state-space and 
shift the emphasis to actual scientific modelling and on how the models represent 
phenomena. Concrete models are not united by a common structure, albeit only in a 
loose way, i.e. the exemplars that give rise to them may be such a family. If this is the 
most defensible thesis for the SV, as I contend, then there still remains an open 
question. If the theoretical models are not representations, but are abstract and 
idealised replicas of physical systems, then it is not the replicating relation that needs 
to be investigated, as Suppe suggests, but the conceptual processes of abstraction and 
idealisation. To do this we must investigate the abstractive and idealising conditions 
that are used in our theories, but more importantly, we must investigate how concrete 
models are constructed. The latter inquiry can assist us in the task of understanding 
the notions of abstraction and idealisation in science, but also in understanding how 
the converse process of concrétisation functions as a conceptual mechanism in 
constructing representations of the world.
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5 Representation Models of the 
Nuclear Structure
5.1 Introduction
The birth of early Nuclear physics dates back to the discovery of radioactivity in 
1896. During the ‘primitive’ period of development (1896-1932), physicists were 
primarily concerned with discovering experimental facts about the nucleus. The 
Rutherford scattering experiments (1911), for instance, showed that an atom consists 
of a tiny, massive, positively charged nucleus surrounded by a number of light 
negatively charged electrons. Isotopes were also discovered during this period, the 
field of mass spectroscopy was developed and a few nuclear reactions were induced 
in the laboratory. Early attempts to understand the details of nuclear structure by 
applying the theoretical developments of the period -Quantum Mechanics- were 
unsuccessful. The reason was that the known experimental facts gave rise, at the time, 
to the proton-electron picture of the nucleus. These attempts were abandoned even 
before a new hypothesis was proposed because, among other reasons, early models 
based on this picture implied that the nucleus should obey Fermi or Bose statistics, 
depending on whether the number of charges Z in the nucleus was odd or even. It 
was, however, invariably found that it is the number of proton (nucleon) masses A in 
the nucleus that being odd or even implies Fermi or Bose statistics, respectively.
With Chadwick’s discovery of the neutron in 1932 (an uncharged particle with 
approximately the same mass as the proton), Heisenberg and Ivanenko independently
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proposed the proton-neutron picture of the nucleus, based on the assumption that a 
nucleus consists of Z protons that account for the charge and N=A-Z neutrons (where 
A is the total number of nucleons). Since its proposal, all considerations on nuclear 
structure have been based on the hypothesis of the proton-neutron picture.
During the time between 1932 and the development of quantum electrodynamics and
quantum chromodynamics, several models of the nuclear structure have been
developed, all of which are attempts to account for the quantum mechanical features
of the nucleus and to explain experimental results. In the early stages of this period,
we encounter a pluralistic development of models which explain different properties
of the nucleus and which account for different known facts (with occasional
overlaps). There exist conflicting models in this list, which nevertheless, since at the
time they were used to understand different properties of the nucleus, complemented
each other in the attempts to explore the nuclear structure. That they complement
each other becomes clear by the fact that they led to the Unified model of nuclear
structure, which combined all previous knowledge on the subject. In this Chapter, I
shall focus on the development of nuclear models in this period leading to the
construction of the Unified model, with emphasis on the different ways by which
quantum theory is applied to the nuclear domain and on how the different models
relate to each other. Despite the development of quantum electrodynamics and
quantum chromodynamics, no ‘unifying theory’ of the nucleus has yet been
developed. Because quantum chromodynamics is useful in characterising the strong
nuclear force, it may seem promising for providing us with a model of the nucleus.
However, it does not yet enable us to construct nuclear models but more importantly,
because its scope is confined to high-energy physics it seems to lack the capacity for
application to low-energy phenomena, which is also where the demand for nuclear
model applications lies. Hence, the models to be discussed are still very valuable not
just in assisting us in the classification and explanation of experimental results, but
more generally in learning about the properties of the nucleus. In this Chapter I will
examine the following models of the nuclear structure: (a) the liquid drop model, (b)
the Fermi gas model, (c) the nuclear single particle shell model and some extensions
to it. While in the next Chapter I will examine (d) the unified nuclear model that
brought together the features of the single particle shell model and of the collective
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model. I shall not examine any models of nuclear scattering reactions, e.g. the 
compound model or the optical model, although I believe that the arguments given 
here also hold for this set of models.
On the basis of two conflicting hypotheses about the nucleus, we can divide models 
of nuclear structure and literally all nuclear models into two rather broad categories. 
The hypothesis that underlies the models in the first category assumes the nucleus as 
a collection of closely coupled particles; these models are sometimes referred to as 
the strong interaction models. In this set of models the relative motions between the 
nucleons is entirely ignored and only collective modes of nuclear motion are 
accounted for. For some purposes, such an idealisation is acceptable because of the 
large-strength and short-ranged character of nuclear forces. The second hypothesis 
that underlies the models in the other category assumes that the nucleons move in an 
average nuclear field in rather independent ways. These ways differ from model to 
model (within this category) depending on other auxiliary hypotheses constraining 
the character of the motion. The models in the latter category, in which collective 
modes of nuclear motion are ignored, are sometimes referred to as the independent 
particle models. Of course, to imply a sharp distinction between the two categories, 
that physicists often do, is a simplification or an idealisation because almost all of 
these models contain traces of the characteristics of models that belong to the other 
category.
The fact that two conflicting hypotheses mark the foundations for the construction of 
nuclear models may seem prima facie as an indicator of an unfortunate truth about 
the sub-discipline of nuclear physics. Namely, that we lack a comprehensive 
knowledge of the character of nuclear forces and subsequently that we are not yet 
able to develop an acceptable ‘unifying theory’ of nuclear structure. But notice that in 
general even if we did have such knowledge, the task of solving the resulting nuclear 
many-body problem would still be impossible. Consider the internal energy E  of a 
nucleus of A nucleons, given as an eigenvalue of the Schrodinger equation
ifi -  ~Hy/ ^ , where H  is the Hamiltonian of the nucleus, the eigenfunction
y/{r^,...,rfj is the wavefunction, and r, denotes the position of the i nucleon;
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H w { ’'x,-;rA) = E v{r„ .. . ,r^ )  (5 . 1)
If we define the binding energy B  of the nucleus as the minimum energy required to 
completely separate its component nucleons, and because the potential energy value 
when the nucleons are separated beyond the range of their mutual interactions is zero, 
it then follows that If we were to apply the Schrodinger equation to compute
the eigenvalues for E, we would express the Hamiltonian as a sum of the kinetic 
energy operator for nucleonic motion and the potential energy operator for interaction 
between the nucleons, H=T+V, where for nucleon mass m:
7’ = ( - f iV 2m ) f v f .  and, F  = 2  (5 2)
1=1 i> j  j= \
The Vjj correspond to the interaction potential between nucleons i and j. It is known, 
of course, that expressing the potential energy as a sum of pair-wise terms is an 
idealisation. Indeed, influences on the pair-wise interactions are exerted by the 
presence of other nucleons. This fact, which would strengthen even further the 
present argument, is presently ignored only to avoid redundant complexities. The 
nucleus can exist in different bound states, characterised by different wavefunctions 
and different values of E, as well as of other observable quantities. The different 
eigensolutions to equation (5.1) correspond to the different states of the nucleus. 
Consequently, if we could solve the Schrodinger equation, the eigenvalues E  would 
give us the energy of the different states and from the corresponding eigensolutions x]/ 
we would be able to extract all possible information concerning all other conceivable 
properties of these states. For example, the eigensolutions would provide information 
about the magnetic dipole moments and the electric quadrupole moments of the 
nuclei. All this is what quantum theory instructs us; yet solving the Schrodinger 
equation for the nucleus poses enormous problems. Firstly, the nature of the pair-wise 
nucleon-nucleon interaction that has to be inserted into the equation is not completely 
known, nor yet the influence on it from the presence of other nucleons. Secondly, 
even if this interaction is specified we encounter insurmountable calculational 
difficulties for the cases of more than two nucleons (A>2), that lead to resorting to 
variational techniques for solving the nuclear many-body problem.
Note that the total energy o f a stable nucleus is less than the sum of the energy of its constituent 
nucleons and the difference is the binding energy.
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These difficulties are indicative of the fact that none of our available quantum 
mechanical theoretical models (e.g. the harmonic oscillator, the hydrogen atom, etc.) 
fit the world of nuclear physics. In order to apply quantum mechanics to the nuclear 
domain we need to construct the Hamiltonian operator for the nucleus. This work is 
devoted to how Hamiltonian operators are constructed in the nuclear domain. By 
exploring the different ways Hamiltonians are constructed, we can learn how 
quantum theory is applied in the nuclear domain and this, I hold, can subsequently 
teach us about the relation between quantum theory and nuclear models. The SV 
teaches us that models are the result of mathematical definition (given the laws of the 
theory). I find this claim an obscuring simplification, if it is used descriptively (i.e. to 
describe actual model construction), and I find the SV in need of being supplemented 
with a ‘theory’ of model construction.^^ In actual practices, such as the application of 
quantum theory in nuclear physics, what the SV calls a ‘definition’ involves a 
complexity of conceptual activities. The construction of nuclear models, in particular, 
involves (for example) positing novel hypotheses about the structure and properties 
of the nucleus and synthesising these with already established hypotheses. The SV 
also teaches us that the unity of theory and models is manifested by the subsumption 
of all models under the unifying theory structure. This is also a claim that seems 
untenable for the case of nuclear models. If there is a form of unity, it seems to me, 
we must search for it not in structural analyses but in more complex relations that 
may hold between theory and models.
In earlier Chapters, I charged the SV that it presupposes a sharp distinction between 
models of theory and models of data, and that it assumes that when we define a 
theory-structure we immediately lay down an indefinite number of models that are 
available for modelling the theory’s domain. These assumptions imply that theory 
application is achieved by choosing a model of the theory and contrasting it to the
Admittedly the da Costa/French line, which is not discussed in this work, is an attempt to do this by 
supplementing the SV with an account of heuristics. Whether the partial structures account is 
successful or not in addressing the problems raised here is subject to further work beyond the scope of 
this dissertation.
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appropriate data model. If the SV rested merely upon these assumptions then the task 
of countering it would not pose significant difficulties. There are numerous 
applications of quantum theory, among them nuclear physics, where models of the 
theory are not used to represent physical systems. But the SV rests on an additional 
assumption. It also assumes that the actual scientific models used in theoretical 
representation approximate a model of the theory, or that they are the pragmatic 
counterparts of corresponding models of the theory. A consequence of this 
assumption is that the methods and processes of construction of actual representation 
models can be ignored, for they bear no effect on how these models function in 
scientific inquiry. Hence the SV renders these processes philosophically uninteresting 
and obscures that representation models often are constructed in ways that are 
partially theory independent and often function in theory independent ways.
In Chapter 4, I challenged the view that representation models can be identified with 
approximations of theoretical models in any straightforward way because, 
representation models depart in significant ways from the initial theoretical models 
that gave rise to them. My argument, however, could not stretch far enough since the 
scope of CPM is such that for most cases a theoretical model is available for 
employment in the construction of a representation model. In contrast, the sub­
discipline of nuclear physics can be best understood as an area where we lack any 
usefiil theoretical models and we therefore attempt to construct representation models 
with a minimal reliance on theory. We lack, that is, a model analogous to the classical 
linear harmonic oscillator, which we can use to construct a representation model for 
the simple pendulum. Nuclear physics is therefore an area where representation 
models are related to the theory in ways that the SV offers very little help in 
understanding. Moreover, it is an area in which we can see clearly the incapacity of 
quantum theory to represent without the intermediary concrete representation models 
of the nucleus. Underlying my arguments throughout this Chapter and the next is, 
therefore, a much stronger claim: that representation models cannot be identified with 
any sort of approximation of theoretical models, unless our claim is loaded with 
unjustified a priori suppositions.
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To argue for such a claim, I depart from the SV by holding on to the premise that the 
processes of construction of representation models are important and operative to 
how the models function. I shall try to demonstrate that models of the nuclear 
structure are not constructed by an outright reliance on quantum theory, i.e. that the 
construction of representation models is not achieved by having a model of the theory 
as a starting point. Because of the difficulties involved in applying quantum theory 
(directly) to the nuclear domain, representation models of the nuclear structure cannot 
be constructed by having as basis an antecedently available class of models. In this 
domain, the processes of construction are far more complex. I shall describe two 
kinds of such processes. In the first, we set-up a classical model and then convert its 
parameters to their quantum mechanical analogues to obtain the Hamiltonian 
operator, thus importing the model into quantum theory. In the second, the ideal 
models of quantum mechanics are in constant interplay with postulated mechanisms 
specific to the nuclear domain. There are two elements present in the latter kind of 
construction. On the one hand, the postulated mechanisms are frequently ad hoc, and 
on the other hand they instigate the construction of new ideal models, thus enhancing 
the scope of the theory.
Because none of our available quantum mechanical theoretical models fit the world
of nuclear physics, I argue that we cannot rest upon the conjecture that the models
constructed in this domain to account for nuclear structure, as well as those that
account for nuclear scattering reactions, somehow approximate ideal models of
quantum theory. This cannot be justified because it would require that we have some
knowledge of the physics in the nuclear domain. But the goal of our inquiry into this
domain is to learn about the physics of the nucleus and indeed the nuclear models are
one of the means by which this goal is facilitated and partially achieved. The domain
of nuclear physics is such that we must put together every bit of our knowledge in
order to explore it. One of the major tasks in this exploration is to construct concrete
models that enable us to improve our insight into the physics of the nucleus. Contrary
to the SV, I dispute the claim that this improvement comes about by subsuming the
nuclear models under a unifying theory structure. My claim is that we improve on the
representation capacity of nuclear models by relying heavily on the predecessor
models and thus improving on the explanatory and predictive success of the models. I
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consider the development of nuclear models an example in science, which indicates 
that the scope of quantum mechanics is not, in any clear sense, some physical domain 
like the nucleus. Assuming, therefore, that the scope of a theory is the class of its 
semantic models, it follows that the theory cannot represent the nuclear structure 
without the intermediary representation models. This immediately leads to questions 
pertaining to the application of the theory and also to questions of whether the 
understanding of theory application, suggested by the SV, does justice to the nuclear 
case. This is from where I derive my first motivation for exploring how quantum 
theory gets applied in the nuclear domain; or, as I prefer to phrase the aim of my 
inquiry: how quantum mechanics is used in the construction of representation models 
of the nuclear structure.
My second motivation, tacit throughout this work, is that to understand what a theory 
is we must look at how it is applied. Hence, I see the exploration of the nuclear 
domain not only instructive for our understanding of theory application, but also as a 
means to shed light on what the nature of scientific theories is. The Semanticists, as 
well as the Logical Positivists, maintain the opposite, i.e. that we first establish our 
understanding of what a scientific theory is -by some form of formal reconstruction- 
and then incorporate into this framework all its applications. Because nuclear physics 
does not demonstrate a final product, i.e. a complete ‘unifying theory’, that 
philosophers may reconstruct as they wish, it is easy to discern the various stages of 
theoretical development in this domain. Subsequently, the various methods and 
processes employed in the construction of nuclear models (which are also 
discernible) reveal how quantum theory is applied and its domain of application 
extended to cover different domains and new phenomena. Contrary to the SV, these 
processes do not indicate a unity of theory and models by appeal to mathematical 
structure.
Nuclear physics is a problematic case for the proponent of the SV. There are very few
signs of structural unity of the nuclear models. For instance, there is a number of
conflicting features in different models. It is an area that the proponents of the SV
must fit into their conception of scientific theories. If Quantum Mechanics is merely a
class of structures united by a Hilbert space, then surely its application to nuclear
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phenomena (via the models to be discussed here) must indicate just that. It is, in other 
words, a pending job for the proponent of the SV to show how exactly the nuclear 
models are models of the theory. It will be argued, in the sequel, that nuclear physics 
does not point to that direction. Various techniques are involved in constructing 
representation models of the nuclear structure, such as analogies with well- 
established ideas from disparate scientific branches. To give some examples: (1) in 
the liquid drop model the nuclear behaviour is assumed analogous to the 
hydrodynamics of a liquid drop, (2) in the various shell models of the nucleus the 
nucleons are assumed to occupy shells analogous to the stationary orbits of electrons 
in an atom, (3) in the optical model the nucleus is treated as a refractive medium. By 
its reliance on structural mapping of theory to phenomena and by its demand for 
structural unity of the models, the SV would render all of our nuclear models, in an 
ultimately trivial and misguided manner, unrealistic. Even those models (such as the 
unified model), which seem promising in guiding us towards a reasonably accurate 
representation of nuclear structure.
It is customary among physicists to call the existing nuclear models
phenomenological. This terminology is due to a number of reasons: (1) because the
models are constructed by the deployment of semi-empirical results, or (2) because
the Hamiltonian operators used are established in ad hoc ways to explain particular
phenomena related to the structure of the nucleus or to scattering experiments, or (3)
because the concepts used in their construction are not always directly related to the
fundamental concepts of the theory. In other words, physicists consider these models
phenomenological because they are not in any straightforward sense deductive
consequences of quantum theory. This, of course, does not mean that they are
dislocated or dissociated from the theory. In fact, quantum theory is the basis for the
construction of each and every one of the nuclear models. The customary labelling of
the nuclear models as ‘phenomenological’, does not lie so much in our lack of
understanding how they relate to the theory (although, admittedly, in some cases we
do lack this understanding), as in the expectation that representation models should
be deductive consequences of the theory. The Logical Positivists as well as the
proponents of the SV have built their views of scientific theories on this intuition. In
the framework of the SV this intuition translates into the expectation that a
137
representation model belongs to the family of theoretical models that constitutes the 
theory, or that it relates in some approximate way to one of these models. I see my 
work, as a challenge to the proponents of the SV to show and justify that this is so for 
the models we construct to represent nuclear structure.
The argument in this Chapter is characterised by two dimensions. The negative 
dimension is the attempt to criticise the SV on several fronts. The positive dimension 
is the attempt to understand what representation models are, how they relate to 
theory, how they are constructed and how they function. I will try to explicate the 
argument’s structure by stressing my primary focus in each individual section. The 
primary intention in Section 5.2 is to stress the claim that a theory gets applied to a 
certain domain via its semantic models only on rare occasions and only under highly 
idealised assumptions, or by imposing on the physical system conditions that are 
known to be fictitious. Furthermore, I describe the two kinds of model construction 
mentioned above, and emphasise the fact that representation models are constructed 
using anything we can gather from our background knowledge, and then imported 
into the theory in ways for which no definite theoretical justification exists. In this 
section, I also develop the three most important early models of nuclear structure; the 
liquid drop model, the Fermi gas model, and the single particle shell model. In 
Section 5.3 the argument focuses on the case where we impose a description on the 
physical system, to which we can assign a semantic model from the outset. I then try 
to show that to turn this initial model into a representation device, in particular for 
unexplored physical domains like the nuclear case, very frequently we must postulate 
in ad hoc ways mechanisms that cannot necessarily be subsumed under a unifying 
theory structure. Yet, these mechanisms give the representation model its wanted 
explanatory and predictive power. In order to justify these mechanisms we pursue 
routes where the theory plays a minimal role, e.g. experiment. I explore in particular 
the spin-orbit hypothesis that was introduced to give the shell structure hypothesis for 
the nucleus predictive and explanatory success. The argument continues into Chapter 
6 where I argue that the Unified model, which is the most sophisticated model of 
nuclear structure that has been constructed, synthesises all of our past knowledge 
about the nucleus, that was gained by the explanatory and predictive successes of 
earlier models.
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Underlying my explication of the construction of the nuclear models to be discussed 
are several equally important considerations that run parallel and are of primary 
significance to my main arguments. The first of these is to bring to the surface what 
we can infer about the predictive and explanatory successes of models for some 
nuclear phenomena, and in particular to explore why their predictive and explanatory 
successes render the models independent, at least partially, from the theory that gives 
rise to them. The second is to stress that there is an implicit reliance, in various forms 
and ways, of the development of each model on its predecessor models, a point that 
becomes explicit in Chapter 6. The third is to bring forth some of the different ways 
by which the theory is deployed in the construction of representation models and thus 
its domain of application extended beyond the class of its semantic models. The 
fourth is to emphasise the fact that the SV cannot justify the application of a theory 
on the basis of a structural relation between a theoretical model and a data model, and 
that the SV does not do justice to scientific inquiry into the nuclear domain by 
adopting the view that every representation model is an approximant of a model of 
the theory. I also try, when it is useful for my argument and when the outcomes of my 
investigation allow it, to expose other untenable implications of the SV. Finally, I 
attempt to keep to the historical dimension of the development of nuclear models 
with reverence, despite the fact that on occasions the order of the presentation 
violates the historical order of the development. At all times I try to keep clear in the 
argument my thesis, that each nuclear model is a complex product of the attempt to 
extend quantum theory to the nuclear domain and of a salient reliance on the 
predecessor nuclear models.
5.2 Early Models of Nuclear Structure
The early conflicting physical intuitions about the nature of the nucleus (i.e. the 
strong interaction and the independent particle hypotheses), gave rise to two sets of 
models that demonstrate two distinct ways by which representation models may be 
constructed. Each of these processes of model construction is a function of the nature
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of the underlying model hypotheses. The nature of the underlying hypotheses 
imposes particular ways by which the model may be imported into the theory. The 
strong interaction hypothesis dictates a description of the physical system that leads 
to the construction of a classical model, which later leads to a kind of ‘theory entry’ 
that involves assigning quantum properties to the classical parameters of the model. 
The independent particle hypothesis dictates a description of the physical system, 
which allows the use of a theoretical model in the construction of the representation 
model. Both of these processes of construction impose their own heuristic, indicating 
the different heuristic usage of theory to achieve the goal of constructing a 
representation model. In sub-section 5.2.1 we look at the first of these processes and 
in sub-section 5.2.2 we look at the second.
5.2.1 Early Strong Interaction Models: The Liquid Drop Model
One of the first and simplest nuclear models to be proposed was the liquid drop 
model The hydrodynamic analogy between nuclear matter and a liquid drop is 
suggestive of the basic assumption that underlies the model. The mean free path of 
nucleons must be significantly small compared to the nuclear radius, just as the mean 
free path of molecules in a liquid drop is small compared to the radius of the drop.^* 
This assumption implies that the nucleus can be regarded as a system of closely 
coupled particles, where independent motions of the constituent particles are ignored. 
At the time when this model was proposed, this hypothesis seemed plausible in view
See Bohr 1936, Bohr and Kalckar 1937, Bohr and Wheeler 1939. To be historically accurate another 
strong interaction model of nuclear structure known as the alpha-particle model preceded the hquid 
drop. In this model the nuclear constitution is assumed to be alpha particles, which are thought to be 
basic stable sub-units. The alpha-particle model was an attempt to use an established model of 
quantum theory to describe collective modes of nuclear motion. Motivated by the exceptional stability 
of alpha particles this model was partially developed and used to explain several structural as well as 
scattering phenomena. As the proton-neutron hypothesis prevailed and became widely accepted, the 
alpha-particle model was given up.
The analogy of nuclear matter with a liquid drop is also suggested by the fact that density and
average binding energy per particle are approximately constant for all except the lightest nuclei. This is
known as the saturation property of nuclear matter.
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of the increasing knowledge of the large-strength and short-range nuclear forces. 
Since then the successes of later independent particle models have led to the 
conclusion that accounting for independent nucleonic motion provides us with 
considerable insight into many other aspects of nuclear structure.Nevertheless, the 
liquid drop model, which exemplifies strong interaction models, offers considerably 
successful quantitative results for nuclear characteristics such as binding energies, 
nuclear radii and collective oscillations and rotations, and accounts well for such 
physical processes as nuclear fission. Let us look into some of these in some detail.
Before the proposal of an adequate nuclear model, with the development of mass- 
spectroscopy it was found that the nuclear mass is related to the masses of its 
constituent particles and the nuclear binding energy: - Z M  p-\-NM ^-c~^B, a
result which shows that nuclear binding energies are sufficiently large to affect 
nuclear mass. Another surprising result about nuclear binding energies is their 
approximate constancy for different nuclei (except the lightest). Along with other 
experimental results, these led in 1935 to von Weizsacker’s semi-empirical mass 
formula (also arrived at, independently, by Bethe in 1936):
B = C„,A- - C^,Z^A~y^ - C ^ { A - 2 Z f  A~' - (5.3)
In the following discussion the terms in the Weizsacker formula are treated in the 
appeared order. The first three terms are just of the form suggested by the classical 
analogy with the charged liquid drop. If we consider an infinitely extendible liquid 
(of constant density) then the energy would be proportional to the number of 
particles. In the nuclear analogy this volume energy is the average energy due to 
saturated bonds between the nucleons, which contributes to B. But since the nucleus 
is finite, the nucleons near the surface should interact with fewer nucleons (i.e. there 
should be unsaturated bonds). Thus B should decrease by an amount proportional to 
the surface area, i.e. to^ 4^ ^^ . Furthermore, the binding energy reduces more on account 
of the Coulomb repulsion between any two protons. This is inversely proportional to 
the distance between two protons, which turns out to be inversely proportional to
^  In fact, we shall see later that the types of motion the nucleus exhibits are a mixture of collective and 
single-particle modes. Thus, both kinds of early models involve different kinds of idealisation.
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At this point the classical analogy ceases to help, but the following considerations 
suggest the addition of the last two terms. The tendency of nuclei to have equal 
numbers of protons and neutrons gives rise to the symmetry term which for Z=N 
diminishes. Finally, a pairing term must be added in order to reproduce the special 
stability of even-even (for Z and N  respectively) nuclei and the almost complete 
absence of stable odd-odd nuclei. Thus in the Weizsacker formula, ^=+1 for odd-odd 
nuclei, <5=0 for oddZ nuclei, and ^=-1 for even-even nuclei.
Although the liquid drop model is a valuable guide to constructing the Weizsacker 
formula,^^ it is patent that more detailed models are required to relate the magnitudes 
of the various terms to the basic interactions between nucleons. Nevertheless, the 
success of the formula in yielding relatively accurate values in most cases and in 
reproducing all important trends, except for the lightest nuclei, can therefore be 
regarded as an indicator of the relative success of the model. One such success of the 
model is in providing an explanation for the phenomenon of nuclear fission of heavy 
elements, the discovery of which came in 1939 and enhanced research into strong 
interaction models.Nuclear  matter is assumed to be incompressible, just as a liquid 
almost is, but deformation is possible. If a spherical nucleus is deformed into an 
elongated shape the following things would happen. First the Coulomb repulsion is 
diminished because the average distance between protons increases. Second the 
surface energy increases because the surface area increases. These two changes, that 
have opposing effects on the magnitude of the binding energy, mean that heavy 
nuclei will demonstrate instability against deformation. This is so because the 
Coulomb energy increases with Z ,^ whereas the surface energy increases with 
hence for large Z the Coulomb energy will take over. For light nuclei, on the other
For the sake of historical accuracy, one should say that the model is valuable for reconstructing the 
formula, i.e. explicating the binding energy in terms of the constituent parts of the formula, as the 
Weizsacker formula historically preceded the exact formulation of the model. It is my personal opinion 
that it also was a precursor and stimulus to the construction of the model.
As a historical note, four years earlier in 1935 a German chemist, Ida Noddack, proposed a fission 
explanation of Fermi’s 1934 experiments, immediately following their armouncement. Ironically, it 
was fortunate for humanity that her ideas were encountered with scientific ‘conservatism’ and 
dismissed at the time.
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hand, the surface tension is more significant hence the spherical shape is the stable 
configuration. A deformation of a large nucleus, whether spontaneous or initiated by 
the capture of a particle, may therefore lead to a large deformation and subsequently 
to a split-up into two or more parts of comparable mass. The liquid drop model also 
provides, to a first approximation, good quantitative results for fission. However, 
some important properties of the nucleus are not adequately accounted by the model, 
for example the special stability of the ‘magic-number’ nuclei, and fluctuations of the 
pairing energ ies .But  the primary purpose for discussing the liquid drop model is 
not to argue about its infallible predictive and elaborate explanatory power. In 
addition to stressing that the liquid drop gave birth to strong interaction nuclear 
models, it is to show how we can use a set of classical hypotheses to set-up a classical 
Hamilton function as a starting point, and then incorporate quantum mechanical 
features into the model. To demonstrate this we must look at a quantitative 
application of the model where the nucleus is treated quantum mechanically.^"^
According to the liquid drop model, because any energy acquired by a nucleon is 
quickly shared, nuclear excitations involve collective displacements of many 
nucleons. Thus in this model, the motions of individual nucleons are completely 
ignored and the nuclear wavefunction is entirely described in terms of the position of 
the nuclear surface. If we assume at the outset that the nucleus in its stable state has 
spherical shape with surface radius Ro, then for small deviations from sphericity 
(where the surface undergoes deformation oscillations at constant density, in which 
the surface tension of the nucleus acts as a restoring force), the equation for the 
surface can be written as follows:
For certain numbers of protons or neutrons the nuclei demonstrate distinctive stability. These 
numbers are known as the ‘magic-numbers’: 2, 8, 20, 28, 40, 50, 82, 126. The same phenomenon was 
known to be demonstrated by atoms. Pairing energy fluctuations can be understood as an increase or 
decrease in the binding energy due to the tendency of nucleons of the same kind to pair-off in the 
nucleus. The binding energy increases for even-even nuclei and decreases otherwise due to the odd 
nucleon. It turns out that when two nucleons with different total angular momentum eigenstates (where 
the difference lies in the sub-states) pair-off, their pairing state has zero total angular momentum.
Detailed expositions of the liquid drop model can be found, among many other sources, in 
Moszkowski 1957, von Buttlar 1963, and Segrè 1977.
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(5 4)
In this defining equation, the a^ j, are deformation parameters (amplitudes of 
oscillation) whose values determine the nuclear shape, and the 1% are spherical 
harmonics. In accordance with the liquid drop model, the energy of the nucleus is the 
sum of the volume energy, surface energy and Coulomb energy. On the assumption 
of incompressibility, the volume energy is independent of the nuclear shape. The 
surface energy is least for spherical shape and increases with deviation from 
sphericity. The Coulomb energy on the other hand decreases with deviation from 
spherical symmetry. Given these considerations for the energy, for small deviations 
from sphericity, the nuclear energy according to the model is of the form:
£ (a ) = £(0) + iXQZKr (5 5)A
In this equation, a denotes the set of deformation variables, E(0) the energy for 
spherically symmetric shape, and Cx are nuclear-deformation-resistance coefficients. 
The Cx are classical coefficients that can be computed by elementary reasoning in 
geometric and electrostatic terms. The deformation parameters however, are 
initially treated as classical time-dependent spherical tensors, that will be given 
quantum properties by applying -what seem to be the standard rules of- quantum 
mechanics at the end-point. To consider the effect of variation on the deformation 
parameters, we can look at surface oscillations.^^ If the nuclear surface changes 
slowly in some prescribed way, there will occur a collective flow of nuclear matter in 
the interior of the nucleus. Assuming irrotational flow, we can approximately (to first 
order in the define the velocity field at every point inside the surface as:
^ = (5.6)
There are four important types of nuclear collective motion (i.e. where many nucleons move 
coherently with well-defined phases), surface vibrations, rotations of deformed nuclei, the various 
deformation stages of nuclear fission, and collective behaviour in the nuclear interior commonly 
known as giant resonance motion. Since these types will be brought together later in the discussion of 
the unified model, the focus in the above example is confined to surface vibrations and, for simplicity, 
combinations with any other type of motion are ignored.
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For slow changes in the deformation parameters, the total kinetic energy of the mass 
flow throughout the nucleus is then of the form:
(5.7)
À n
The quantities Bx are the mass parameters whose calculation depends on the
assumption of irrotational flow and on equation (5.5), although the latter dependence 
is not here shown explicitly. The Hamiltonian for surface oscillations is given by:
^  = T + E(a) (5.8)
Where, the term E(a) plays the role of the potential energy (calculated as the work 
done against the surface tension in the deformation, as in equation (5.5)) for the 
collective motion, and the kinetic energy T is the excess of the actual energy over the 
value of E{2l), which would result if the nucleus were static. Now, for small 
oscillations equation (5.8) becomes
77 = E(0) + E  Z  ( r  + i Q  M (5.9)
The oscillations of the system are the same as for a particle in a many-dimensional 
harmonic oscillator potential. The equation of motion may be quantized -in the usual 
way- by introducing momenta ttx^ , canonically conjugate to the so that the 
Hamiltonian operator takes the form:
/ /  = £(0) + X Z f i % ^  + i Q | a , , f l  (5.10)
A /I V J
The energy levels of the complete Hamiltonian are then given by:
jr = jC(O) 4 (f,^ 4 - ( 5 . 1 1 )
Where, each of the «a// may be regarded as the number of oscillator quanta in the
mode ÀJH, and the are the classical oscillation frequencies.
In trying to bring forth some of the elements involved in the construction and use of
this model, we cannot fail to immediately notice the resulting outcome (i.e. equation
(5.10)) and how significantly different it is from the form of equation (5.2). It could 
be said that this is, obviously, primarily due to the fact that nucleon-nucleon 
interactions are completely ignored in the liquid drop model. But there is also a 
methodological dimension that is often suppressed. In our quest to assign a
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Hamiltonian operator we begin with certain considerations about the physical system. 
In the case of the liquid drop model we begin with classical considerations and 
quantize the equation of motion in the end (classical considerations are also employed 
for the energy calculation due to nuclear rotations and then by quantization the 
eigenvalues of the rotary energy are obtained). This is not to say anything about the 
realistic status of the model, but it is to emphasise the process of ‘theory entry’. We 
know that the nucleus is better described as a quantum mechanical system. But our 
knowledge of the nuclear structure is too lacking both in respect and degree, for us to 
be able to employ a quantum mechanical description from the start. A quantum 
mechanical description of the collective motion of the nucleus would enable us to 
assign to the system a quantum mechanical Hamiltonian directly without first 
resorting to classical assumptions. Why is such a direction not pursued? Why do we 
instead start from classical hypotheses, set up a classical model, which is not any 
different from a classical spherical vibrating membrane, and then quantize the 
quantities of the model?^^
One of my claims, in a different context, throughout Chapter 4 has been that the SV 
cannot address questions of such nature. Indeed, such questions load us with the 
burden of having to account for how the concrete models we use for representational 
purposes relate to our entire theoretical edifice. The SV obscures the need for such 
exploration. It instructs us that the theory is the class of its theoretical models, and 
that they can be applied to all physical domains that belong to the scope of the theory. 
The application of a theory in a particular domain rests upon a theoretical hypothesis, 
which asserts that the model used relates in some structural way to the data model of 
the physical system it purportedly represents. The actual model used for this purpose 
is, in its turn, some approximate form of a theoretical model. All that characterises 
the application of a theory, according to this view, is to simply look through the 
models of the theory and choose the one that best matches the description of the 
physical system. I do not think that this approach does any justice to the liquid drop 
model. We cannot consider it as approximating any model of a theory. It is what we
^  These questions will be re-addressed in the next sub-section 5.2.2.1, in the context of comparing the 
process of theory entry of the liquid drop model to that of the Fermi gas model case.
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would call a semi-classical model. But in that case which theory would we be 
searching in, the classical or the quantum theory? The proponent of the SV is left 
with two choices.
The first is to find reductive rules by which to assign, in a systematic theoretically 
justified way, quantum mechanical properties to classical variables; or in simpler 
words, rules by which to map classical functions to quantum mechanical operators. 
To the best of my knowledge, attempts to formulate such rules have so far failed, and 
the transition from the classical model to its quantum mechanical ‘counterpart’ 
remains theoretically unjustified and to a large degree arbitrary. We rest our bold 
‘quantization leap’ on the arbitrary assertion that ‘this is a suitable place to go from 
the particular to the general’, and on the likewise arbitrary assertion that equation
(5.10) is valid when equation (5.9) is not. This arbitrariness in our procedure of 
importing the model into the framework of quantum mechanics is warranted only by 
the fact that the resulting model is successful in predicting experimental 
measurements and explaining empirical phenomena. This point is about ‘theory 
entry’; we are just unable to give a description of the collective modes of motion of 
the nucleus such as to be able to adopt one of the semantic models of quantum theory. 
Nevertheless, representation models do not always come in such a theory-regulated 
manner, and this is one way by which they exhibit theory independence and by which 
they extend the domain of application of the theory.
The second choice for the proponents of the SV is to appeal to the model’s
phenomenological or semi-empirical standing, in which case we would be forced to
scrap the model altogether. But in that case, we would also be discarding its
explanatory and predictive power, and more importantly we would be overlooking, or
assigning no relevance to, its influence on successor models of the nucleus. We
would, in other words, be forced to dismiss altogether the explanatory and predictive
value of other more sophisticated models, like the unified model. Because, as we
shall see in Chapter 6, parts of the Hamiltonian operator of the unified model are
constructed along the same lines as that of the liquid drop model. This attitude would
lead us to dismiss the entire nuclear model research program. A research program that
according to Bethe, one of the most distinguished theoretical nuclear physicists, has
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consumed the most intellectual energy than any other that preceded it. But this, to say 
the least, naïve attitude is unquestionably unjustified in view of the physical 
knowledge about the nucleus acquired via the research program.
5.2.2 Early Independent Particle Models
5.2.2.1 The Fermi Gas Model
The Fermi gas model was one of the earliest attempts to incorporate quantum 
mechanical features into the discussion of nuclear s t ruc ture . In  the independent 
particle models, it is presupposed that the effective mean free path of nucleons 
(against collisions) within the nucleus is at least comparable to the nuclear diameter. 
A popular way of saying this is that the nucleons move approximately independently 
within the nucleus (i.e. with largely uncorrelated motions or in essentially 
undisturbed orbits). This assumption is, evidently, the very opposite of the underlying 
assumption of the liquid drop model. Another accompanying assumption, common to 
all independent particle models, is that the lowest modes of excitation involve a 
change in the wavefunctions of only one or a small number of nucleons (unlike strong 
interaction models where it is assumed that the easiest excitable degrees of freedom 
involve a large collection of nucleons). The additional presupposition, peculiar to the 
Fermi gas model, is that the wavefunctions of the individual nucleons are held to be 
plane waves. This is unquestionably a highly idealised assumption, because it implies 
that the nucleons move in a nuclear zero-potential field of infinite dimension.
I also find the S V lacking in another respect: it fails to account for the creativity involved in using all 
background knowledge to construct the liquid drop model (Classical Mechanics is here understood as 
background knowledge in modelling the nuclear collective motion), and also that involved in 
importing the model into the prevalent theory. But this is a side issue, which I do not intend to pursue. 
^  See Moszkowski 1957. In fact, the Fermi gas model (as well as the single particle shell model, the 
discussion of which follows) chronologically preceded the liquid drop model. This historical detail, 
however, is irrelevant to the concerns of my discussion, hence my choice of a reverse order in the 
presentation of the models.
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A qualitative description of the model is more appropriate, as the mathematical 
formalities involved are straightforward and generally well known (the ‘equivalent’ 
in the shell model research program will be dealt with in more detail later). Beginning 
with the assumption that nucleons are plane waves, the energy of the nucleons is 
assumed at the outset to consist only of a kinetic energy term. Strictly speaking, the 
plane wave assumption is valid for a hypothetical nucleus of infinite extent. As long 
as the effects of the nuclear surface are not considered however, it can be used to 
approximate finite nuclei too. To compute, for example, the energy of the nucleus we 
write the Hamiltonian operator as the sum of the kinetic energies of the individual 
nucleons plus the sum of the potential energy interactions between pairs of nucleons, 
as in equation (5.2). On the plane wave assumption we have an expression for the 
kinetic energies (non-relativistic case), hence the only significant problem is the 
calculation of the pair-wise interactions. For this we simply calculate two-particle 
wavefunctions, which are essentially the product of two one-particle functions, that 
account for the four different spin combinations and the charge effect on a proton- 
proton interaction. It is not difficult to arrive at an average computation of the binding 
energies. If we want to separate the binding energy into the terms of the Weizsacker 
formula, additional assumptions must be made as to account for each of the terms. 
For example, accounting for the surface energy term requires that we impose further 
constraints on the plane wave assumption by assuming that the nucleons move in a 
box, which is equivalent to postulating a nuclear infinite square-well potential. 
Various other (phenomenological) corrections can be made to the model that 
eventually turn it into a good predictor of low-energy nuclear phenomena, such as, a 
good approximation of average nuclear binding energies and also other low-energy 
nuclear properties.
For the construction of the Fermi gas model we obviously employ one of the ‘stock
models’ of quantum mechanics, namely the one associated with the kinetic energy
operator. ‘Stock models’ is the term used by Cartwright (1999) to refer to what I have
earlier in this work called, using a more familiar Kuhnian term, ‘exemplars of the
theory’. Building on her earlier work (1983), Cartwright argues that theories give us a
finite class of semantic models (she calls them interpretative models), its stock
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models. The idea is similar to the one advocated in Chapter 4, that representation 
models are not to be found in the womb of the theory. I proposed this idea rather 
briefly at the end of Chapter 4; the stock models are those supplied by the theory 
upon which other models can be modelled. Cartwright’s concerns are also about the 
construction of representation models, which she recognises that in most cases is not 
accomplished by searching through the semantic models of the theory to find one that 
matches the description of the physical system. She proposes that to understand the 
processes of these constructions we view the theory in conjunction with its bridge 
principles. Bridge principles, in Cartwright’s use, do not have the same function as 
for Hempel (explained in Chapter 2). For her, they are the means by which the 
abstract terms of the theory get applied to more concrete terms contained in the 
semantic models of the theory, that can reasonably be associated with actual physical 
systems. As I shall avoid elaborating on Cartwright’s abstract/concrete distinction in 
the theoretical concepts of a theory, I shall simply employ an understanding of bridge 
principles as a means of application of a theory. But this form of application must be 
understood as one of many forms, a theoretically principled form (as Cartwright calls 
it) of applying the theory. A bridge principle functions as a licence for employing a 
stock Hamiltonian of the theory, but this only happens when the description of the 
physical system is such that it allows it. Cartwright takes a further step and urges us 
to view the scope of the theory as exactly that which its bridge principles tell us: Tn 
so far as we are concerned with theories that are warranted by their empirical 
successes, the bridge principles of the theory will provide us with an explicit 
characterisation of its scope. The theory applies exactly as far as its interpretative 
[semantic] models can stretch. Only those situations that are appropriately 
represented by the interpretative models fall within the scope of the theory.’ 
[Cartwright 1999, p i96] The bridge principles of a theory, according to Cartwright, 
are few in number hence the scope of a theory is highly restricted. This is why 
representation models are so valuable as intermediaries in theory application -they 
extend the domain of application of the theory.^^ But could we consider them as
Occasionally a new stock model is defined for use in a particular domain, but the expansion of the 
stock model list is unquestionably very gradual. Most importantly, this expansion takes place because 
particular representation models instigate it. 1 shall be examining such a case in section 5.3.
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extensions of a theory? I think not, but even if we did we should do that with a 
number of antecedents in mind that would radically alter the meaning of ‘extension’ 
from the deductive sense implied by the SV, or indeed the logical positivist view. I 
take from Cartwright that only on rare occasions do the bridge principles of a theory 
licence the use of a stock model in the representation of a physical system. In the 
majority of cases physical systems do not have such ‘licensing’ descriptions, and in 
the cases when they do extravagant idealisations and abstractions are involved. I 
depart from Cartwright on two grounds; on my understanding that a theory gets 
applied not just through its stock models but also via a variety of other means (e.g. 
the liquid drop model) and on my understanding of how representation models 
mediate between theory and the world. I consider representation models as partially 
independent from theory only in the sense that they may function on their own as 
devices for explanation and prediction, partially independent of the success of the 
theory that gave rise to them. I also consider representation models as the offspring of 
theories supplemented by additional physical reasoning, a view that I hope to bring to 
the surface in the sequel. Nonetheless, the idea I wish to explore is that representation 
models very rarely come into being in the theoretically principled manner the SV 
instructs us.
At this stage I want to raise the following point as a follow-up to what was mentioned 
in the previous section about the liquid drop model. Just like the liquid drop model, 
the Fermi gas model marks the basis of successor nuclear models. The Fermi gas 
model, unlike the liquid drop model, employs from the outset one of the stock models 
of quantum mechanics, hence the kind of representation of the nucleus is of a highly 
idealised nature. It also makes almost as good predictions as the liquid drop model. 
Yet, in the short period of rivalry between the two models (late 1930’s and early 
1940’s) preference is shown towards the liquid drop mode l ,d es p i t e  the fact (noted 
in the previous section) that it does not utilise a quantum mechanical description of 
the collective motion of the nucleus. I can discern three reasons for this. The first is 
that the main goal in the early days of nuclear physics was to find a model that 
justified the Weizsacker formula. The Fermi gas model is set up in what we would
See for instance Bohr 1936 and Bohr and Wheeler 1939.
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generally regard as a theoretically systematic (or principled) way, based on bridge 
principles of quantum mechanics. That is, we have a description of the nuclear 
structure for which a quantum mechanical bridge principle exists that licences the use 
of a semantic model. In addition, the Fermi gas model predicts acceptably well, but it 
accounts for the terms of the Weizsacker formula via semi-phenomenological 
considerations. The liquid drop model, on the other hand, is set up using a mixture of 
classical and quantum principles, i.e. not in any theoretically systematic way, yet it 
accounts for the Weizsacker formula -to a tolerable extent- from first principles. The 
Weizsacker formula, in other words, plays the role of a heuristic guide in the search 
of an appropriate representation model.
The second reason is that there exist two conflicting hypotheses, the strong 
interaction and the independent particle views, and the first one is the prevalent 
despite the fact that the second can accommodate quantum mechanical features more 
naturally. Hence, another element in the heuristic is the underlying hypothesis that is 
compatible with the existing empirical knowledge. The third reason, which is 
interconnected with the second, is that the explanatory power of the liquid drop, and 
in particular its assistance in understanding the phenomenon of nuclear fission, is 
valued highly; indicating that explanatory power also plays an operative role in the 
choice of the model.
What I choose to draw from this historical episode is a two-fold message. Firstly,
what determines the application of a theory to a new domain of phenomena is the
conglomeration of all background theoretical knowledge in conjunction with the
existing empirical knowledge in the specific domain. The Weizsacker formula is such
a blend of background and empirical knowledge, for example it dictates that there
should be a Coulomb contribution to the energy, also a volume contribution, and so
forth. As a consequence the prevailing theory, quantum mechanics, plays a lesser role
in the choice of the representation model simply because its own stock models don’t
fit. In other words, there do not exist any bridge principles that can tie the description
of the nucleus, given primarily via the Weizsacker formula, to one of the stock
models of quantum mechanics. Secondly, the reason the strong interaction hypothesis
is more widespread than its rival is because the empirical facts about the large-
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strength and short-range nuclear forces impel the physics community in this direction. 
The stock models of quantum mechanics also play a lesser role to this outcome- 
choice.
The conclusion I choose to draw is this: in order to extend the scope of the theory to 
cover the nuclear domain, i.e. in order to apply the theory to a physical domain, we 
must construct representation models. To achieve this, we can start from a stock 
model and add corrections, which is usually the case when a particular physical 
domain has been extensively studied and such corrections are available, as in the case 
of the simple pendulum examined in Chapter 4. But if such correction factors to the 
Hamiltonian operator are not available, then the measure of the model’s success is not 
a numerical match (of any acceptable degree) of its predictions to the experimental 
measurements, but whether or not it provides an acceptable degree of qualitative 
physical insight into the specific domain. In such cases, the theory gets applied via 
other background knowledge. In the example of the liquid drop model the theory gets 
applied via a model of classical mechanics, whose quantities get assigned quantum 
mechanical properties after the model is set up. It is true that we can use our 
background knowledge to construct a representation model that is entirely 
independent of the theory and then import that model into the theory, because it is 
something we do. But we must recognise that importing the model into our theory is a 
heuristic move of arbitrary nature, i.e. a move that is not licensed by a set of rules 
provided by the theory. In the liquid drop model example, to make the move from 
equation (5.9) to equation (5.10) we need a set of rules (more or less functioning like 
bridge principles) by which to convert the coefficients «A// to their canonically 
conjugate generalised momenta Such rules are not available. What we do is 
initially assume that the ax^  play the role of coordinates, the that of velocities of
the oscillators, and Bx is given the role of mass. Then we make the arbitrary heuristic 
transition to the quantum mechanical domain by conjecturing that the are
quantum mechanical operators and use a quantum mechanical converting relation:
= -BA. (5.12)
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The canonical momenta are then introduced as quantum mechanical operators, which 
are assigned the usual commutation rules with the coefficients ax^ . The point is this, 
very often in physics the Hamiltonian is constructed with, more or less, a classical 
picture in mind. The quantum mechanical properties are then assigned to the classical 
Hamilton function (or the classical equation of motion) to obtain the quantized form 
of the classical picture. In our example, mathematical convenience or intuitive appeal 
are not the reasons for this mode of application of quantum theory. There is no clear 
quantum mechanical description of the collective modes of nuclear motion, hence we 
lack ways by which to assign a quantum mechanical stock model to this physical 
system. Instead, the terms of the classical Hamilton function get mapped onto their 
quantum mechanical analogues by means of ‘invisible rules’ ostensibly provided by 
quantum theory. However, these ‘rules’, on which the application of quantum 
mechanics rests, are not part and parcel of quantum theory.
This second way of expanding the domain of application of quantum theory is what 
stimulates caution when we identify a theory, following the SV, with a mathematical 
structure. If the theory does not supply us with the tools and principles by which to 
apply it in a particular domain, not because the physical domain is not believed to 
have quantum mechanical features but because the stock models of quantum theory 
do not fit that domain, and yet we still apply it successfully then I take it that there 
must be more to the theory than just structure. Furthermore, if we import an otherwise 
‘alien’ model into the theory, then representation models cannot be simplemindedly 
considered extensions of the theory. Their predictive and explanatory successes, and 
not how they relate to the theory, determine the final verdict of representation 
models, such as the liquid drop. If the model gives reliable predictions and good 
explanations then we adopt it, otherwise we discard it altogether and try another. 
When a model is imported into the theory in the arbitrary manner I have described 
then its predictive and explanatory success is the only criterion we have for its 
acceptance. If we can use a stock model of the theory to represent a physical system, 
such as the Fermi gas model, then it is to our best. But how often does this happen, 
and what assumptions are involved for this to happen?
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S.2.2.2 The Single Particle Shell Model
The single particle shell model of nuclear structure is generally viewed by nuclear 
physicists as an improvement over the Fermi gas model. Yet it is not the kind of 
improvement where we add correction factors to the initial Hamiltonian operator as to 
account more accurately for the factors that influence the physical system. Indeed, an 
additional hypothesis is made, which places the shell model onto a different category 
from its predecessor. This hypothesis involves an analogy with the physics of the 
atom, and in particular the orbital structure of electrons in complex atoms, which of 
course, is known to consist of allowed electron orbits that correspond to shells of a 
given value for the principal quantum number, with each shell having degenerate sub­
shells specified by the orbital angular momentum quantum numbers. In the nuclear 
analogy, the nucleons are assumed to move approximately independently, in spite of 
the strong interactions known to exist between free nucleons, in specified shells (this 
last qualification distinguishes the shell model from the Fermi gas model).
The single particle shell model is the most primitive version of the family of shell- 
models. To make the principal presupposition behind this model more precise, 
assume that for an odd-^ nucleus the nucleons are regarded as filling the shells 
(stationary orbits) in such a way that all of them except the last odd nucleon pair-off 
to form an inert core. This core is further assumed not to contribute at all to the 
angular momentum or the electromagnetic moments of the nucleus. Thus, the nuclear 
picture we are faced with is that of the remaining odd nucleon acted upon by the rest 
of the nucleus via a prescribed potential. Notice however that unlike the atomic case, 
in the nuclear case there is no central field produced by an external source (as the 
nucleus of an atom presents a Coulomb field for the orbiting electrons); one has only 
the strong attractions between the nucleons. So a corollary to the above assumption is 
that we consider the motion of the odd nucleon in the nucleus, under the influence of 
all other nucleons of mass M, as motion in a spherically symmetric fictitious central 
field of force. This idealisation, or theoretical distortion if you like, is of course still 
an improvement over the Fermi gas model, for the potential energy operator can now 
be considered as a function of position. The main problem, however, is that this
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effective mean potential within the nucleus is unknown and the main task for the 
physicist is to discover it, or more appropriately to construct one that represents the 
physical system and its mechanisms. In the early 1930’s, when this model was 
developed, the potential energy part of the Hamiltonian operators was chosen from 
the list of stock potentials of quantum mechanics. One such postulated potential is the 
infinite square well.
(5.13)
[ 0 0 , for, r>R.
Another is that of the infinite harmonic oscillator well.
V(r) = -V^+\Mo)f^  (5.14)
For both of these well-known potentials there exist exact analytic solutions to the 
Schrodinger equation. Nevertheless, they bear a very distant resemblance to a real 
nucleus because, among quite a few other things, they do not provide the possibility 
of barrier penetration through tunnelling. Stock potentials such as a finite square 
well or a finite square well with rounded edges, which (as compared to the ones 
above) bear a closer resemblance to the realities of the nucleus, can only be solved 
numerically. Therefore, although they do indicate significant improvement in 
predictive success on several fronts, they offer no help in gaining qualitative insights 
from their solutions. To avoid unnecessary dwelling on the failure of all these models 
to produce the desired predictions, I will point out just one. All these models predict 
only some (and not all) of the magic numbers, and since this is one of the primary 
nuclear features that an independent particle model -in particular, one that assumes 
spherical symmetry- should account for, questions in regard to the reasons for this 
discrepancy are sound. It is experimentally known that nuclei with either a proton or 
a neutron number that coincides with the magic numbers do not possess electric 
quadrupole moments in the ground state. Quadrupole moments are defined such as to 
measure deviation of the nuclear density from spherical symmetry; zero quadrupole 
moment indicates a spherical nuclear shape and large quadrupole moments indicate 
large spherical asymmetry. Since these shell models assume spherical symmetry it is 
expected that they should demonstrate zero quadrupole moments and hence at least
The transmission of energy even though the energy lies below the top of the barrier. This is a wave 
phenomenon and in quantum mechanics it is also exhibited by particles.
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predict the magic numbers. But in addition to the predictive discrepancies, no one 
expects the form of field generated by the nucleons to be that of a harmonic oscillator 
or an infinite square well. The stock models of quantum mechanics offered no help 
on this issue, and for over a decade the single particle shell model was virtually 
abandoned and favour shifted towards the liquid drop model, primarily because of the 
need for an argument of physical significance in its favour.
The extravagant idealisations in which the single particle shell model is immersed, as 
well as its forerunner the Fermi gas model, were not the reason the two models were 
largely ignored for a number of years. On the one hand, the working scientists failed 
to discover convincing corrections to the potential energy operator that would 
increase the predictive success of the model. But also, on the other hand, at the time 
when the models were proposed, the climate quickly became unfavourable towards 
independent particle models predominantly for three reasons: (1) Because of the 
accumulating experimental knowledge of the large-strength and short-ranged nucleon 
interactions. (2) Because of the incongruous implication (of the shell model) for the 
presence of a common centre of force and the lack of available ways by which to 
circumvent this idealisation. (3) Because of the discovery of nuclear fission and the 
demand for an explanation of the phenomenon. Subsequently, the assumption that 
nucleons move approximately independently filling up shells in the nucleus was 
considered physically unjustified. Therefore, both insufficient predictive success and 
lack of explanatory power played a role in this outcome.
Despite the ad hoc way by which the liquid drop model is constructed, it seems apparent that it is 
preferred to the expense of not only the Fermi gas model but also the more sophisticated single particle 
shell model, due to its explanatory and predictive success and due to its capacity to account for the 
Weizsacker formula from first principles. I do not think it is necessary to reiterate the previous 
argument.
157
5.3 More ‘Realistic’ Potentials for the Single Particle 
Shell Model: The Quest for Explanatory Power
The revival of the shell model research program had to wait for a breakthrough, 
which did not come until 1948. It was mentioned in the previous section that nuclei 
with either Z or N  coinciding with one of the magic numbers should have zero 
quadrupole moments. Therefore, such nuclei should have spherical charge 
distributions. In addition, it is known experimentally that such nuclei have a relatively 
large binding energy per nucleon, i.e. the energy necessary to remove a nucleon from 
the nucleus is relatively large. Within the framework of the shell model, both of these 
empirical facts indicate that the magic numbers correspond to closed (filled-up) 
shells. Since the stock Hamiltonians of quantum mechanics (such as the harmonic 
oscillator and square well potentials) are extremely schematic single particle shell 
potentials, the Hamiltonian operator associated with the model (like so often in 
Physics) had to be constructed phenomenologically in order to reproduce inter alia 
the magic numbers.
In 1948 Mayer (and independently in 1949, Haxel, Jensen and Suess) suggested that a 
non-central force term be added to the central force potential of the shell model. This 
term was based on an ad hoc hypothesis, which postulated that there is an interaction 
between the orbital and spin angular momenta of the unpaired nucleon. This 
hypothesis, which revived the shell model from obscurity, implied that the potential 
energy operator should take the following form:
F (r , l ,s )  = K(r) + ^ ( l s )  (S.I5)
I present the proposed potential operator above in such a form that any operator can 
be used for the central potential V(r), and for the spin-orbit coupling term the value of 
the constant a could be considered as having no radial dependence. The spin-orbit 
potential is generally considered phenomenological because it is an ad hoc 
conjecture. The mechanism of the interaction was unknown. It derived its usage from 
the physics of the atom, but in the latter case the spin-orbit coupling of an electron 
bound in an atom arises from the interaction of the magnetic moments associated
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with the angular momenta. If an electron moves in an electric field with certain 
velocity, a magnetic field is induced at its location. This induced magnetic field has 
an effect on the magnetic moment associated with the electron spin. From elementary 
electromagnetism it can then be shown that the magnetic moment is measured 
through its interaction energy with an external homogeneous magnetic field. That is 
to say, we know that the operator representing the interaction energy is given by the 
scalar product of the magnetic moment with the induced magnetic field. The 
magnetic moment is a function of the spin of the electron, and the magnetic field can 
be shown to be a function of the orbital angular momentum. Consequently, the 
interaction energy of the electron can be expressed as a spin-orbit coupling (i.e. a 
scalar product of the orbital and spin angular momenta). For an electron bound in an 
atom we thus have a theoretically regulated way of showing that there is an energy 
part of the Hamiltonian operator that is associated with the spin-orbit coupling. For 
the nucleons, however, the spin-orbit coupling cannot arise from an induced magnetic 
field, because neutrons are uncharged particles and thus their motion does not give 
rise to magnetic fields. The mechanism of the spin-orbit interaction of nucleons is 
therefore largely unknown.
What Mayer (1948) did was to introduce a dimensionless constant (represented here 
as a) and change the algebraic sign on the spin-orbit coupling operator used in the 
atomic case. These changes imply that the mechanism which gives rise to the nucleon 
spin-orbit coupling is different from the electromagnetic mechanism (described 
above) that operates for electrons in an atom. The spin-orbit coupling was introduced 
into the potential energy operator of the shell model in an ad hoc manner, simply to 
adjust the model’s predictions and thus account for empirical observations. The 
changes in the model predictions come about very simply and conveniently. 
Assuming, for the sake of brevity, that we choose V(r) to be the harmonic oscillator 
potential, if a is chosen to have no radial dependence then the presence of the spin-
The mathematical formalities for this mechanism, which are relatively straightforward, can be 
found in almost all books on atomic physics. I avoid them here for purposes of simplicity of 
exposition, by keeping this work mathematically ‘clean’ from physics not directly related to nuclear 
phenomena.
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orbit coupling term does not change the harmonic oscillator eigenfunctions. Hence, 
the form of the solutions to the Schrodinger equation are just as simple as solving for 
an oscillator potential. Only the energy eigenvalues are changed by additive terms on 
/ and 7 , where j  is the total angular momentum. To be more precise, each energy 
eigenvalue of the harmonic oscillator is split into two parts. If a is positive, the 
energy for states of / anti-parallel to s are shifted to higher energies, and those of I 
parallel to s are shifted to lower energies. The addition of the spin-orbit coupling, as 
presented above, makes the empirically known magic numbers occur as closed sub­
shells. To make them appear as clearly separate closed major shells without moving 
beyond this model, we can either adjust the oc-values from shell to shell (i.e. give a 
radial dependence to a), or make the oscillator potential more square. The latter could 
be achieved by interpolating a potential F(r) between the two extreme cases of the 
harmonic oscillator and the infinite square well.^ °"^  The radial part of the wave 
functions of such an intermediate potential cannot however be given explicitly. This 
computational disadvantage can be overcome in a variety of ways by constructing 
more ‘realistic’ potentials that tend to lower the energies of the states with higher 
orbital angular momentum.
One such construction that achieves the above effect (firstly suggested by Woods and 
Saxon, 1954) uses for the F(r) term in equation (5.15) an operator that was originally 
proposed for adjustment of the nuclear scattering potential in the optical model. In 
this operator, r„ is the nuclear radius, which can be taken to be equal to the radial
The reason for doing this is because for large / the infinite square well shells are energetically too 
low and the corresponding harmonic oscillator shells are too high relative to the observed values. This 
is generally understood as taking place because for large I the angular momentum barrier causes the 
nucleon to spend most of its time in the region near the edge of the well. Thus, the nucleon experiences 
too deep a potential in the square well and too little attractive force when a harmonic oscillator 
potential of the same depth as the square well is used. An interpolated intermediate potential can give 
the appropriate depth at larger distances for the states of large orbital angular momentum.
The search for such potentials dominated much work on the independent particle models with shell 
structure in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. In addition to the Woods-Saxon potential discussed here, 
other possible candidates were the Green-Wyatt potential, the Guassian potential, the Yukawa 
potential. See Green et al (1968), Eisenberg and Greiner (1970), Von Buttlar (1968).
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distance at which the absolute value of the potential drops to one half of its central 
value; and t is the surface thickness (or diffuseness of the nuclear surface, if one is 
considering nuclear scattering) of the potential. Both of these quantities contribute to 
the magnitude of the central potential:
F(r) = -F „(l+ (5.16)
In another approach to the problem of achieving the above effect, suggested by 
Nilsson in 1955, the Woods-Saxon potential is simulated by adding a term 
proportional to f  to the harmonic oscillator with spin-orbit splitting model:
F (r ,  1, s) = V '  +  • s +  (5 .17)
The constant A=-2altf', as before, characterises the strength of the spin-orbit 
coupling; and the parameter B simulates the deviation of the oscillator potential from 
a more ‘realistic’ potential (such as the Woods-Saxon potential). With this 
adjustment, however, the centre of gravity of the oscillator shells is not conserved and 
the model parameters must be readjusted for various shells. More recently, in 1967, 
Gustafson circumvented this problem by modifying the f  term to include the 
deviation of the f  operator from its mean value in the #-shell rather than the operator 
itself. Thus resulting in the following potential operator:
F (r ,  I, s) = i M o  V" +  /II ■ s +  |l' I Af)) (5 .18)
There are a number of instructive issues, in relation to the construction of the single 
particle shell model with spin-orbit coupling, so far described, that I wish to take up, 
before moving further into the development of the most sophisticated version of the 
model, whose synthesis has to wait until Chapter 6.
5.3.1 Scientific Theories: Hypotheses vs. Mathematical Structures
Let me begin by rehearsing what I believe to be a plausible more accurate scenario 
for the SV in the story of the shell model, than the one alluded to so far, i.e. that we 
apply the theory by simply running through its semantic models to find one that 
matches the physical system. In the framework of the SV the nuclear shell model
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would not be regarded as a single mathematical structure but as a structure-type, what 
we have called in sub-section 3.2.1.1 a state-space type. As a reminder, a state-space 
type is an abstract structure with some parameters left unspecified. Each time the 
unspecified parameters are specified in a particular way, the structure-type gives rise 
to one specific theoretical model. Hence a state-space type designates a family of 
models. What physicists call the single particle shell model is in fact such a family of 
models, of the structure-type associated with the Hamiltonian operator H  -  T + V{r) , 
together with the additional constraint imposed by the hypothesis that nucleons move 
approximately independently in specified nuclear shells and pair-off to form an inert 
core. When the kinetic and potential energy operators are specified then we have a 
fully determinate model. Of course, to make a just case for the SV, when new 
parameters are postulated (of which the potential energy operator is a function) we 
could view it as a new structure-type candidate for representing the physical domain 
of inquiry namely the one associated with the new Hamiltonian operator, e.g. 
H  = T + V{r,s,\) , or simply as a structure-type nested in the previous one. Therefore, 
what we have earlier called the single particle shell model with spin-orbit coupling 
could be viewed as a new family of models proposed for the plausible representation 
of the nuclear structure, or as a structure nested in the family of single particle shell 
models. It would therefore seem that the application of a theory, according to the SV, 
is not as simplistic as I may have so far indicated.
Admittedly, this was a highly schematic way of describing what a theory application 
consists of according to the SV. The more detailed description implies that by 
imposing further constraints on the theory-structure, via peculiar-to-the-domain 
hypotheses, we define new structure-types and this results in a proliferation and 
nesting of theoretical models. This kind of analysis of theory application, suggests a 
process that runs all the way down to the representation (or concrete) model, to which 
I have attributed special status (wrongly, of course, if we abide to the SV analysis). I 
have stressed this latter point about the SV repeatedly throughout this work, because 
if its only contribution to understanding what scientific theories are were just the 
claim that (for example) the Schrodinger equation with a Hamiltonian of the general 
form H  = T + V{r) is a mathematical structure-type, then it would be no more than a
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trivial contribution. The arguable implication of the SV, however, is that it considers 
representation models as descendants, i.e. natural (deductive) extensions, of the initial 
theory structure. This apprehension reduces the actual models we use for 
representation purposes to nothing else but the pragmatic outcomes of the efforts to 
stretch the theory all the way down to the phenomena, or to structures that relate 
approximately to corresponding theoretical models. For reasons that I will try to 
explain by using the shell model as an example, such oversight to the processes of 
construction of representation models and to theory application in general is, in my 
view, analogous to reading Tolstoy’s War and Peace for the sole purpose of 
familiarising oneself with the historical events depicted in this epic masterpiece.
The construction of the single particle shell model relies on the general hypothesis of 
independent particle motion. The generic nature of this hypothesis allows for 
numerous mathematical manifestations (each of which is incompatible with the next, 
e.g. the Fermi gas model vis-à-vis motion of nucleons influenced by a parabolic 
potential). In order to use the hypothesis to construct a representation model we must 
introduce several addenda to it. It is further conjectured that the nucleons fill-up 
shells in analogy with the atomic case, and further that the nucleons pair-off to form 
an inert core, and that there is a spin-orbit coupling associated with the odd-nucleon 
that affects the latter’s motion. The process of introducing addenda can go on for as 
long as our epistemic limitations allow. The result can be viewed as a conjunction of 
hypotheses or as just a more specific form of our initial hypothesis, and it has a 
mathematical manifestation with a more restricted scope to the previous one in the 
chain. The SV puts this story upside down. It claims that the laws of the theory define 
an infinite class of structures. Then, if we choose the structure -which we identify 
here as the single particle model with spin-orbit coupling- for representing the 
nucleus, then we invoke the theoretical hypothesis that the -data model about the- 
nucleus is isomorphic to this structure. It is my understanding that in a more explicit 
form, the theoretical hypothesis would state that the nucleus is (isomorphic to) a 
system of independent particles that fill-up shells (stationary orbits) and in which the 
nucleons pair-off to form an inert core and finally that the spin-orbit interaction of the
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odd nucleon also affects the latter's m o t i o n / W e  may ask, does it matter that the SV 
gives us the wrong order of understanding scientific discourse? I think yes. If the SV 
gives us the correctly ordered picture of understanding scientific discourse, not much 
else can be said about scientific theories except to work out the details of this view. If 
however it does not, then we can justifiably infer that it is simply a rational 
reconstruction of the (actual thing) discourse that attempts to explicate the finished 
product, i.e. the theory. If we can find a persuasive argument for the latter position, 
then we can proceed to reveal what aspects of actual scientific theorising are obscured 
by the SV.
The SV places structures on a primary and hypotheses on a secondary level. 
Scientific hypotheses are reduced, according to the SV, to claims about the relation of 
a structure to a model of data. What is presumably puzzling in this picture is the 
question of how the structures are identified. Trivially they are the products of the 
scientific mind, but so too are a remarkably large number of other things, hence we 
cannot rest upon such a triviality. A reasonably careful examination of the SV leads 
one to infer that structures are defined ‘objects’. This is, of course, substantiated by 
the explicitness of some proponents of the SV on this issue. In my examination of the 
SV in Chapter 3 ,1 have tried to show that the means by which structures are defined, 
according to the SV, are what we generally call the laws of the theory. But if this is 
the case then the laws of the theory could be more fundamental than those objects 
they purportedly define, viz. the structures. Then the immediate question is, what sort 
of ‘objects’ are the laws of the theory. The most common answer to this has always 
been that the laws are hypotheses (one of the modes of these hypotheses, i.e. a way 
they are, is expressions of ‘relations’ that satisfy a structure). But then, if we have 
established that a small number of hypotheses (the laws) are what give rise to 
structures then we are surely sanctioned to extend this line of thought to other more
It goes without saying that if any detail in the chosen model is changed it immediately implies a 
change in the explicit form of the theoretical hypothesis. No matter how much numerous philosophers 
hate to admit, whose intuition about scientific theories inhibits them from espousing the SV, tlie last 
thing we can charge the SV, as a way by which to comprehend what scientific theories are, is lack of 
coherence. To my knowledge, the number of interesting mistakes or shortcomings of the SV that have 
been pointed out are limited and have confined magnitude.
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complex forms of hypotheses. It does not require much imagination to view any 
mathematical structure as an object determined by some complex hypothesis. Here is 
a sketchy example of such a complex hypothesis: the hypothesis that finds its 
expression in the Schrodinger equation (i.e. the laws of quantum mechanics) in 
conjunction with the hypothesis that nucleons are moving approximately 
independently, in conjunction with the hypothesis that nucleons fill-up shells, in 
conjunction with the hypothesis that nucleons pair-off to form an inert core, and 
finally in conjunction with the hypothesis that there is a spin-orbit coupling that also 
affects the motion of the odd nucleon. This hypothesis is used to define the structure 
that is commonly known as the single particle nuclear shell model with spin-orbit 
coupling. It would therefore seem that the SV gives us the wrong order by which to 
understand the overall picture. This may be the case because we could discover 
details about the character of models, and subsequently the character of theories, that 
are discernible only in a close study of the hypotheses that give rise to them, and that 
are otherwise obscured. The fact that hypotheses are the defining tools of structures 
gives us enough grounds to proceed in this direction. I do not perceive this as a 
conclusive argument against the SV, but more as a reason why I believe that the SV 
is just a rational reconstruction of theories. As such, by concentrating on the 
derivative structures for the analysis of theories, and by omitting the role of the 
structure-defining hypotheses, it is plausible that the SV errs on three fronts. (1) It 
distorts elements that constitute actual scientific theorising -and in particular the 
scientific activity of theory application- by reducing the latter to more or less a pure 
mathematical activity. (2) It fails to recognise major scientific quests, such as the 
search for explanatory mechanisms. (3) And finally, it presupposes a mistaken view 
of how idealisation and its converse process, de-idealisation, is practised in scientific 
inquiry. All three of these shortcomings are intertwined with my general view that 
representation models in science are not what the SV wants us to understand. The 
first of these is a criticism of mine that is present throughout the entire of this work. 
The second I address shortly in the present sub-section and continue in sub-section
I wish to remind the reader that by a rational reconstruction of theories I mean the suggestion of a 
logical framework into which theories can be essentially reformulated, i.e. an explication of the 
structure of theories and not a description of how actual theories are formulated.
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5.3.3, and the third I will address in sub-section 5.3.2 that follows and will return to 
in Chapter 6.
But we have also just discovered something else about the SV: namely, that it
attributes two functions to hypotheses. Firstly, they are used to define structures, and
secondly they are used to make truth-claims about the structural relation between the
mathematical structure and the data model. But these two functions render the
structures, from a certain point of view, redundant -although sometimes convenient-
mediators between the defining hypothesis and the experimental data. In what sense
are they redundant? The idea that hypotheses define structures could be interpreted,
as a way of stressing the view that theories do not make direct claims about the
phenomena per se, as it has been traditionally understood. Scientific hypotheses make
claims only about idealised and abstract systems (i.e. about idealised and abstract sets
of objects subject to a certain set of relations). What I am suggesting here is that the
primary difference between the Received View and the Semantic View be understood
as follows: in the former, theoretical claims have traditionally been understood to
refer to statements about actual phenomena; whereas in the latter, theoretical claims
should be recognised to refer to abstract and idealised structural ‘images’ of the
phenomena. In the Logical Positivist program on scientific theories we begin with a
set of hypotheses (the axioms) and establish a deductively closed system that
stretches all the way to truth-functional statements about observations. Of course,
there are further complications to such a view and its proponents have supplemented
it with correspondence rules and the like to overcome them. The point however is that
in that view it became prevalent, but not pervasive (a notable exception is Hempel
1988, but also the physicalist program of Neurath that the young Hempel seemed to
have shared -see Friedman, unpublished manuscript), that the theoretical statements
refer to actual empirical systems. The SV combats the Logical Positivist syntactically
motivated attitude by utilising mathematical structures. The hypotheses define
structures and are then used to make claims about the relation of these structures to
their physical counterparts (the data models). Among other things, the purpose
achieved is to emphasise that the laws of the theory do not refer to actual physical
systems, i.e. strictly speaking they have no factual content. Although arguable, this
point is well taken, but we need not embrace the SV and all its implications in order
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to adopt this position or some variant of it. If the SV is embraced, then its focus on 
structural analysis and its demand that every scientific model be subsumed in the 
theory structure comes at certain costs: (1) the explanatory nature and partial theory 
independence of representation models is concealed, and (2) the process of 
idealisation and its converse, as a process of theory application, is given a far too 
simplistic and inadequate account.
When we want to check for the connection between representation models and the 
theory that gives rise to them, the above line of reasoning becomes important. The SV 
holds that there is unity of all models of the theory, a claim that is justified by 
subsuming every model (including representation models) to the theory structure. It 
then makes use of structural analysis, which ultimately leads the proponents of the 
SV to resort to the claim that the actual model used for representation purposes 
relates in some approximate way to a model that belongs to the theory structure. A 
more farfetched version of this view, that may not be shared by all the proponents of 
the SV, is to regard representation models as the pragmatic outcomes of the attempts 
to stretch the theory to the phenomena. That is, to the position that representation 
models are constructed on purely pragmatic grounds. If however we step outside of 
the structural analysis of the SV and rely on an analysis of the hypotheses that give 
rise to the structure, it becomes clearly difficult to defend this position. Indeed, in the 
case of the shell model, what is evident is that the choice of the hypotheses is not 
taken on pragmatic grounds but it is based on the search for (explanatory) 
mechanisms that may influence the physical system of concern. In addition, it 
becomes easier to understand why at different stages in the construction of the 
representation model, existing stock models of the theory are invoked to represent a
If the claim about the redundancy of structures is valid then we may also infer, that by focussing on 
the structural character of theories the SV aims to explicate (and justify) the unification of theoretical 
claims. Viewing the theory as a class of mathematical structures ensures the unification of theoretical 
claims. Moreover, we can see that despite the fact that the SV was partly intended to disrepute the 
logical positivist distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification it 
nevertheless maintains its own version of such a distinction, camouflaged within the additional 
subtlety that the act of ‘discovery’ is now viewed as the act of ‘construction’.
In Chapter 4 ,1 have argued that this claim is unfounded.
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particular mechanism or on some occasions new suitable stock models are 
constructed. That is to say, we can understand that it is not just the theory that gives 
birth to representation models, but also that representation models exert their effect 
on the theory by instigating an expansion of its scope.
Take, for example, the shell model where we initially begin with the hypothesis that 
nucleons occupy shells, which implies a central potential. The stock models of 
quantum mechanics are tried out as mathematical representations of this potential, 
e.g. the harmonic oscillator or the infinite square well, because our initial hypothesis 
allows that we start from the available stock models (contrary to the strong 
interaction hypothesis). The central potential hypothesis has a heuristic nature, some 
of its initial elements will be retained and some others will eventually be discarded or 
modified. The specific stock models we try out, however, are based on several 
subsidiary working hypotheses, because the goal at this stage is not to discover the 
final acceptable potential operator from among the stock potentials of the theory 
(unless coincidentally we happen to stumble upon it). The purpose of these working 
hypotheses is to find the most suitable initiatory mathematical representation of the 
central potential that will enable the exploration of the nuclear domain. That is why 
we should regard them as working hypotheses, to be tried out and be discarded once 
they achieve their purpose. Physicists know very well from the beginning that even if 
they finally adopt some modified version of the shell model for representing the 
nuclear structure, the final potential should have deviated significantly from the 
central potential. They know this because the physics of the nucleus cannot 
accommodate a picture based on a central force. So by trying out the different stock 
models the primary purpose is not what it may seem, i.e. fitting the experimental 
facts, but it is to discover how the central potential should be modified. They are 
searching, in other words, for mechanisms that would explain the desired shifts of the 
model predictions from that of the central potential. The search for such mechanisms 
is the key to understanding the shell model.
The spin-orbit coupling associated with the odd-nucleon is such a postulated ad hoc
mechanism. The spin-orbit hypothesis adds its own character to the heuristic. It gives
the wanted kinds of modifications to the model predictions and hence it is a starting
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point; it guides the research community to search for better stock models (for the 
central part of the potential) that would give more refined predictions (e.g. the 
Woods-Saxon potential). It is very frequently taken for granted that the models of a 
theory are available for modelling a domain the moment the general theory structure 
is defined. So far I have disputed the availability of a ready-made, or antecedently 
available, (infinite) class of models for the theoretical representation of physical 
systems, by pointing to the work of Cartwright (1983 and 1999) and the qualification 
which she makes that the theory only supplies us with a finite set of stock models for 
such a purpose. Now I want to further qualify the argument. Part of scientific 
theorising consists in the construction of new stock models that may be of use in a 
particular domain. The motivation for their construction comes from the demand of 
the mechanisms at work in the representation model. This point is manifested in the 
case of the Woods-Saxon potential (as well as other proposed potentials). The 
Woods-Saxon potential is constructed because we want to pursue the spin-orbit 
hypothesis, it provides a better defence for the latter because together they improve 
on the predictive power of the model. To make the point more general, the stock 
models of the theory employed in the construction of a representation model (in a 
particular domain) are partially determined (or regulated) by the postulated 
mechanisms at work.^^° I take this point to rebut the position that representation 
models are constructed on purely pragmatic grounds, because if such were the case 
then representation models would just be constructed by the addition of correction 
factors to the initial stock model. In the case of the single particle shell model what 
determines the mathematical representation of the potential is the interplay between 
theory and the auxiliary postulated mechanism of spin-orbit coupling.
It is interesting to contrast the introduction of the Woods-Saxon potential to the 
introduction of the third terms BŸ and in equations (5.17) and
(5.18) respectively. These terms are not the outcomes of hypotheses that postulate 
new mechanisms like the spin-orbit coupling. They are introduced for purely
' This same point can also be made for the construction of the optical model of nuclear scattering, for 
which the Woods-Saxon potential was originally constructed.
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pragmatic reasons. They are correction factors to the harmonic oscillator potential to 
make it simulate the Woods-Saxon potential. I pointed out these cases because I want 
to emphasise that the addition of correction factors to an initially chosen potential 
energy operator occurs when we have a description of the physical system that 
validates the adoption of the chosen operator. When this situation occurs, then we 
may have enough grounds to support the thesis that actual representation models are 
constructed on purely pragmatic grounds. This however is a situation that we 
generally encounter in well-explored domains. With hindsight we come to regard 
every part, but the first, of our Hamiltonian operator (or force function etc.) to be a 
cumulative correction factor to our initial stock Hamiltonian. In the beginning of the 
exploration of a physical domain however, like in the case of nuclear physics, it 
becomes conspicuous that in the construction of a representation model what we 
eventually come to regard as correction factors are in fact postulated mechanisms at 
work that determine the choice of our stock model. And in many cases these 
postulated mechanisms impose the need for ‘mini-research programs’ to construct 
more suitable stock Hamiltonians and bridge principles to thus enrich the theory.
The SV would give us a different explanation for the foregoing story. It would claim 
that an actual representation model is a structure, part of which is included in the 
theory structure plus some extra structure for which the theory does not account. This 
extra structure that has to be ‘filled-in’ in order to match the corresponding data 
model, is what is added to the model of the theory on pragmatic grounds. This 
explanation, however, does not discriminate between those cases that, I have claimed, 
postulate novel mechanisms at work from those that do not. If we view the process of 
construction of a representation model solely as an activity that perpetually 
supplements structure then it seems inevitable that we conceal this feature. If 
however, we view this activity as the perpetual synthesis of hypotheses, as I suggest, 
then this feature becomes clear. When we view the final product, i.e. the 
representation model, without attending to its process of construction then, no doubt, 
the SV is correct in pointing out that it is a mathematical structure. Part of this 
structure may be subsumed in the theory that gave rise to it, and part of it may be 
alien to the theory. But this is only a rational reconstruction of the finished product.
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which I take it to be equivalent to saying that any model can be traced back to the 
theory that gave rise to it because it shares structure with the latter.
If we come to regard, as suggested earlier, representation models as structures defined 
by some complex hypothesis, then we have an empirical criterion by which to decide 
what parts of the hypothesis-conjunction are of pragmatic nature and which are not. 
Any part of the conjunction that postulates a physical mechanism is subject to 
empirical investigation. Whereas, any conjunct that is only meant to provide a 
mathematical simulation cannot be tested empirically. The latter is only testable as 
part of the model, for it is added to the model for pragmatic reasons, solely to adjust 
the model predictions. The former however possesses the capacity for explanation, 
once enough experimental evidence is acquired for establishing the existence of the 
postulated mechanism. These postulated mechanisms are the elements of the models 
that provide the nexus between models and real physical systems. Compare this to 
what the SV has to say on the issue. A certain aspect of the model is of pragmatic 
nature or it relates approximately to the theoretical concepts, if it does not occupy a 
salient place in the unifying theory structure. But the pursuit to subsume all models 
under the umbrella of a unifying theory structure is motivated by the same exact a 
priori view as that held by the Logical Positivists, i.e. that the deductive 
consequences of the theory stretch all the way to the phenomena. Only, for the SV the 
justification for this position does not require resorting to an observation/theory 
distinction, but instead to a sharp distinction between models of theory and models of 
data. This distinction inevitably leads to the view that every actual representation 
model is constructed on purely pragmatic grounds or is an approximant of some 
model of the theory, thus concealing those elements of the models by which we may 
reasonably link them to physical systems.
5.3.2 Remarks on Idealisation: The Cumulative Correction Process
This discussion inevitably leads us to questions on idealisation and in particular what 
role it plays in theory application. The most familiar account on the issue is that of 
McMullin (1985). In his essay, McMullin maintains a view that comes very close to
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equating idealisation with approximation. He contends that scientific theories are 
usually idealised descriptions that apply only to circumstances that can be achieved in 
the highly contained environments of laboratories, but seldom do they occur in real 
world environments. Focussing on the methodological dimension of McMullin’s 
argument we can view the converse process to idealisation, i.e. de-idealisation, as a 
way by which a theory gets applied to the phenomena. We start from a set of highly 
idealised principles, to construct an initially idealised model. The latter can be further 
de-idealised by utilising other conceptual resources of the theory, which enable us to 
add correction factors to our initial model. Eventually we end-up with a reasonably 
de-idealised model that, in McMullin’s realist outlook, approximates the real 
s y s t e m . I n  a more epistemologically neutral outlook it resembles the real system it 
ostensibly describes. To visualise the process we can think of the pendulum model 
explained in Chapter 4. The de-idealisation of the linear harmonic oscillator proceeds 
cumulatively by the inclusion of more and more influencing factors. In fact, the 
proponents of McMullin’s views would claim that the pendulum example exemplifies 
their account of de-idealisation. Following my discussion of the pendulum however, I 
find such a claim highly arguable, given that the correction factors to the classical 
simple harmonic oscillator model very frequently do not belong to the conceptual 
resources of classical particle mechanics.
The peculiarly interesting thing about McMullin’s account of the de-idealisation 
process is that it is remarkably useful for the proponents of the SV, realist and anti­
realist alike. To see why, let’s consider a general hypothetical case. Suppose we have 
an initial idealised model that is expressed in the following functional relation: 
H{x)  = ( ^ 1  (%), ... ,g„(x)). Then, a first step de-idealisation would be to expand the
functional relation by accounting for a physical parameter that (according to the
Arguing from a realist perspective, McMullin (1985) proceeds to show that the idealised nature of 
theories presents no epistemological problems to the realist, because the theory possesses the necessary 
conceptual apparatus to de-idealise its models to the point where an approximate description of actual 
physical systems is achieved. I am not concerned with the epistemological dimension of McMullin’s 
argument. Here I want to focus on the methodological dimension of how idealisation and in particular 
its converse, de-idealisation, can be used as an instrument to understand the application of theoiy to the 
world.
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theory) we have initially ignored. The result would be a new functional relation: 
f^{g^{x), ... ,&»(%))+ (x), ... A W )  - The process of supplementing the
function H{x) with cumulative correction factors can go on, presumably until the 
theory has no more to offer on the issue. Clearly, all the derivative de-idealised 
relatives of our initial model relate to the latter in an obvious way: in the limit as the 
correction factors tend to zero they yield the initial model. Thus in our general 
hypothetical example above we can express the relation between the two models, as 
follows: lim (i/'(^ ) = y;(g,(x), ... ,g„{x)) + f-^(h^{x\ A W ) )  = ^ W  In other
words, on this account idealisation is the process by which we let factors, that 
according to the theory are influential to the physical system, tend to zero. De­
idealisation is the converse process of allowing these theoretically dictated factors 
take finite values. This is what the processes of idealisation and de-idealisation 
consist of in McMullin’s view. And this I claim, is the most suitable account of de­
idealisation if it is to be accommodated as a process of theory application in the SV.
To see why let me view the process more abstractly. We know that, according to the 
SV, a model with some parameters unspecified is a defined structure-type. When a 
new parameter is specified we construct a new structure-type nested in the previous 
one. Imagine this process repeated for a number of parameters. The result is a 
sequence of structure nesting. Thinking about this abstractly, idealisation/de­
idealisation is no more than a partial ordering of s t r u c t u r e s . T h e  criterion (i.e. 
relation) of this partial ordering is that of the restriction of the domain, i.e. two 
models are partially ordered (i.e. M iiM i) if and only if the domain of Mi is a 
restriction of the domain of M 2 (i.e. domMygdomM) Intuitively, we could think of 
the criterion for partial ordering as the specification (or addition) of a parameter in the 
functional relation.
It makes no significant difference to this argument whether we talk of strong or weak partial 
ordering. Strong partial ordering requires that the relation satisfies the conditions of anti-symmetry and 
transitivity; whereas weak partial ordering requires the satisfaction of the conditions of reflexivity, 
weak anti-symmetry and transitivity.
173
But immediately we discern that if such is the case, then this de-idealisation view of 
applying a theory is part and parcel of the SV, whose formulation implies a partial 
ordering of structures. This holds for the views of realists like Suppe and anti-realists 
like van Fraassen. The difference between the two would lie in the character they 
would assign to the correction factors. The former would claim that the conceptual 
resources of the theory determine the correction factors but the final model is still an 
abstract and idealised replica of a real system. Primarily due to reasons attributed to 
tractability, or mathematical and numerical limitations, or simply the incapacity to 
extend the domain of the theory beyond a certain stage because the theory’s 
conceptual resources have restricted scope. Van Fraassen would claim that some of 
these correction factors are theory-instigated, whereas others are introduced on purely 
pragmatic grounds, but all that matters is that the final model is structurally 
isomorphic to the respective data model.
In Chapter 4, I argued that the correction factors to the pendulum are not introduced 
by using the conceptual apparatus of the theory alone. Many other things are involved 
in the process of de-idealisation. In particular, we make use of auxiliary empirical 
laws and experimentally determined values for the associated parameters. Here I want 
to augment the argument and claim that it is quite explicit in the single particle shell 
model that supplementing the model with the spin-orbit ‘correction factor’ involves 
postulating a novel hypothesis. The specific hypothesis of the spin-orbit coupling 
postulates a mechanism that the theory offers no assistance in discovering. Hence the 
SV lacks the capacity to subsume the single particle shell model with spin-orbit 
coupling under the theory structure. The primary indication for this is that, for the 
reasons mentioned in the previous section, the introduction of the spin-orbit coupling 
hypothesis cannot be given an adequate explication by understanding de-idealisation 
as a process of theory application in the way explained above. But I also want to urge 
by this argument a more general claim: implicit in the SV is a far too simple and 
distorted account of idealisation/de-idealisation as a process of theory application. 
This account has two key features, (1) that the introduction of correction factors is 
cumulative and (2 ) that the correction factors are dictated by the conceptual resources 
of the scientific theory that gives rise to the initial model. The second feature fails to
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account for the introduction of the spin-orbit coupling; the first feature as we shall see 
later (in Chapter 6 ) fails to account for the construction of the unified model.
5.3.3 Representation Models: Media for Scientific Explanation
In the particular case of Mayer’s spin-orbit coupling hypothesis, it may be argued that 
the fact that the postulated mechanism is ad hoc renders the resulting model a 
pragmatic counterpart of a theoretical model. In contending this, however, we 
overlook the most important nature of the representation model; to borrow from 
Morrison (1999), its autonomy. Although there is no theoretically systematic way to 
justify the introduction of the spin-orbit force, as is the case for the atom, it does not 
mean that experimentally motivated arguments are disqualified from providing the 
justification. Indeed this is what takes place. Because of the piecemeal fashion by 
which the model is constructed, the concern with substantiating the spin-orbit force 
shifts to the experimental facts. Numerous scattering experiments were conducted 
some of which succeeded in showing that the spin-orbit force exists in nuclear matter. 
Examples are Adair (1952), Hensinkfeld and Freier (1952), Signell and Marshack 
(1957 and 1958). This is very similar to my claim in Chapter 4, that the closest 
representation models get to theoretical models is when the latter are blended with 
empirical ingredients. I used this argument to point to the fact that the distinction 
between theoretical and data models is not as clear-cut as the proponents of the SV 
want us to think. The same holds for the present case.
Empirical evidence in support for a postulated physical mechanism is usually 
acquired by the use of another mode of scientific inquiry, which does not involve the 
theory directly but is strongly associated with representation models. This mode of 
inquiry is peculiar to the representation model because when used together with 
experiment it is the way by which to render the model explanatory. It involves 
holding constant the important components of the model-defining hypothesis and 
altering some of its subsidiary parts, in an attempt to discover empirical evidence in 
support of a postulated mechanism. Indeed this is the case for the spin-orbit 
hypothesis, which can serve as an example by which to clarify this point. One of the
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conjuncts in the defining hypothesis of the model (other than the spin-orbit coupling 
hypothesis) can be modified in ways that enable inferences to be made about the 
postulated spin-orbit mechanism. One of the hypotheses that underlies the single 
particle shell model involves the idealising assumption that the nucleons pair-off to 
form an inert core. If this hypothesis is modified (in the way explained below) and all 
other defining parts of the model remain equal, we define a model that I shall refer to 
as the loose particle shell model (as substitute for the clause ‘single particle’) . T h e  
physical intuition behind this particular modification is that those nucleons that fill up 
shells form an inert core, and the loose nucleons that remain in the unfilled shells 
(whether odd or even in number) contribute to the nucleus’s properties. Although, the 
loose particle shell model (being less idealised) generally makes different predictions 
from the single particle shell model, its predictions about spin are the same as the 
latter’ thus showing that the spin-orbit interaction makes a contribution to the 
nuclear behaviour. The initially ad hoc hypothesis of spin-orbit coupling was thus 
later to be elevated to the status of a prediction of a property of nuclear matter, 
despite still being in need of theoretical subsumption. It would be off the target to 
claim that some future Mesonic theory will provide the necessary explanation for the 
spin-orbit hypothesis and even the answers to, possibly the most haunting scientific 
question of, ‘what holds the nucleus together’. The claim urged in my argument is
There is the immediate tendency to call such cases de-idealisations or better approximations. I do 
not oppose the general position of such an apprehension but, given the preceding discussion in sub­
section 5 .3 .2 ,1 choose to exercise caution because what is modified in the single particle shell model is 
one of the defining hypotheses. The implications of the modification vary in character and degree in 
ways that distinguish it from modifications that involve simple addenda to the Hamiltonian operator. 
One such example is that the explanatory power of the single particle shell model is extended in tlie 
loose particle shell model because the latter can supply us with an explanation of both odd-A and even- 
even nuclei. I shall try to elaborate more on the issue of de-idealisation shortly in Chapter 6, in an 
attempt to discern the elements of this process of theory application and their character. But what is at 
issue here, following the preceding discussion, is that an accurate account of idealisation/de­
idealisation is still wanting.
” I do not provide the experimental results and accompanying explications, but the reader is referred 
to any of the following nuclear physics literature, Preston and Bhaduri (1975), Segré (1977), Burcham 
(1973), Elliot and Lane (1957), and many text books on Nuclear Physics with an experimental touch to 
them.
176
that representation models are the means by which any theory gets applied to the 
world. The fact that representation models postulate theoretically unexplicated 
mechanisms, is part of the reason why new theoretical research programs are 
instigated. It goes without saying, that my argument is meant to claim that even our 
future Mesonic theories will be in need of their own representation models.
Morrison argues that one of the roles representation models have, in scientific activity 
and inquiry, is that of autonomous agents. ‘The autonomy is the result of two 
components ( 1 ) the fact that models function in a way that is partially independent of 
theory and (2 ) in many cases they are constructed with a minimal reliance on high 
level theory. It is this partial independence in construction that ultimately gives rise to 
the functional independence.’ [Morrison 1999, p43] I think that the ‘bold’ spin-orbit 
hypothesis as introduced into the shell model, and the ways by which its introduction 
is justified, is an example that supports Morrison’s argument. Moreover, it supplies 
the model with explanatory power that derives from other sources and not from 
existing theory and it gives the model its (partial) representation capacity. Both of 
these interconnected features provide the model its special status as a mediator 
between the theory, which is by its own nature ‘segregated’ from experience, and the 
phenomena.
An important part of the reason why representation models enjoy a certain autonomy 
is because the subsidiary hypotheses that impose constraints on them, over and above 
those imposed by the theory, are not part of the theory for which the models mediate. 
These hypotheses differ in kind from those used in the definition of the stock models 
of the theory. The latter determine the scope of the theory: its stock models. The 
former however are attempts to explore physical domains. Their primary purpose is 
to extend the scope of the theory to particular physical domains. These additional 
hypotheses imply a particular nature to the subject matter of the model, which is in 
need of an explanation. The explanation can come from wherever we can find it, 
whether from theory-based or experiment-based considerations (or a mixture of the 
two) it does not matter, because the goal is to furnish explanatory power to an 
important medium of scientific explanation: the representation model.
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5.4 Conclusion
I have argued in this Chapter that representation models cannot be subsumed under 
the theory’s structure, as the SV suggests. They are autonomous agents of scientific 
inquiry because they possess explanatory and predictive power independent from that 
of the theory. They may be constructed by the use of background knowledge and 
semi-empirical results, as is the case of the liquid drop model. Or, they may be 
constructed by stock models of the theory that have to be amended by postulating 
novel mechanisms for which the theory offers no justification. Or, they may be 
constructed by a combination of the two methods, as we shall see in Chapter 6  for the 
case of the unified model. Whichever the case, the point is that this independence 
from theory in construction ‘ultimately gives rise to their functional independence’. 
By functioning independently they provide us with explanations of physical systems 
for which otherwise we would be kept in the dark.
It is clear from the examples of representation models I provided that we do not apply 
quantum theory just by using its theoretical models but in a variety of ways. These 
ways suggest that the theory of quantum mechanics is much richer than just its class 
of semantic models and its small number of bridge principles. The failure of the 
Semantic View to capture the fimctions of representation models and to explicate 
their processes of construction is the clear message in the arguments presented in this 
chapter. But the overall argument continues into Chapter 6  in hope that we can 
provide an explication of the processes of construction of representation models, that 
does justice to the evolutionary history of representation models and to the physical 
content that model-defining hypotheses furnish the models.
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6 The Unified Model of Nuclear 
Structure
6.1 Introduction
We have so far looked at the single particle shell model to which we later added the 
spin-orbit interaction. It was stressed that this model enjoyed a lot of success in 
correlating and predicting a large number of nuclear data, and that it displaced the 
liquid drop model for a short period of time. We specifically focused on the case of 
the magic numbers. But it should also be mentioned that the model enjoyed success 
in providing a relatively good understanding of the ground state spins and parities of 
most ^-odd nuclei, and of many features of nuclear decay schemes. Despite its 
relative success the model was known to rest upon an idealisation for which there was 
room for improvement. One of the underlying assumptions, mentioned earlier, of the 
model is that the nucleons pair-off to form an inert core of spin 0. Indeed this kind of 
coupling is not far from that expected, in view of the large-strength and short-range 
attractive nature of nuclear interactions. But in fact actual nuclei exhibit inter-nucleon 
interactions that give rise to additional correlations. It was also briefly mentioned that 
this idealising assumption could be substituted with a more ‘realistic’ one that 
considers only the filled-up shells as the inert core of the nucleus.
If we compare equation (5.15) to the potential energy operator of equation (5.2) we 
realise that equation (5.15) approximates the independent particle hypothesis by 
imposing further constraints. In particular, the constraint that nucleons fill up shells
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and pair-off to form an inert core or any alternative to it (such as, the loose particle 
shell model constraint). This, of course, is just one of many ways to proceed. I have 
so far neglected to mention that parallel to the development of the single particle shell 
model dealt with here, another distinct method of exploring shell structure was 
developed, in which the above assumption is side-stepped: the so-called Individual 
Particle Shell Model. The individual particle shell model can be understood as a 
model that assumes a generalised form of shell structure. In this case, the pairing-off 
constraint is completely dropped and inter-nucleon interactions are entirely accounted 
for and are considered the source of the nuclear potential. In other words, in the 
individual particle shell model we do not introduce an approximated form of the 
potential energy operator into equation (5.2), as in the single particle shell model 
case. Instead, the many-body nuclear problem, which as mentioned in the very 
beginning of the previous Chapter is insoluble, is dealt with directly accounting for 
pair-wise nucleon interactions and for influences exerted on them from the other 
nucleons. The inevitable consequence of this method is to resort to available 
variational techniques, such as Hartree-Fock field methods, for its solution. Thus in 
the single particle approach we encounter the case of approximating the Hamiltonian 
operator we wish to solve the Schrodinger equation for, and in the individual particle 
approach we use the exact operator that represents our hypothesis about the physical 
system and then solve it by approximation methods. Because of the complexity of the 
variational methods used in the individual particle shell model case, a lot of the 
underlying physics is obscured. Thus I chose to present the single particle shell model 
in which the elements that I believe are necessary in our quest to understand 
representation models are easier to discern. This personal choice, however, makes no 
difference to the overall argument because the same abstractive hypothesis underlies 
both of these models: the collective mode of nuclear behaviour is totally neglected. 
Subsequently, if the explanatory and predictive power of both models is to 
significantly increase, the wavefunctions of both models should be improved by the 
introduction of collective modes of motion. The introduction of collective modes of
In the nuclear physics literature, this model frequently goes by the name of ‘Many Particle Shell 
Model’.
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nuclear motion is of course largely inspired by the strong interaction hypothesis/ 
The methods by which these improvements are introduced in the two models do not 
differ in any philosophically significant ways. That is why I have so far focused, and 
will continue to do so for the rest of this Chapter, on the single particle shell model 
and its development and improvement. The collective mode improvements on either 
of the two approaches to shell structure give rise to what is generally known as the 
Unified Model of nuclear structure.
6.1.1 Preliminary Remarks on the Background to the Unified Model
It became apparent in the early 1950’s that the shell model research program could 
not furnish acceptable explanations for several nuclear phenomena, e.g. nuclear 
fission and the giant resonances of nuclei (a phenomenon first observed in 1947, to be 
discussed shortly). It also became apparent that the shell model’s fictitious 
assumption of a central potential could not be adequately corrected by reliance solely 
on the independent particle hypothesis. In 1952 Bohr, and later in 1953 Bohr and 
Mottelson, developed a model for the collective modes of nuclear motion, which 
came to be known as the Collective Model of the nucleus. This model relies heavily 
on the liquid drop model (it could justifiably be viewed as a more sophisticated 
version of the latter) although some basic assumptions are modified. The collective 
model is, most probably, the most sophisticated strong interaction model. It considers 
the nucleus as a collection of closely coupled particles and by use of the 
hydrodynamic analogy, the Hamiltonian for the collective motion of the nucleons is 
developed. The collective Hamiltonian consists of four terms each accounting for the 
vibration, rotation, giant resonance, and a mixture of vibration-rotation modes of
This procedure could involve the introduction of the concepts of the liquid drop model, which is the 
line pursued in the present work. But for the sake of accuracy, it must be noted that the same can be 
achieved by using the concepts of another strong interaction model, the alpha particle model that was 
mentioned briefly in an earlier footnote.
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collective nuclear motion. The collective model was an inspiring drive for a new 
direction to the shell structure research program.
The outcome of this research direction was the unified model, which although it 
incorporates many of the peculiarities of the collective model it does so by 
assimilating these into the character of shell structure. Frequently in the nuclear 
physics literature, we encounter the view that the unification of the single particle 
shell model with spin-orbit coupling with the collective model is a form of synthesis 
of the two distinct models. I shall not pursue this line in my analysis; instead, I shall 
consider the unified model as an improvement, but not an extension, of the single 
particle shell model. My reasoning for this relies heavily on the model-defming- 
hypotheses view elaborated in the previous Chapter. The development of nuclear 
models began in the 1930’s with two underlying conflicting hypotheses. One 
assumed that the motion of the nucleus is roughly equivalent to the motion of 
strongly coupled particles and the other assumed that the nuclear-constituent particles 
moved independently and that their motion is what constitutes aggregate nuclear 
motion. The first gave rise to the liquid drop, alpha particle and collective models and 
the second gave rise to the Fermi gas and the various kinds of shell structure 
m o d e l s . T h e s e  hypotheses were conflicting not by virtue of their logical 
incompatibility (this is why I chose not to call them contradictory or incompatible, 
despite such frequent characterisations in the physics literature), but by virtue of the 
underlying physical intuitions and the different quests for explanation of experimental 
knowledge. The first hypothesis is motivated by the perpetually accumulating 
experimental knowledge of the large-strength and short-range nuclear interactions, by 
its resulting models providing good explanations for phenomena such as nuclear 
fission and later on giant resonances, and finally for providing a good justification for 
the Weizsacker formula. The second hypothesis is motivated primarily by the fact
A. Bohr 1952, A. Bohr and Mottelson 1953, (A. Bohr was the son of N. Bohr). Since the unified 
model is simply a linear synthesis of the concepts of the single particle shell model with spin-orbit 
coupling with those of the collective model, I consider it uimecessary here to discuss the latter on its
own.
118 The development of nuclear scattering models demonstrates, in many respects, similar features.
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that it makes use of quantum mechanical principles from the outset, and it gives rise 
to models that seem to be the result of quantum theory alone. The shortcomings of all 
offspring models of the above hypotheses were pointed out in Chapter 5. I think that 
the development of the unified model demonstrates an example in which the 
synthesis of existing physical intuitions takes place at the level of the defining 
hypothesis. Indeed, what seems to be a synthesis of two distinct models is in fact just 
the use of the existing mathematical representations of the different Hamiltonian 
terms, in the context of the unified model. This context however, which is dictated by 
the model’s underlying defining hypothesis, implies an alteration in the physics of the 
predecessor models. If we view the unified model as a synthesis of the two previous 
models then we fail to see the changes that take place in its physics.
In the rest of this Chapter, I want to present the unified model of nuclear structure, 
and attempt to shed some light on its process of construction. In doing so I will be 
arguing that one important element of our scientific inquiry into the world is that 
progress in the construction of representation models in a particular physical domain 
relies, to a large extent, on the explanatory and predictive successes of predecessor 
models. I will try to show how, and argue why, the unified model relies on the 
success of the single particle shell and collective models. In effect, I will be arguing 
that the use of representation models is just as vital as theory in how physical 
knowledge about a particular physical domain is accumulated. I argue that the unified 
model of nuclear structure, which is the most sophisticated model of the nucleus that 
has been constructed, synthesises all our knowledge about the nucleus, gained by the 
explanatory and predictive successes of earlier models. The arguments of Chapter 5 
that preceded the presentation of the unified model also hold for its case, this 
becomes clear in my presentation of its construction, hence there will be no need for 
detailed repetition.
In Section 6.3 I will present an account for the thought process that underlies the
construction of the unified model. It is along the lines of existing work on
idealisation, but I choose to call this process ‘the process of abstraction and
concrétisation’. I believe that this account of the process captures the ambient factors
involved in the construction of the unified model. My argument, however, is not
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confined to the unified model. I claim that representation models in general are 
constructed by abstraction and concrétisation. Consequently I am proposing a theory 
of theory-application.
6.2 The Structure of the Unified Model Hamiltonian
The unified model is the offspring of a hypothesis that combines all previous physical 
intuitions on nuclear structure. The goal is to overcome all shortcomings faced by 
earlier models. On the one hand, we know that strong interaction models are 
extremely schematic, because despite the large-strength nuclear forces the nucleons 
are expected to demonstrate some form of independent motion. In addition, strong 
interaction models are semi-classical and consequently not theoretically acceptable. 
On the other hand, (on the part of the independent particle models) the basic
assumption of the shell models is that the nuclear potential is spherically symmetric.
There is enough experimental evidence, however, to know that slow nuclear surface 
vibrations and static deformed nuclei occur, depending on the structure of the 
potential energy surface. Therefore, the single-particle orbits should depend on the 
form of the nuclear surface, that is on the spatial distribution of all nucleons. Inter 
alia this thinking led to the conclusion that there could be an interaction between 
collective and single-particle degrees of freedom, in short, to the unified model. Both 
of these kinds of modes of nuclear motion are combined linearly in the unified model 
Hamiltonian, which also involves an interaction term for the two modes;
^ T O T  ~  ^ S P  ^  ^ C O L  ^ I N T  1 )
The first Hamiltonian term is that of the single-particle modes of motion. The general 
formulation of the unified model does not require a particular specification for this 
term. For the sake of keeping the discussion simple and for keeping along the lines of 
the exposition in the preceding chapter, let me assume shell structure with spin-orbit 
coupling by letting,
H ^ = ^ T ,+ V { r „ \ , s , )  (6.2)
i
The second Hamiltonian term (in equation (6.1)) is that of the collective modes of
motion. In fact, it was briefly mentioned earlier that empirical knowledge leads to the
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conclusion that there are four kinds of nuclear collective behaviour; hence each kind 
must be manifested one way or another in this Hamiltonian term.
( 6  3)
Nuclear motion due to fission is not an explicit part of the above Hamiltonian, but the 
phenomenon derives its explanation indirectly by reference to the second and third 
terms above (the vibration term and the rotation-vibration mixture term). The last 
term is the Hamiltonian term of giant resonance that is given explicitly below and 
will be discussed in some detail shortly. Each of the above terms could be given the 
following explicit form, which are easily reducible to the form used by the 
Copenhagen school (Bohr 1952, Bohr and Mottelson 1953) for the collective model.
2
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The parameters in the equations are defined as follows. The I  and j  are the total 
angular momentum of the system and the total angular momentum of the outer 
nucleons respectively, the components of which obey the standard commutation 
rules. The %, and Pq correspond to the generalised coordinates and their derivatives, 
and 3i (for /=1, 2, 3) could be called the moments of inertia that are given above as 
functions of 3o. The qim in the giant resonance Hamiltonian term are creation and 
annihilation operators for giant multipole resonance phonons.^^^
The third Hamiltonian term is that of the interaction of the single-particle and 
collective modes. The interaction of the motions must obey certain theoretical
For a more elaborate mathematical presentation and explication of all the terms of the collective 
Hamiltonian and the collective coordinates see Eisenberg and Greiner (1970).
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restrictions. If we assume conservation of angular momentum and parity, then this 
term must be rotationally invariant and parity conserving. Furthermore, since we 
require time reversal invariance of the Hamiltonian, the kinetic energy must contain 
only products of an even number, i.e. even A, of conjugate momenta. This term can 
thus be written in the following explicit form:
( 6  8 )
I A/i i n
If we exclude higher multipole deformations in (e.g. octupole, hexadecupole etc.) 
we may write the approximate form of the Hamiltonian in terms of the quadrupole 
deformations, as given in the right-hand side of the above equation. The term 
gives the strength and radial dependence of this interaction, generally given by 
f(r)--rVQ{a^^ = 0 , r , l , s )  for a spherical shell model potential Voir, I, s), under the 
assumption that the nucleon motion is very rapid compared to the collective motion.
If we were to focus our attention only on the total Hamiltonian structure of equation 
(6 .1 ), then it is conceivable that we perceive the model as an extension of the single 
particle shell model. In other words, we could consider the second and third terms of 
the Hamiltonian as correction factors to the idealised single particle shell model, 
along the lines of McMullin’s cumulative account of de-idealisation. We could 
possibly even go as far as to claim that the correction factors are introduced on purely 
pragmatic grounds. It is also conceivable that we could invent numerous hypotheses 
that give rise to the same structure, each one giving the model a different physical 
character, of course. But the physics of the model are dictated by just one underlying 
hypothesis, without which the model cannot be understood. The physical ideas 
behind the model are tacit components of the defining hypothesis and not explicit 
features of the model. These physical ideas are not the result of systematic theoretical 
considerations. They are the development of our physical intuitions about the nuclear 
domain, moulded by the successes and failures of earlier models. In view of the fact 
that they are not validated systematically by theory, they are ad hoc considerations to 
be tried out and ultimately judged by their success. This is why considerations about 
the defining hypothesis are important.
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The hypothesis that underlies this model and gives rise to its structure is this: 
Nucleons move nearly independently in a common slowly changing non-spherical 
potential. This hypothesis is the starting point for understanding what the 
mathematical terms of the model Hamiltonian actually are. We notice that both the 
shell model hypothesis and the Fermi gas hypothesis are specific manifestations of 
the first clause in the above hypothesis, ‘nucleons move nearly independently’. In 
fact, any conceivable hypothesis that allows the nucleons to have single-particle 
degrees of freedom could be substituted for this clause of the unified model 
hypothesis. The fact that we impose shell structure to the unified model hypothesis is 
based on other additional hypotheses, which are motivated by independent reasons. In 
particular, by the fact that shell structure has been so far successful in accounting for 
single-particle degrees of freedom (the spin-orbit interaction hypothesis played an 
operative role in bringing about this success). Hence the justification for adopting a 
single particle shell model with spin-orbit coupling potential comes from reasons 
independent of the principles of quantum mechanics. This is so because it is after the 
success of the shell model that we have augmented the set of quantum mechanical 
bridge principles for the specific domain of nuclear structure. The two additional 
stock models associated with the newly established bridge principles are the Woods- 
Saxon potential and the Mayer spin-orbit coupling term.
The second component of the above hypothesis, ‘common slowly changing non- 
spherical potential’, is meant as a constraint on the independent motions of the 
nucleons. This is a departure from the collective model, which uses exactly the same 
Hamiltonian as the collective term here, but considers that to be the motion of the 
nucleus. In the unified model the nucleus as a whole exerts a collective potential that 
is non-spherical and affects, or restrains, the motion of individual nucleons. This 
clause, therefore, contains three implicit sub-clauses: ( 1 ) that there is a collective 
mode of nuclear motion which constrains the motion of individual nucleons, (2 ) that 
if the nuclear potential is to constrain the motions of individual nucleons then there 
must be an interaction between the single-particle modes with the collective modes of 
motion, (3) that if we assume the nuclear potential to change sufficiently slowly then 
we can make a physical approximation that may sanction the separation of the
nuclear motion into single-particle and collective motions.
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The character of the collective mode of nuclear motion, which constrains the motion 
of individual nucleons, must be investigated empirically since the theory does not 
provide us with this information. As already mentioned our experimental knowledge 
requires that we provide explanations for four kinds of nuclear collective behaviour, 
hence each kind must be manifested, one way or another, in this Hamiltonian term. 
The way the collective terms in equations (6.4), (6.5), (6 .6 ), (6.7), are justified are 
along the same lines as the liquid drop model, analysed in section 5.2. The Classical 
form of the Hamiltonian is established by the use of a classical description of the 
nuclear collective motion. The modes of motion of rotation, vibration and the 
interactive mode of rotation-vibration are described in terms of classical parameters 
and classical collective coordinates, along the hydrodynamic analogy, and then 
converted into their quantum mechanical analogues. It was noted that quantum 
mechanics does not provide us with rules for this conversion which remains 
theoretically unjustified and arbitrary, in the sense discussed in the previous chapter. 
The same argument holds for the relevant terms of the unified model Hamiltonian. I 
shall not repeat the process in detail here, but I shall try to briefly explicate the 
construction of the giant resonance Hamiltonian term, and in doing so I shall have to 
reiterate the argument in schematic style.
Giant resonance motion is a phenomenon first detected in 1947. It involves density
fluctuations in the nucleus that may be caused by the electric field of a coincident
photon (y-ray). The electric field of the photon acts only on the charged nucleons (i.e.
protons) and because the nuclear centre of mass has to be at rest, the neutrons move
in the opposite direction to that of the protons. Nuclei demonstrate various types of
density fluctuations. For instance a dipole fluctuation (in an assumed spherical
nucleus) involves the motion of the protons in roughly one hemisphere and of the
neutrons in the opposite hemisphere. A quadrupole density fluctuation involves the
motion of protons in two opposite quadrants of the sphere and of neutrons in the
remaining two quadrants, and so forth for higher order fluctuations. This description
of the giant resonance phenomenon is unquestionably classical. The concept of
‘fluctuation density’ is a classical concept, which conceals in it the analogy that the
protons and neutrons behave like two classical fluids. In summary form let me sketch
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the process of constructing the giant resonance Hamiltonian. We begin by using the 
hydrodynamic analogy for the fluctuation density (i.e. satisfaction of the Helmholtz 
equation and the homogeneous Neumann boundary condition) to find a general 
solution of the fluctuation density in terms of its collective coordinates. The most 
general solution to the classical time-dependent problem is an equation for the 
fluctuation density analogous to the defining equation (5.4) of the surface variables 
«A/i- From this equation, and continuing on the hydrodynamic analogy of a two-fluid 
system we determine an expression for the total energy of the system in terms of the 
collective coordinates. We then quantize the energy equation by introducing 
canonically conjugate momenta to the coordinates. And finally we define creation 
and annihilation operators for the giant multipole resonance phonons on the 
coordinates and momenta, to get the form of the Hamiltonian term in equation (6.7).
The point of this is to stress that the entire collective term of the unified model
Hamiltonian is arrived at by quantization of the respective classical equations. The
description of the collective motion is in terms of classical concepts, the modelling of
all four terms of the system (i.e. equation (6.3)) is done by means of classical models,
which are then quantized in customary, but arbitrary, ways. I have earlier used this
argument, for the case of the liquid drop model, to argue that when we construct a
representation model by using a classical description and then assign quantum
mechanical properties to the constituent parts of the model, we do this because no
stock model of quantum mechanics fits the description of the system in question. In
such cases, when we lack the systematic use of the theory in the model construction,
the construction of the model involves all the relevant background knowledge and the
process of ‘theory entry’ involves the use of rules that are not provided by the theory.
It follows that, when theory and model relate in such fuzzy ways, the only criterion
we have for the model’s acceptance is its explanatory and predictive success. This is
what it means for the model to have partial autonomy from the theory. This argument
could be used to claim the partial independence of the unified model from quantum
mechanics. However, the case of the unified model presents us with an additional
interesting question: Why is it that we break up our description of the physical system
into a quantum mechanical part (i.e. the single-particle motion) and a semi-classical
part (i.e. the collective motion)? Addressing the process of construction of such a
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sophisticated representation model (as the unified model) might shed some light on 
this question. In section 6.3, I shall attempt to give a view of the relation between 
theory and representation models that accommodates such features.
The second implicit element of the aforementioned clause is that, if the nuclear 
potential is to constrain the motions of individual nucleons then there must be an 
interaction between the single-particle modes with the collective modes of motion. 
This interaction is explicitly accounted for by the third term of equation (6.1) and 
implicitly by various components in the collective term of the Hamiltonian. The 
interaction term of the Hamiltonian is, in other words, chosen so that the assumption 
of non-sphericity is introduced into the total Hamiltonian, because a correction factor 
to the single particle shell potential that can bring about such an effect is not feasible. 
This is a departure from the shell model. The non-sphericity of the potential is 
introduced into shell structure as a consequence of the fact that single-particle and 
collective mode coupling is assumed. The single-particle Hamiltonian term, which 
represents shell structure, expresses only the individual nucleon motion. It does so, in 
an idealised way, i.e. by retaining the assumption of spherical symmetry within it. 
But spherical symmetry is not a part of the assumptions underlying the total unified 
model Hamiltonian. Often physicists talk of the deformed single particle shell model, 
but I take it that this is just convenient phraseology. What information is, in fact, 
contained in the total Hamiltonian becomes clear in a closer study of its terms. I shall 
simply give a caricature of this.
If the interaction between single-particle and collective motions is weak, we talk of
weak coupling. Such is the case for spherical nuclei, whose physics are represented in
terms of quadrupole vibrators. That is, the collective term of the total Hamiltonian
reduces to that of an oscillator, similar to the liquid drop equation (5.10), because the
potential is spherically symmetric hence rotary motion can be totally ignored. In
addition, only quadrupole deformations need be considered in the collective and
interaction terms of the Hamiltonian, since as we may recall quadrupole moments are
used to measure the deviation of the nuclear density from spherical symmetry. Thus
for weak coupling the Hamiltonian in equation (6.1) reduces to that of a quadrupole
vibrator. If this were a good representation model for all nuclei then we could speak
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of the collective and interaction terms as added correction factors to the single­
particle term of the Hamiltonian, because collective and single-particle motions in 
this model are introduced as if they function almost independently of each other. 
However, this is only a very special case of the unified model generalised 
Hamiltonian given in equation (6 . 1 ). This Hamiltonian attempts to give the general 
picture of the deformed nucleus, to which the spherical nucleus is a limiting case. 
Hence in the more general case it is assumed that the interaction between the 
collective and single-particle motions is strong, and we talk of strong coupling.
When we look into the strong coupling case, i.e. the Hamiltonian given in the
equations (6 .1 ) to (6 .8 ) above, we discern a number of features that although
separated in the different Hamiltonian terms belong to the defining hypothesis of the 
total Hamiltonian. These features, which tell us how the single-particle motion is 
associated with the non-sphericity assumption, I shall label as follows: (1) the
rotation-particle coupling (that corresponds classically to the Coriolis force), (2 ) the
vibration-particle coupling and (3) the rotation-vibration-particle coupling. To discern 
this information we must regroup our total Hamiltonian of equation (6.1) into a more 
customary form:
H tot ( 6  9)
Where, the first term corresponds to what we could call the single particle motion in a 
deformed axially symmetric potential. The second term corresponds to the rotation 
and vibration modes together with a modified rotation-vibration term. These two 
terms can now be seen as the results of two separate hypotheses whose mathematical 
representations are added linearly. The first hypothesis gives the information of a 
single nucleon undergoing motion under the influence of a spherically deformed 
potential. And the second hypothesis gives the information of a deformed nucleus 
undergoing motion together with an additional nucleon. The third term is a 
compilation of various small terms that perturb the system described by the linear 
synthesis of the above two hypotheses. We have actually regrouped the Hamiltonian
’ We could visualise this in analogy to the following classical case. The first part treats the motion of 
planet ^  in a potential field due to the rest of the solar system and the second part treats the motion of 
the entire solar system (together with planet >4) relative to a fixed coordinate system.
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in the standard form of two idealised linearly independent terms to which we add a 
perturbation term (as a set of correction factors). In most standard textbooks on 
nuclear physics, which do not emphasise the process of construction of the model, the 
unified model Hamiltonian is presented in this form. Below I include the explicit 
forms of the total Hamiltonian terms of equation (6.9) and for simplicity, I ignore the 
giant resonance term and include only the spherical harmonics associated with the 
quadrupole deformations:
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In this regrouping of the terms, it is easier to discern the various elements of the 
unified model defining hypothesis. For example, the non-sphericity of the potential is 
seen as -a correction- part of the single-particle Hamiltonian term. Yet, it is clear that 
it originates as part of the interaction term of equation (6 .8 ). In addition, the terms of 
the perturbation Hamiltonian H' may now be recognised as follows: the first term is a 
pure single-particle correction term; the second is the rotation-particle coupling; the 
third and fourth terms describe the rotation-vibration interaction, the vibration- 
particle coupling and the rotation-vibration-particle coupling; finally the last term 
gives the influence of the individual nucleon on the surface vibrations. If the total 
unified model Hamiltonian is looked at in its regrouped form of equation (6.9), then it 
is reasonable to infer that all the above interactions are correction factors to an 
idealised initial hypothesis. The regrouping of the Hamiltonian makes the unified 
model look almost like the hydrogen atom case. To build a representation model for
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the hydrogen atom, we start from a highly idealised theoretical model of quantum 
mechanics, that ironically we call the hydrogen atom model, and add a perturbation 
term (i.e. correction factors) to establish a more ‘realistic’ model of the actual 
hydrogen atom physical system. My claim, however, is that in the case of the unified 
model this position overlooks the process of construction. The construction begins 
with equation (6.1), which is a manifestation of a highly complex hypothesis that 
portrays our picture of the nucleus as it has evolved through the successes of our 
previous representation models. The fact that the terms of the total Hamiltonian can 
be regrouped in familiar ways of taxonomy only shows that we can take almost any 
Hamiltonian and express it in terms of a known term and some perturbation term. 
Although this is very useful for computational and for taxonomy purposes, it has very 
little to do with the actual process of construction. The fact that it is done indicates 
that the components of the model-defining hypothesis can be broken down and 
ordered according to their physical interpretation, and in ways that facilitate our 
computations. The conceptual character of the model-defining hypothesis however, 
which will be examined in Section 6.3, can be accurately apprehended by examining 
the actual process of construction.
Undoubtedly, the unified model is essentially a hybrid of shell model and collective 
model (liquid drop model). My question is, ‘what sort of hybrid is it?’ In regards to 
the physical conditions the unified model is closer to the shell model, that is, the 
nucleons move approximately independently rather than being strongly coupled. But 
the crucial connection between the unified model and the shell model is of an 
empirical nature, suggested by the fact that while collective motions in nuclei, to 
some extent, involve all the nucleons, the most loosely bound ones have 
proportionately the most effect. This connection is suggestive of how the unified 
model is constructed. By assuming the nuclear potential to change sufficiently slowly 
(which is the third implicit element of the aforementioned clause), we are making a 
physical approximation that sanctions the separation of the nuclear motion into 
intrinsic (i.e. single-particle) and collective motion. The first of these represents the 
motions of the nucleons in a fixed potential while the second is associated with 
variations in the shape and orientation of the nuclear field. This separation is in many
respects analogous to the separation into electronic and nuclear motion in molecules.
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What motivates this physical approximation? I think the answer to this (in addition to 
the obvious reason of being motivated by existing empirical knowledge) is primarily 
due to the surviving success of the shell and collective models. Once the intrinsic and 
collective modes of motion are separated we know we can represent the separate 
Hamiltonian terms by borrowing from the two predecessor models. So the unified 
model is a hybrid only by borrowing the mathematical representation of its separate 
terms, not by virtue of being an extension of the shell model. We can now see what 
sort of correction the interaction term in the Hamiltonian (of equation (6.1)) is. It is 
meant as an improvement for the approximation assumption that the nuclear potential 
changes slowly.
I believe that this understanding could only come by looking at the underlying 
hypothesis of the unified model. All the physical assumptions involved are contained 
in the hypothesis, not in the defined structure. If we focus solely on the structure of 
the model then any story would do. We could, for instance, look at the unified model 
and see an extension of the shell model that includes several correcting factors, which 
account for the collective modes of motion. In Chapter 3 I tried to explicate the fact 
that according to the SV, we define the intended models of the theory directly without 
recourse to formal syntax, by using the laws of the theory. But representation models 
do not belong to the class of intended models of the theory. They have ‘a life of their 
own’: their function is to extend the physical domain of application of the theory. 
Thus if we do not try to interpret them with reference to their underlying hypotheses 
we run the risk of making an epistemic mistake by reducing their physics down to the 
basic principles of the theory. This would practically be equivalent to discarding their 
physics altogether.
I have given an analysis of the hypotheses that underlie the unified model. Through
such analyses, I argue, we can discern the evolutionary history of representation
models. Since a model viewed as a mathematical structure cannot itself exhibit its
own evolutionary history, I believe to have indicated a feature of model construction
that is obscured by the SV. The above story enables us to discern one important
element of our scientific inquiry into the world; that the progress in the construction
of representation models in a particular physical domain relies, to a large extent, on
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the explanatory and predictive successes of predecessor models. This use of 
representation models indicates how physical knowledge about a particular physical 
domain is accumulated, which, in its turn, shapes the defining hypotheses of 
successor models. It is also quite evident in the unified model case that the same 
arguments I gave for the previous models also hold. The model postulates 
mechanisms, initially in ad hoc ways, that later (if successful) come to be regarded as 
established bridge principles for the special case of the nuclear domain. Together 
with the spin-orbit hypothesis, in the case of the unified model we can also argue that 
the giant resonance hypothesis is established after postulating an ad hoc mechanism. 
These, inter alia^ give the unified model its partial independence from theory and its 
explanatory power. Moreover, it is clear that the unified model is not developed by 
the use of the theoretical models of quantum mechanics, but by a complex variety of 
methods, such as building some of its pieces with classical models in mind and then 
furnishing them with quantum mechanical properties. I do not think it is necessary to 
rehearse these arguments. Instead, I would like to focus on another dimension of the 
above exposition of the unified model construction that may shed some light on a 
more accurate account of idealisation as practised in scientific theory application.
6.3 Further Remarks on Idealisation: The Process of 
Abstraction and Concrétisation
Throughout this chapter I have advanced the view that our conception of the nature of 
a physical domain is shaped by the successes and failures of our respective 
representation models. So it comes as no surprise that the unified model is a hybrid of 
two predecessor representation models of the nuclear structure. I have argued that the 
unified model is not an extension of the single particle shell model, but an offspring 
of a defining hypothesis that makes use of the physics of the latter. The description I 
have given of the unified model indicates that to construct the model we start from a 
highly complex hypothesis about the nature of the nucleus. This hypothesis expresses 
our conception of the nuclear structure. The nucleus is a complex system of a 
collection of particles, which move about independently but at the same time
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demonstrate a mode of motion as a collection, and that the two modes of motion exert 
influences on each other. It is upon this conception that our application of quantum 
mechanics in the nuclear domain rests. Evidently, different conceptions would lead to 
different representation models, i.e. different applications of the theory. This is the 
situation for the previously described cases of the liquid drop and the single particle 
shell models. We therefore need an account about theory-application that does justice 
to the variety of ways representation models are constructed, and also for the 
hypotheses that give rise to these models and manifest our conceptions of the 
physical systems. We have seen how McMullin’s idealisation/de-idealisation 
cumulative account fails to capture the way by which nuclear models are used to 
explore the nuclear domain. In this section I want to develop a more generalised 
idealisation and de-idealisation account that I will call, following Suppe (1989) and 
Cartwright (1989), the processes of abstraction and concrétisation. I shall briefly 
digress in order to clarify the need for such a terminological change, before 
attempting to elaborate this account and to explore its use in theory-application.
6.3.1 A Terminological Change: Abstraction and Concrétisation
The term ‘idealisation’ is commonly used to label the thought process involved in the 
scientific methods traced historically to the Galilean methods. The term has been 
retained in more recent discussions that focus on models in contemporary science or 
more generally on applications of t h e o r i e s , a n d  it is used to refer to concepts, 
systems, circumstances, conditions etc., which are either highly distorted descriptions 
of the real world, or descriptions from which many possibly relevant influencing 
factors have been neglected. Each for their own reasons, Cartwright and Suppe have 
both chosen to alter the terminology and speak of abstractions in science, instead of 
idealisations.
In addition to McMullin, some examples of such authors are Giere 1988, Shapere 1984, Laymon 
1985 and 1995, Morrison 1997, 1998, and forthcoming (a).
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It seems that for Cartwright the motivation for this terminological change is twofold. 
Firstly, the notion of idealisation disguises the idea of changing the particular features 
or properties of a physical system, whereas the notion of abstraction (which she traces 
back to Aristotle) is about subtracting features from the concrete circumstances. The 
second line of her motivation stems from her broader epistemological concerns. She 
argues that because idealisation is conceptualised as a change of the features of a 
concrete physical system, it follows almost naturally to speak of a ‘degree of 
departure from truth’ and consequently of a ‘notion of approximate truth’. In the case 
of the notion of abstraction, however, such expressions do not make sense, for we 
talk about a genuine subtraction of relevant f e a t u r e s . S u p p e ’s motivation for 
suggesting a terminological change relies primarily on his observation that in our 
theoretical descriptions of the phenomena there are two kinds of thought processes 
involved. The first is the case of pure abstraction, i.e. relevant factors of the concrete 
system are genuinely subtracted from our theory or model. And the second is that of 
pure idealisation where certain features of the concrete system are distorted in our 
theoretical description. In the case of pure abstractions, it is ‘causally possible’ for the 
concrete system to realise the conditions dictated by our theoretical description, e.g. it 
is causally possible to isolate in the laboratory a concrete pendulum from air 
resistance that has been abstracted from the theoretical description. In the case of pure 
idealisations, however, the situation is such that it is causally impossible for the 
concrete system to realise the distortions imposed on the theoretical description. For 
example, it is causally impossible to bring the pendulum bob to realise conditions that 
are equivalent to having no extension.
I find both Cartwright’s and Suppe’s reasoning persuasive as to conclude that the 
notion of abstraction is much more general than the notion of idealisation and as such 
captures a broader spectrum of thought processes involved in scientific activity. 
Abstractions, as genuine subtractions of influencing factors, may also imply changes 
in the features of a concrete system. However, changes of the features do not 
necessarily imply the subtraction of factors, although the term idealisation as used by
As I do not focus on general epistemological issues in this work, for my purposes 1 am inclined to 
ignore the latter motivation altogether.
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many authors is meant to designate Aristotelian abstraction too. Abstractions as 
genuine subtractions may also imply distortions of the features of the concrete 
system. However, distortions (i.e. idealisations) are only a very special kind of 
subtraction of features. These thoughts lead to the conclusion that idealisation, as 
understood in the present context, is a special form of abstraction, and not the 
converse.
But I believe there is an additional reason why the notion of abstraction can be more 
apt and useful than idealisation. It allows us to draw a distinction of how the same 
concept is used inter-theoretically (e.g. in classical mechanics and in the special 
theory of relativity) and intra-theoretically (e.g. in a kinematical sense and in a 
dynamical sense). As an example I will elaborate on the inter-theoretic use of the 
concept of a ‘rigid body’. A rigid body is defined in classical mechanics as a body for 
which the distance between any two of its parts remains invariant under rotation, 
vibration and rectilinear motion. Although no such bodies are found in nature, what is 
interesting is that classical mechanics does not impel us to the commitment that rigid 
bodies are a physical impossibility. The special theory of relativity also employs (for 
reasons that I will not attend to) the classical concept of a rigid body. But we must 
be cautious of a significant difference in the usage. In the case of the special theory of 
relativity, we are supplied with scientific grounds by which to consider the notion of 
a rigid body referring to a ‘fictitious’ entity, i.e. a physical impossibility. Given the 
above classical definition of the concept, if a force is applied to a body, in order for it 
to remain rigid, the force must be transmitted instantaneously to all its parts. For this 
to happen, the force must be transmitted with infinite velocity. The special theory of 
relativity, as is well known, does not allow the transmission of energy and 
momentum, and consequently forces, with velocity greater than that of the velocity of 
light in vacuum. Hence, in order to avoid the apparent contradiction we must settle 
with holding the classical concept of a rigid body as a fictitious entity, although the 
concept is useful in the exposition of the theory whose fundamental principle it 
contradicts.
Shapere (1984) gives a very interesting analysis o f how the concept of a rigid body is employed in 
the special theory of relativity, and contrasts it to its use in rigid body mechanics.
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In the terminology of idealisations we are forced to call both uses of the ‘rigid body’ 
concept idealisations. Yet the uses of the concept in the two theories are distinctly 
different. We need to clarify how they differ or else change our terminology to one 
that contains the clarification within it. I think the terminology of ‘abstractions’ does 
contain clarifications of this kind within it. To arrive at the definition of a rigid body, 
in the classical usage of the concept we abstract features and properties of concrete 
bodies, thus distorting the phenomena. That is, our abstraction is of the special case 
of a pure idealisation but only by virtue of the fact that we have not found such 
bodies in nature, not because classical mechanics prohibits their existence. In the 
relativistic usage of the classical notion of ‘rigid body’ however, we employ an 
approximate definition of a relativistic analogue concept. The classical sense of ‘rigid 
body’ is according to the special theory of relativity not an idealisation, but referring 
to a fictitious entity. It is used only for the convenient exposition of the theory. In fact 
we could instead employ a relativistically consistent definition of a rigid body, such 
as, being a body in which the maximum velocity that impulses could be transmitted is 
the speed of light. This relativistic sense of a rigid body is now an abstraction within 
the special theory of relativity in the same way as the classical notion is an 
abstraction within classical mechanics. It is, what Suppe would have called, a pure 
idealisation by virtue of the fact that we have not observed such bodies (and possibly 
they do not exist) with a dielectric constant equal to 1, and not because the theory 
prohibits their existence. So, it may be said, both classical and relativistic ‘rigid body’ 
concepts are idealisations. But this is only the case relative to the theory in which 
they are used. Without such qualification the terminology of ‘idealisations’ is 
inaccurate. Because, according to the special theory of relativity the relativistic notion 
is an idealisation and the classical notion is scientifically fictional. We must somehow 
distinguish the two without reference to the theory in which they are used, and the 
terminology of idealisations does not help. With the terminology of abstractions this 
inter-theoretic distinction comes naturally. The relativistic concept is formed by 
several abstractions but the classical notion involves an additional abstraction of a 
property that happens to be in violation of a fundamental principle of the special 
theory of relativity: namely, the theoretical feature of the maximum limit to the
velocity of transmission of impulses is subtracted.
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Having expressed my rationale for changing the terminology from the ‘process of 
idealisation’ to that of the ‘process of abstraction’, I also want to give my reasoning 
for changing the terminology for the converse process of de-idealisation. De­
idealisation is the term commonly given to the process of bringing a theoretical 
description closer to the occurrences in an actual physical system. In sub-section 
5.3.2 I analysed McMullin’s de-idealisation account as a view of how theories are 
applied to the phenomena. I emphasised the fact that it involves the cumulative 
introduction of correction factors to our initial model about a physical system. The 
key features of this account are two, that the introduction is cumulative and that the 
correction factors are dictated by the conceptual resources of the scientific theory that 
gives rise to the initial model. In sub-section 5.3.2 I argued against the second feature, 
by claiming that the spin-orbit hypothesis is not dictated by any theory. Shortly I will 
try to argue against the generality of the first feature of this account. To do this it is 
convenient, when we talk about this process, to think about it as incorporating 
features into the abstract description given by our model such as to turn it into a more 
concrete description. Incorporating more features to construct a more concrete 
version of our model may be done by the cumulative introduction of influencing 
factors, as is the case of the simple pendulum. However, I have already argued that 
for the case of the unified model we incorporate concrete features by synthesising 
them in the model-defining hypothesis. This synthesis cannot be viewed as a 
cumulative process, and since the terminology of de-idealisations has become 
customary for the cases where we make changes (understood as addenda to the 
Hamiltonian operator or the force function) to the model to bring it progressively 
closer to the truth, I prefer to drop the talk about de-idealisations altogether. As a 
substitute I shall use the term concrétisation of the model, which I believe captures 
the synthesis of the various concrete ingredients convoluted in the model-defining 
hypothesis, without implying the commitment that the concrete features originate 
within the conceptual resources of the theory.
In addition, the limiting case of de-idealisation is traditionally understood as the
introduction of all the factors that the theory suggests for the improvement of the
representation capacity of our model. The term ‘concrétisation’, however, should be
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understood as referring to the representation model itself, not the theory. The limiting 
case of concrétisation of representation models is, of course, the inclusion of all 
factors that are present and active in the physical system. Hence, both the inclusions 
of factors motivated by theoretical considerations, and those motivated by 
experimental considerations count as concrétisations of the model. This terminology, 
therefore, abides to my view that representation models have a degree of autonomy 
from the theory that gives rise to them.
6.3.2 The Process of Abstraction and Concrétisation
The process of abstraction in scientific theorising enters at different levels. I want to 
identify two principal levels of abstraction that are useful to our understanding of 
how theories are applied. Assuming that we begin with the universe of discourse, the 
first level of abstraction I want to distinguish is that of selecting a small number of 
variables and parameters abstracted from the phenomena and used to characterise the 
general laws of a theory. For example, in classical mechanics we select position and 
momentum and establish a relation amongst the two variables, which we call 
Newton’s 2"  ^ law or Hamilton’s equations. We have no justifiable reasons to 
eliminate the possibility that the kinematics and dynamics of bodies are influenced by 
factors that are related, for example, to electrical or heat phenomena. By abstracting a 
set of parameters we thus create a sub-domain of the universe of discourse, which we 
call a scientific theory. Thus Newton’s laws signify a conceptual object of study that 
we may call the domain of classical mechanics, as long as we distinguish it from 
having any direct reference to physical domains. Similarly Maxwell’s equations 
signify the domain of classical electromagnetism, the Schrodinger equation signifies 
the domain of quantum theory, and so forth. In all these laws (which we may call 
abstract, in the sense that they are established by a small number of abstracted 
parameters) something is left unspecified: the force function in Newton’s 2"  ^ law, the 
electric and magnetic field vectors in Maxwell’s equations, and the Hamiltonian 
operator in the Schrodinger equation. We understand that the specification of these is 
what would establish the link between the assertions of the theory and physical 
systems.
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So far, my description may seem indistinguishable from Suppe’s Semantic View 
version. The distinguishing elements lie in the process of specification of the force 
function or the Hamiltonian operator. Suppe maintains, along with all the proponents 
of the SV, that this specification is along the lines of a definition. For instance, we are 
confronted with a real pendulum that we want to model via Newton’s 2"  ^ law. We 
know that we can define the mathematical form of the force function to be 
proportional to the displacement of an oscillating body from its equilibrium position. 
This defined force function is associated with a model that resembles some of the 
features of our real pendulum. The resemblance of these features, Suppe claims, is 
grounded in what he calls the abstract and idealised replicating relation (that we may 
recall from chapter 3). The defined model is an abstract and idealised replica of the 
real pendulum. The question as to how we could increase the degree of resemblance 
of our model to the real pendulum is practically meaningless for his view. All we 
need to do is define a new force function that accounts for more features of the real 
pendulum and thus minimise the gap of the replicating relation between the model 
and the real pendulum. Suppe’s theory of abstraction stops here because he makes the 
same assumption as van Fraassen, that the conceptual resources of the theory are all 
that is necessary in applying the theory and all that is used in constructing 
representation models.
I have been arguing all along that this is not enough. We need a view of theory- 
application that can accommodate our constructions of representation models. For 
this we need to expand our understanding of the process of abstraction to also 
explicate the process of specifying force functions and Hamiltonian operators. This is 
the second principal level at which abstraction enters in our theorising and in which I 
am mostly interested; it is effective in allowing us to relate the assertions of the 
theory to physical systems. Assume that we begin with a formulated theory, such as 
quantum mechanics, in which case the starting point is the Schrodinger equation:
= -H y/ . When we are faced with the problem of applying the Schrodinger
equation to a particular physical system, we are in fact facing the problem of 
specifying a Hamiltonian operator for the representation of the system. The
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specification of the Hamiltonian operator relies on our conception of the particular 
physical system, which is expressed in a model-defining hypothesis. Our hypotheses 
can be such that we can specify Hamiltonian operators in two distinct ways. The first 
way is to specify a Hamiltonian straight out of the list of stock models of quantum 
mechanics. The second way, however, requires the use of background knowledge 
about the physical system from wherever we can gather it, and is subject to 
continuous development.
If we use one of the stock models of quantum mechanics to represent the system, in 
effect we make a hypothesis about the physical system that involves an assemblage of 
abstractions. Not many systems (if any) in the real world behave like potential wells 
or harmonic oscillators, or the like. Therefore, our hypothesis is asserted in a 
counterfactual way: given that these factors are abstracted from the physical system, 
the system will behave as a harmonic oscillator. In other words, the formulation of 
the hypothesis forecasts what factors should be later reintroduced to improve the 
representation capacity of the Hamiltonian operator. What is usually done in quantum 
mechanics, is to add a perturbation (correction) term to the initial Hamiltonian. 
Sometimes this perturbation term is dictated by systematic theoretical considerations, 
but this is not always the case. Other times we have to search for corrective terms by 
using our physical insight into the particular physical domain, and quantum 
mechanics does not always play a central role in this exploration. The single particle 
shell model is a case where our initial hypothesis allows the use of a stock model, and 
forecasts what abstractions (e.g. spherical symmetry) must be overcome in order to 
concretise the model and consequently improve its representation capacity. Quantum 
theory, however, does not suggest ways by which to deal with the spherical symmetry 
that the hypothesis imposes and neither does it suggest how to account for inter­
nucleon interactions. These concrétisations to the single particle shell model 
Hamiltonian have to come from theory-independent considerations. The spin-orbit 
coupling brings, at least partially, these desired effects.
Cartwright (1989, pp202-206) has addressed the processes of abstraction and 
concrétisation as a theory-application view of the above kind and suggested the
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following a c c o u n t L e t  7* be the defining hypothesis of factor H, which in a 
realistic description R  is functionally related to factors Pj, and Sj, ...,Sk. We
could think of the P ,’s as the primary factors of influence on H  and the Si's as the 
secondary factors of influence. The process begins with formulating an abstract 
hypothesis of the following form:
If R{x) and S^{x)-0 , , S^{x) = 0,
then H{x) = f{P^{x\ ...
The statement says that if we abstract all the secondary factors of influence from the 
realistic description, then H  would be functionally related only to the primary factors 
of influence. The step by step process of concrétisation of our hypothesis, that would 
improve the representation capacity of our model, involves the gradual addition of the 
secondary factors. A first step concrétisation would be the following:
If R{x) and = 0, ... , = 0, and S^{x)^0 ,
then H{x) = g ,_ \f{P ,{x \ ... ,P„(x)), /?,%(%))]
The new relation gk.j, between H  and its influencing factors, is functional of the 
previous one /  plus the function hk, which expresses the impact of Sk on the 
magnitude of H. If we carry this process to the limiting case of final concrétisation, 
where all the subtracted factors are introduced, we are left with a statement of the 
following form, in which the impact of all secondary factors on the magnitude of H  is 
included in the final functional relation:
r°: If R(x) and ..., S,^(x)#0, then
f^ix) = go[f(Pi(x), ... K(S,(x)l ... , &,%(%))]
This concrétisation account avoids the two problems faced by McMullin’s de­
idealisation account. Firstly, it does not imply that the correction factors are
Cartwright attributes this account to Leszek Nowak. I reproduce the suggestion from Cartwright 
(1989, p204) in a slightly altered notation, more suitable for my purposes.
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introduced in a cumulative manner, in fact they all exert some impact in the overall 
functional relation which implies that their impact could also come from their mutual 
interactions. Secondly, we may assume that these factors are causally influential on H  
but not necessarily described by the theory’s conceptual apparatus. Yet despite the 
improvement over McMullin’s view, this account is a simplification of the conceptual 
process of abstraction and concrétisation and does not capture the more general form 
of theory-application we encounter in examples of the second kind. It shares with 
McMullin’s view the weakness of being what I choose to call a ‘one-dimensional’ 
account of concrétisation, or de-idealisation, of model construction.
The second way by which to specify a Hamiltonian and apply quantum theory, which 
the unified model exemplifies, is far more intricate. Through the successes of earlier 
models in accounting for different properties of the nucleus, our conception of the 
nuclear structure has become progressively more detailed. We now have a far more 
‘realistic’ description of the nucleus, and we also know how to model it 
mathematically. As a consequence, the hypothesis that specifies the Hamiltonian, 
associated with the model, has a relatively concrete form. The unified model 
hypothesis asserts that the nucleus exhibits some form of independent nucleon 
motion, but that this motion is constrained by a slow collective motion of a core of 
nucleons, and that the two modes of motion interact with each other. In addition it 
asserts that the collective mode of motion is constituted by three distinct kinds of 
motion (vibration, rotation and giant resonance), two of which demonstrate an 
interaction mode. No doubt, a number of factors in our description of the nucleus are 
abstracted, for instance we still talk of a core of nucleons that do not demonstrate 
independent motion. In its entirety, this is however a relatively concrete hypothesis, 
and thus it does not fit the above logical schema suggested by Cartwright and Nowak.
The case of the unified model is one where the hypothesis asserted is not in its
entirety in a highly abstract form. It involves many of the significant features of the
nuclear structure that are present in our description of the physical system.
Nevertheless, in specifying a Hamiltonian we abstract by dividing these features into
three separate terms (recall equation (6.1)), as if their contribution to the behaviour of
the nucleus is distinct and autonomous. This procedure is very frequent in modelling
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in physics, but we must recognise that it is only a conceptual division. The three 
terms in the unified model Hamiltonian are not meant to act disjointedly nor to 
represent separately, we impel the division by abstracting. The abstraction involved is 
the foundation of the counterfactual assertion, implied by the Hamiltonian, that the 
overall nuclear motion is as if it receives contributions from distinct and autonomous 
influencing factors. This way by which abstraction is used in our modelling must be 
reflected in our logical schema of abstraction and concrétisation. Thus making our 
logical schema more general (‘multi-dimensional’, as I suggest to call it) as to 
account for cases where the hypothesis is asserted in a rather concrete form.
After we have settled this point we can see where the process of concrétisation 
becomes operative. Concrétisation is involved in bringing every individual term of 
the Hamiltonian closer to reality, as if it functions alone. And also in bringing closer 
to reality the interacting terms, thus compensating for the assumption that the 
separate terms are disjoint and autonomous. So the process of concrétisation in the 
unified model involves the addition of all the factors that are considered functional in 
the individual Hamiltonian terms of single-particle mode, collective mode, and 
interactive mode of motion. As schematised by Cartwright concrétisation does not 
capture these functions. The logical schema I want to suggest, to capture this thought 
process, is an extended multi-dimensional version of Cartwright’s and Nowak’s 
account and is as follows:
If R(x) and ^„(x) = 0, ... , (x) = 0, , S^^(x) = 0, and if P^ {^x),
act on the physical system autonomously from ..., (x), then
H{x) = f,(P„(x), ... ,/;,(x )) + /,(P „(x ), ... ,P,^(x)) + ... +fs(Ps,{x),  ... ,P*(x))
The statement says that in a realistic description i? of a physical system we 
abstract in two distinct ways. Firstly we abstract by categorising the factors of 
influence into primary. P ’s, and secondary. S's, and by subtracting all the secondary 
factors of influence from our initial theoretical description. Secondly we abstract by 
grouping the primary factors into separate te rm s,/’s, each of which is assumed to act 
autonomously on the physical system, and by categorising the secondary factors into
206
their corresponding groups. Then H  would be the sum of terms, each of which is 
functionally related only to different primary factors of influence. The step by step 
process of concrétisation of our hypothesis, that would improve the representation 
capacity of our model, involves the gradual addition of the secondary factors related 
with each and every one of the individual Hamiltonian terms. A first step 
concrétisation would be the following;
and *S'i,(x) = 0, ... = and and if
(%), ... , act on the physical system autonomously from 7 ,^(%), ... ,
then //(x )  = / ( / ; , (x), ... + ... + ... ,P„,(x)), /!„^(5„^(x))]
+ + /« (^ iW . W )
Where I have just added the influence of just one secondary factor {So^ in just one of 
the Hamiltonian terms igafi-i)- This goes only to show that concrétisation factors are 
added only to individual Hamiltonian terms, it does not portray the actual practice in 
science, where concrétisation factors may be added simultaneously or after 
significant theoretical and experimental developments. It must be noted that this 
logical schema allows for the regrouping of the Hamiltonian terms, as well as for the 
introduction of new terms as correction factors or as addenda. In other words, it 
allows for radical improvements to representation models in a particular physical 
domain that usually come about after a breakthrough is accomplished. Hence, I 
suggest that we view the move from the single particle shell and collective models to 
the unified model in this manner. A final concretised assertion would have the 
following form:
If i?(x) and ... , # 0, and if
(x), ... ,P„,„(x) act on the physical system autonomously from P^i(x), ... ,P^,(x), 
then f l ' ( x )  = g ,o [ / i ( /^ i ( x ) ,  ... ,/^^(x)), / j , , ( 5 „ ( x ) ) ,  . . . ,  / î,« (5 ',« (x ) ) ]  +
■■■ ••• . + ■■■ +
g6oUsiPs\i^), ■■■ h s , { S s , ( x ) \  . . . .  h ^ (S s^ {x )) \
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The final statement 7^^  says that in a theoretical description of a physical system, in 
which all known factors of influence that were initially abstracted from the realistic 
description R are now reintroduced, we have an expression that breaks down the 
impact of all influencing factors into several terms each of which is assumed to act 
autonomously on the physical system. I believe that this account captures well the 
construction process of the unified model Hamiltonian. It also points to how we break 
up our description of the physical system into a quantum mechanical part (i.e. the 
single-particle motion) and a semi-classical part (i.e. the collective motion), and come 
up with a Hamiltonian operator that combines these non-dictated by quantum theory 
features. Subsequently it sheds some light on how representation models relate to the 
theory. Moreover, it explicates one other important element of actual model 
construction. Each different term of the Hamiltonian carries its own separate, and 
frequently independent, assumptions. It is in my opinion a mistake to regard these as 
assumptions of the total Hamiltonian. Spherical symmetry, for example, is an 
abstraction of the single-particle term of the total unified model Hamiltonian. The 
constraint of sphericity is relaxed in the collective term, hence the abstraction in the 
single-particle term is a residue that ‘haunts’ our model. This is one reason why in 
section 5.3.2, I criticised the traditional view of de-idealisation because it is a 
partially ordered process. Indeed, concrétisation, as I suggest it functions, involves 
leaps from one Hamiltonian term to the next, each correction belongs to the term in 
which it applies, it is too simplistic to view different Hamiltonian terms as corrections 
to another. Science is not carried out in an ideal world, hence ready-made recipes for 
constructing representation models are absent from the scientist’s cookbook. The 
only criterion for the success of the model is its explanatory and predictive power, 
and as philosophers we should reconstruct the scientific activity as such.'^^
Finally, it is important that we distinguish between the procedure of abstraction and 
the decision of what factors are to be abstracted. The procedure of abstraction I
Notice that the issue of approximation can be accommodated within this account by introducing 
approximate values for the influencing factors, thus yielding a concretised and approximate 
hypothesis. Of course, adjusting a theory of abstraction and concrétisation with considerations on 
approximation, is an issue that must be the subject of more careful and detailed work.
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suggest, is an explication and description of a thought process that takes place in 
model construction. It is thus a philosophical rational reconstruction, that is to say a 
simulacrum, of certain elements of scientific activity. The decision as to what factors 
are to be abstracted is part of scientific activity per se. Amongst other things, the 
latter involves theoretical competence, rich and sound experience in the application of 
a theory to a particular physical domain, and possibly complex inductive techniques. 
In making this distinction I, therefore, distinguish my suggested account from work 
on questions of how abstractions or idealisations are used in science. Questions, 
that is, which draw feedback from idealised manipulations of theories in theory- 
application procedures. Instead, my questions are oriented around what abstractions 
(or idealisations, if you like) are and what kinds of abstractions are employed in the 
constructions of scientific theories and representation models, and finally how do we 
confront the question of how theories propounded as abstractions or idealisations may 
be related to phenomena. My motivation stems from understanding scientific theories 
propounded as abstractions, thus my philosophical worries are concerned with how 
we establish reasonable links of such theories with the more concrete tools of 
scientific inquiry, i.e. representation models, and subsequently relate them to the 
phenomena. In this quest, my starting point was Suppe and Cartwright, from whose 
work it is apparent that I draw. But for different reasons that I hope to have made 
clear, I find their work inadequate to capture the complexity of this relation.
6.4 Conclusion
I have tried to show how the unified model of nuclear structure is constructed. I hope 
to have demonstrated the partial autonomy from theory the model has. A feature 
which, following Morrison, I attribute to the explanatory and predictive success of the 
model itself, but also on the fact that its construction relies heavily on the explanatory 
and predictive success of the single particle shell model and the collective model. I 
have also tried to show that the construction of representation models, especially
See in particular Giere 1988a, Shapere 1984, McMullin 1985, Laymon 1985, 1995, Morrison 1997, 
1998, and forthcoming (a); these are of course authors from whose work I draw heavily.
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those of high complexity as the unified model, are not a matter of definition as the 
proponents of the SV would have it. In fact if we look at them as defined structures, 
then we must recognise that they are subject to a defining hypothesis. The latter is a 
manifestation of our conception of the particular physical system or of the elements 
of a particular physical domain. As such, it is always subject to change as our 
knowledge of the domain improves; moreover, this improvement in knowledge goes 
hand in hand with the successes and failures of representation models.
Obviously the process of constructing a representation model is a complex activity, 
far more complex than what formalistic analyses of scientific theories, like the SV, 
seem to suggest. Surely it is not a process of having a theory completely laid out and 
just choosing the model of the theory we want to test. The models of the theory play a 
heuristic role in many different steps of the representation model construction, but so 
do other subsidiary hypotheses about the physical system. But, this is all the models 
of the theory do; the final construction, as Morrison puts it, has a life of its own. Its 
explanatory power is what we must recognise. The explanatory and predictive power 
of the unified model accounts for and corroborates the principles of quantum 
mechanics, but also for the subsidiary hypotheses about our conception of the 
physical system that played a vital role in the construction.
I have also tried to give a general philosophical account of the construction of 
representation models, what I have called the process of abstraction and 
concrétisation. This account suggests a direction of how we should think of the 
relation between theory and representation model. If the account is a worthwhile 
explication of the process of model construction, then it could guide us to look for a 
better theory of representation than the ones suggested by the proponents of the SV. It 
also could direct us in how to improve on our theories of confirmation. But these are 
issues for fiiture detailed work.
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